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PREFACE 
Like many other historians of science, I began my 
undergraduate education as a science major--physics, in my 
case--and subsequently discovered that the conceptual 
development of my field was more interesting to me than the 
current state of research. Uncertain about my future 
career plans, I taught secondary science and mathematics 
for a few years. During this time my interest in the 
history of science continued to grow, and the interaction 
between science and religion became the primary focus of 
that interest. With the advice and encouragement of 
Professor Richard Rosen, who had first exposed me to the 
history of science at Drexel, I decided to pursue a 
graduate degree in the Department of History and Philosophy 
of Science at Indiana University. 
I have never regretted that decision. The faculty at 
Indiana grounded me solidly in the history and 
historiography of science, raised my sights, corrected some 
of my deficiencies, and tolerated my idiosyncracies. 
Without their patience and expertise, my life would be far 
poorer today. I would like to thank them for supporting my 
first year of study with an Indiana University Fellowship, 
without which I could not have embarked on what has been 
for me a great adventure. 
Any list of contributors to this dissertation must 
vi 
begin with Richards. Westfall, who took to heart the 
responsibilities he assumed in accepting me as a student. 
His books and lectures on the personalities, ideas, and 
institutions of the scientific revolution have been a 
powerful influence on my own understanding of that period. 
His expert guidance, constant encouragement, and profound 
literary instincts have helped this project come to 
fruition. If he had done half as much for me, he would 
have done more than enough. 
Other members of my doctoral committee have also 
contributed to this project. Edward Grant, whose 
familiarity with medieval science is second to none, 
steered me through the deep waters of Aristotelian natural 
philosophy after the Condemnation of 1277. Gerald Strauss 
lent his considerable expertise in religious history and, 
going well beyond the call of duty, intelligently 
criticized each chapter as it was written. And Frederick 
Churchill, more than anyone else, taught me the meaning of 
historiography. Noretta Koertge, though not a member of my 
committee, helped me revise my dissertation proposal and 
was always happy to talk about my research. Another 
"outsider," James s. Preuss, read drafts of three chapters. 
For roughly a generation, historians of science have 
witnessed a debate within their discipline between 
"internalist" and "externalist" approaches to 
historiographical issues. No doubt some will describe this 
vii 
dissertation as "internalist" because I argue from the 
perspective of intellectual history, while others will call 
my work "externalist" because I look "outside" of science, 
to theology, for an ultimate explanation. Though I do not 
object to these labels~~' I reject the debate with 
which they are associated--! have no reason to assume that 
the one kind of explanation is intrinsically better than 
the other. I would prefer that this work, and all others, 
be judged on its own merits and deficiencies, without 
regard to such historiographical biases. Several scholars 
have evaluated some of my ideas in this spirit, and I would 
like to acknowledge them here: Dwight Bozeman, William J. 
Courtenay, Gary Deason, Richard Greaves, and David c. 
Lindberg. Margaret J. Osler, whose work closely parallels 
my own, has been gracious and helpful. Because she has 
written so thoroughly about Gassendi and Charleton, I did 
not include them in my project. Her work on Descartes is 
just as good, but does not make my own work superfluous. 
A project of this magnitude could not have been 
completed without the assistance of cooperative and 
knowledgeable librarians. The staff of the reference desk 
at the Indiana University Library and their colleagues in 
the rare book room of the Lilly Library all meet this 
description. They have been, at all times, courteous and 
thoroughly professional. Barbara Halpern deserves special 
mention for promptly purchasing several dissertations at my 
viii 
request. 
In recent years the history of science, like other 
areas in the humanities, has suffered from a sharp decline 
in the amount of funds available to support research. The 
appearance of any new sources of support is therefore all 
the more significant. In 1980 the Charlotte w. Newcombe 
Foundation began to fund dissertations dealing with the 
influence of religious values on society. I would like to 
commend the Newcombe Foundation for viewing science as a 
part of society and for making grants to graduate students 
in the history of science. As a recipient of a 
Dissertation Year Fellowship for 1983-84, I would like 
personally to acknowledge their generous support, without 
which the completion of this dissertation would have been 
greatly delayed. 
Finally I want to thank my wife, Kathy, whose 
emotional and financial support made it possible for me to 
spend five years in Bloomington working toward a goal which 
often seemed elusive and distant. I owe her a debt far too 
great to be repaid simply by dedicating this essay, with 
love, to her. 
Bloomington, IN 
30 July 1984 
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CREATION, CONTINGENCY, AND EARLY MODERN SCIENCE: 
THE IMPACT OF VOLUNTARISTIC THEOLOGY 
ON SEVENTEENTH CENTURY NATURAL PHILOSOPHY 
ABSTRACT 
Could God have made it true that 2 + 2 = 5? Was he 
bound to make the best of all possible worlds? Is he able 
at this moment to alter the course of nature, either in 
whole or in part? Questions like these are often 
associated with medieval theology, not with early modern 
science. But science is done by people, and people have 
not always practiced the rigorous separation of science and 
theology that has come to characterize the modern world. 
Although many 17th century scientists sought validity for 
their work apart from revelation, divorcing science from 
religion was something they never intended. Indeed most 
natural philosophers of the scientific revolution assumed 
without question that the world and the human mind had been 
created by God. This was no small admission, for it meant 
that both the manner in which and the degree to which the 
world could be understood depended upon how God had acted 
in creating it and how he continued to act in sustaining 
it. Fifty years ago the late British philosopher M.B. 
Foster identified two different theologies of creation 
which differ profoundly in their implications for natural 
science. Rationalist theology, which assigns to God the 
activity of pure reason, "involves both a rationalist 
X 
philosophy of nature and a rationalist theory of knowledge 
of nature." Voluntarist theology, which "attributes to God 
an activity of will not wholly determined by reason," 
implies that the products of his creative activity are 
contingent and can be known only empirically. By a careful 
analysis of four natural philosophies of the early modern 
period--those of Galileo, Descartes, Boyle, and Newton--! 
intend to show that there was indeed a connection between 
theological voluntarism and empirical science in the 17th 
century. 
xi 
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INTRODUCTION: 
TESTING THE FOSTER THESIS 
Creative activity in God, material substance in nature, 
empirical methods in natural science--how closely each of 
these involves the other is made clear by an examination of 
almost any of the great philosophies of the modern period. 
A defect in the philosophical conception of God is 
reflected in corresponding defects both in the doctrine of 
nature and in the theory of natural science. Thus it is a 
mark of the philosophy of the Rationalist tradition that it 
is unable wholly to digest the un-Greek element in the 
Christian theology according to which God is endowed with a 
voluntary activity in the creation of the world. 
--Michael B. Foster, Mind 43 (1934), pp. 465f 
The one God, the first and only Deity, both Creator and 
Lord of all, had nothing coeval with Himself, not infinite 
chaos, nor measureless water or solid earth, nor dense air, 
nor warm fire, nor refined spirit, nor the azure canopy of 
the stupendous firmament. But He was One, alone in 
Himself. By an exercise of His will He created things that 
are, which antecedently had no existence, except that He 
willed to make them. 
--Hippolytus, The Refutation of All Heresies (ca. 230 AD) 
[With regard to omnipotence,] the doctrine of Moses 
differed from that of Plato and of all the Greeks who have 
correctly approached the study of Nature. For Moses, God 
has only to will to bring matter into order, and matter is 
ordered immediately. We do not think that way~ we say that 
certain things are impossible by nature and these God does 
not even attempt~ he only chooses the best among the things 
that come about. 
--Galen, On the Uses of the Parts xi, 14 (ca. 190 AD) 
2 
"The relation of science to religion in the 
seventeenth century," writes Richards. Westfall, is "the 
central problem in the history of modern Western thought."l 
With this bold assertion I cannot but concur, yet I must 
reject the terms in which it is couched. To be sure, the 
impact of science on religion in the seventeenth century 
was significant, as Westfall himself has documented so 
well, yet religion, not science, held the dominant position 
in seventeenth century Europe. The implied question ought 
to be turned around: What was the relation of religion to 
science in the seventeenth century? 
Sociological aspects of this question have been the 
subject of a great body of scholarly research, much of it 
devoted to the influence of Puritanism on scientific 
activity in England. A survey of this work--even a survey 
of surveys--would consume far too much space to justify its 
inclusion here and, in fact, would lead us away from the 
issue I intend to explore. Suffice it to say that the 
relation of religion to science, when understood in social, 
economic, and political terms, remains unclear, perhaps due 
to the sheer weight of the evidence which needs to be 
explained. The definitive account, if such is possible, 
1. This remark is found in the preface to the second (1973) 
edition of Science and Religion in Seventeenth-Century 
England (New Haven: Yale UP), which was first published in 1958. 
3 
has yet to be written.2 
The relation of religion to science can also be 
approached from the standpoint of intellectual history: 
though religion and science are a great deal more than 
systems of thought, they are not less. Edwin Arthur Burtt 
and Alexandre Koyre, those distinguished students of the 
history of ideas, both showed that early modern science 
contained a non-trivial metaphysical dimension which often 
rested explicitly on a strong theological base.3 As Koyre 
2. Pioneering efforts to provide a sociological account of 
the relation between religion and science include 
A. de Candolle, Histoire des sciences et des savants 
(Geneva, 1873): Dorothy Stimson, "Puritanism and the New 
Philosophy in Seventeenth Century England," Bulletin of the 
Institute of the History of Medicine 3 (1935), 321-34: and 
Robert K. Merton, "Science, Technology and Society in 
Seventeenth-Century England," Osiris 4 (1938), 360-632. 
For an overview of the current state of the argument, see 
Gary A. Abraham, "Misunderstanding the Merton Thesis," Isis 
74 (1983), 368-87: Richard L. Greaves, "Puritanism and 
Science: The Anatomy of a Controversy," JHI 30 (1969), 
345-68: A. Rupert Hall, "Merton Revisited or Science and 
Society in the Seventeenth Century," History of Science 2 
(1963), 1-16: J.R. Jacob and M.C. Jacob, "Seventeenth 
Century Science and Religion: The State of the Argument," 
History of Science 14 (1976), 196-207: Douglas s. Kemsley, 
"Relgious Influences in the Rise of Modern Science: A 
Review and Criticism, Particularly of the 'Protestant-
Puritan Ethic' Theory," Annals of Science 24 (1968), 
199-226: Theodore K. Rabb, "Puritanism and the Rise of 
Experimental Science in England," Cahiers d'histoire 
mondiale 7 (1962), 46-67, and "Religion and the Rise of 
Modern Science," Past and Present 31 (1965), 111-26: and 
P.M. Rattansi, "Science and Religion in the Seventeenth 
Century," in The Emergence of Science in Western Europe, 
ed. Maurice Crosland (London: Macmillan, 1976), pp. 79-88. 
3. See Burtt, The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern 
Physical Science (2nd ed.: London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
1932): and Koyre, From the Closed World to the Infinite 
Universe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1957) and Newtonian 
Studies (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1965). 
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once put it, "The God of a philosopher and his world are 
correlated."4 Most natural philosophers of the early 
modern period believed without question that the world and 
the human mind had been created by the omnipotent God of 
the Judeo-Christian tradition. For them, both the manner 
in which and the degree to which the universe could be 
understood depended on how God had acted in creating it and 
how he continued to act in sustaining it, profound 
theological questions indeed. Over the centuries Christian 
theologians, though reaching a consensus on the reality and 
goodness of the creation, have differed widely on the 
precise nature of the created order. The spectrum of views 
is bounded at one end by the Greek notion of 
intelligibility via participation in pre-existing 
archetypal forms and, at the other end, by the biblical 
notion of the inscrutability of God's arbitrary acts.5 
Thus the Christian doctrine of creation is a dialectic 
between God's unconstrained will, which utterly transcends 
the bounds of human comprehension, and God's orderly 
intellect, which serves as the model for the human mind. 
This is commonly referred to as the distinction between the 
4. From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe, p. 100. 
5. See the introduction to Creation: The Impact of an Idea, 
ed. Daniel O'Connor and Francis Oakley (New York: 
Scribner's, 1969), pp. 1-12: and Georges Florovsky, "The 
Idea of Creation in Christian Philosophy," in Creation and 
Redemption (Collected Works, Vol. 3: Belmont, Mass.: 
Nordland, 1976), pp. 43-78. 
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absolute and the ordinary power of God.6 Individual 
thinkers typically acknowledge that God has both will and 
reason, but usually emphasize one at the expense of the 
other. The question I wish to explore in this essay is 
inspired by this dialectic: Within the thought of an 
individual seventeenth century natural philosopher, is 
there a link between his theology of creation and his 
philosophy of nature? 
Fifty years ago the late British philosopher Michael 
B. Foster undertook a detailed investigation of the 
implications of Christian theology for the enterprise of 
natural science.7 Among his many claims, some more 
plausible than others, Foster argued that "the method of 
natural science depends upon the presuppositions which are 
held about nature, and the presuppositions about nature 
[depend] in turn upon the doctrine of God." Foster 
identified two basic attitudes toward God which, he argued, 
differ substantially in their implications for scientific 
methodology. Rationalist theology "is the doctrine that 
the activity of God is an activity of reason." Since "God 
6. William J. Courtenay's forthcoming essay on "The 
Dialectic of Divine Omnipotence" traces the origin of this 
distinction to a treatise written in 1067 by Peter Damian. 
I am grateful to Professor Courtenay for kindly allowing me 
to see this paper before publication. 
7. "The Christian Doctrine of Creation and the Rise of 
Modern Natural Science," Mind 43 (1934), 446-68, and 
"Christian Theology and Modern Science of Nature," Mind 44 
(1935), 439-66, and 45 (1936), 1-27. 
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is nothing but reason, there is nothing mysterious or 
inscrutable in his nature." Such a theology, Foster said, 
"involves both a rationalist philosophy of nature and a 
rationalist theory of knowledge of nature." As a product 
of divine reason, the world must embody the ideas of that 
reason; and "our own reason, in disclosing to us God's 
ideas, will at the same time reveal to us the essential 
nature of the created world." A voluntarist theology, on 
the other hand, "attributes to God an activity of will not 
wholly determined by reason." The products of his creative 
activity are thus not necessary, but contingent, and can be 
known only empirically.8 This alleged connection between 
voluntaristic theology and empirical science is what I 
intend to consider in this essay. 
Foster was not an historian of science, but a 
Christian philosopher with an apologetic aim: those many 
contemporary thinkers who admire modern science also ought 
to admire its source, Christian theology. In this respect, 
of course, Foster was not particularly original--Duhem had 
said much the same thing forty years before. I have no 
intention of following their line: it is history, not 
apologetics, that I have in mind, and this brings me to the 
most serious problem in Foster's work, his lack of 
8. "Christian Doctrine," p. 465; "Christian Theology," pp. 
1, 10, and Sn, respectively. 
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historical documentation.9 Although he went a long way 
toward showing what a consistently pursued theology of 
creation ought to have entailed for natural philosophy, he 
did very little to show that this had actually been the 
case historically. However, other scholars with a greater 
sensitivity to history have laid the groundwork for an 
historiography that incorporates Foster's essential 
insights. Foremost among these are Reijer Hooykaas, Eugene 
Klaaren, J.E. McGuire, Francis Oakley, and Margaret J. 
Osler.IO Considered individually, their studies generally 
lack the scope and detail required for an adequate test of 
the Foster thesis. Only Osler has looked closely at more 
than one person, and her excellent work on the foundations 
of the mechanical philosophy has by no means exhausted the 
9. This is one of many objections raised by Rolf Gruner, 
"Science, Nature, and Christianity," Journal of Theological 
Studies 26 (1975), 55-81. This is not the place to refute 
Gruner's arguments, many of which are valid but have no 
bearing on the validity of this essay. 
10. Hooykaas, Religion and the Rise of Modern Science 
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1972), and "Science and Theology 
in the Middle Ages," Free University Quarterly 3 (1954), 
77-163: Klaaren, Religious Origins of Modern Science (Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1977): McGuire, "Boyle's Conception of 
Nature," JHI 33 (1972), 523-42: Oakley, "Christian Theology 
and the Newtonian Science: The Rise of the Concept of the 
Laws of Nature," in Creation: The Impact of an Idea, ed. 
O'Connor and Oakley, pp. 54-83: and Osler, "Descartes and 
Charleton on Nature and God," JHI 40 (1979), 445-56, 
"Providence and Divine Will: T~Theological Background to 
Gassendi's Views on Scientific Knowledge," JHI 44 (1983), 
549-60, and "Eternal Truths and the Laws of Nature: The 
Theological Foundations of Descartes' Philosophy of 
Nature," unpublished paper. I would like to thank 
Professor Osler for allowing me to see this paper and for 
her comments on portions of this essay. 
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subject. Oakley and Hooykaas have managed to cover a wide 
range of figures, but only summarily~ Hooykaas, for 
instance, devotes less than twenty pages to voluntaristic 
elements in the works of Kepler, Galileo, Descartes, 
Pascal, Boyle, Newton, and several others. Klaaren, on the 
other hand, focuses almost exclusively on two men, Van 
Belmont and Boyle, one of whom (Van Belmont) was neither a 
voluntarist nor a rationalist, and his account of Boyle is 
marred by imprecise language and a convoluted argument. I 
am unable to say what it is that he intended to prove.ll 
McGuire's paper on Boyle is quite clear, but it confines 
itself almost entirely to just two of his many treatises, 
the Free Inquiry into the Vulgarly Received Notion of 
Nature and The Christian Virtuoso. 
Taken together, however, these scholars have 
demonstrated the explanatory power of the Foster thesis as 
applied to early modern science. Without their successes, 
this dissertation probably would not have been contemplated 
and certainly would not have been completed. With their 
11. Klaaren says (p. 1) that his "chief purpose" is "to 
show that religion was conducive to the advent of modern 
science, specifically that belief in creation was a major 
presupposition in the emergence of natural science in 
seventeenth-century England." I do not know how to take 
this. One hardly needs to prove that belief in creation 
was a major presupposition of 17th century English 
scientists--it can be taken almost as axiomatic. And I do 
not see how studying Van Belmont can have anything to tell 
us about English scientists. Klaaren seems to have more 
than this on his mind, but I am at a loss to say what that 
may be. 
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help, I will now clarify further the issue I intend to 
discuss in this essay. 
It will be important always to keep in mind the 
dialectic nature of Christian theology, according to which 
God has both will and reason, not just will or reason. To 
assert the one to the exclusion of the other would be an 
error. As Foster put it, "It is Christian to ascribe to 
God an activity of will, but it is not Christian to deny to 
God a theoretical activity or to ascribe to him a blind 
activity of will." Thus the doctrine of creation implies 
"that the created world must contain an element of 
contingency, not that it must be nothing but contingent."12 
Thinkers in the voluntarist tradition, McGuire has 
observed, "do not usually deny that God is bound by the 
laws of logier rather they are concerned to emphasize the 
power of God--PANTOKRATOR--and the inscrutability of Divine 
Will."13 Both voluntarists and rationalists agree that the 
world is created and intelligibler they differ on the role 
of the divine will in creation and on the manner in which 
the world is intelligible. For rationalists, God's will is 
bound to the dictates of his reason, and therefore the 
world is open to human reason at every point, for human 
reason is the image of the divine. Voluntarists, on the 
other hand, begin by stressing God's absolute power to do 
12. "Doctrine of Creation," p. 468. 
13. "Boyle's Conception of Nature," p. 527 nlO. 
10 
as he pleases, apart from any rational constraints, and 
account for intelligibility by appealing to God's ordained 
power. This view, in the words of Oakley and Daniel 
O'Connor, "rejects an~ priori deduction of rational and 
necessary order." It claims instead "only a de facto 
intelligibility directly dependent on the Divine Will. 11 14 
Hooykaas has argued similarly: "the biblical conception of 
a world fabricated and created by a free act of [the] will 
of God implies a science subject to data and facta, things 
given and things made, whether they are rational or not." 
Theology and science, he has also said, "have a common 
enemy in philosophical rationalism, which refuses to accept 
things it cannot explain. 11 15 
I therefore propose to test the validity of these 
ideas, which for simplicity I will refer to as the "Foster 
thesis," by a careful examination of four great natural 
philosophers of the seventeenth century: Galileo Galilei, 
, 
Rene Descartes, Robert Boyle, and Isaac Newton. Both 
pragmatic and methodological reasons led me to select this 
particular group and not another. First of all, because 
each one played a leading role in what is often called the 
scientific revolution, they constitute a stiff test for the 
Foster thesis: if it has no validity for them, it probably 
14. From the introduction to Creation: The Impact of an 
Idea, p. 9. 
15. Religion and the Rise of Modern Science, p. 29, and 
"Science and Theology in the Middle Ages," p. 88. 
11 
has no validity for others in the same period. Because 
they were important figures, their works are readily 
available, either separately (Newton) or in essentially 
complete collected editions (the others). Boyle wrote 
entirely in English, and most of the treatises of the 
others have been translated reliably into English. 
Although I have consulted the original languages to check 
key passages, I have done most of my reading in various 
translations. The secondary literature on each of these 
figures is enormous--one could easily read for twenty years 
and not digest the half of it. Fortunately only a fraction 
centers on science/religion issues, and only a fraction of 
that on the question I have in mind. Of course I have had 
to become familiar with the salient features of the vast 
scholarship devoted to each of these men and to the social 
and intellectual contexts in which they worked. Secondly, 
the four men I have chosen represent a cross section, 
albeit a limited one, of the seventeenth century scientific 
community: one Italian, one Frenchman, and two Englishmen: 
two Catholics and two Protestants: two physicists, one 
chemist, and one philosopher with a strong interest in 
biology: two who spent time as university professors and 
two who did not: and, in terms of this study, two 
rationalists and two voluntarists. Together they span the 
seventeenth century both chronologically and symbolically. 
Certainly a larger group would make a better test of the 
Foster thesis, but time has not allowed me that luxury--
12 
'Tis better to do a little with certainty (I hope) and 
leave the rest for others. I would like to have included a 
Cathoic voluntarist such as Pascal, Gassendi, or 
Malebranche, and a Protestant rationalist such as Leibniz 
(who does in fact put in an appearance in connection with 
Newton), since the group I have selected suggests 
misleadingly that voluntarists were English Protestants and 
rationalists were Continental Catholics. It is true that 
voluntarism is an outstanding feature of the Augustinian 
tradition, on which Protestants drew perhaps more freely 
than Catholics. It is also true that it was especially 
attractive to the English--just as a voluntarist God had 
the power to reorder his creation in whole or in part, so 
the English strove to reorder their society into a new 
creation.16 But neither the Protestants nor the English 
had a monopoly on the will of God and the doctrine of 
creation. All of Christendom shared in the rich 
inheritance of Greek philosophy and biblical theology which 
flowed together in the deep river of Christian thought. 
A full history of voluntarism, then, requires a full 
history of the doctrine of creation. Obviously that is 
16. Klaaren has found the characteristic voluntarist 
dialectic of God's absolute and ordinary power in the 
writings of Puritans like John Preston, William Perkins, 
and William Ames, and also in those of Anglicans like 
Robert Sanderson, John Wilkins, Nathaniel Culverwell, 
Walter Charleton, and John Locke. See Religious Origins of 
Modern Science, pp. 39 and 48-52. 
13 
impossible for me to attempt here.17 However I do need to 
say something about the tension between rationalism and 
voluntarism in the late Middle Ages following the 
Condemnation of 1277, for only in light of its historical 
background can we accurately weigh the influence of 
voluntarism on the scientific revolution. In the first 
chapter therefore I summarize the Condemnation and its 
effects on late medieval natural philosophy. In the next 
four chapters I consider in detail the role of divine will 
in the natural philosophies of Galileo, Descartes, Boyle, 
and Newton. In the conclusion I offer my assessment of the 
impact of voluntaristic theology on seventeenth century 
natural philosophy. 
17. For part of that history see Langdon Gilkey, Maker of 
Heaven and Earth~ A Study of the Christian Doctrine of 
Creation (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1959), and Arnold 
Erhardt, The Beginning: A Study in the Greek Philosophical 
Approach to the Concept of Creation from Anaximander to St. 
John (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1968). 
CHAPTER ONE: 
THE CONDEMNATION OF 1277: 
NOMINALISM AND VOLUNTARISM IN THE LATE MIDDLE AGES 
Of course, what really mattered to Tempier was only the 
full recognition of the sovereignty and freedom of Goa, but 
in rejecting any limits to these, he unintentionally took 
away limitations to scientific theorizing as well. Not 
only the theology of necessity was at stake, but also the 
natural science of necessity. Among the theses he 
condemned were those that suggested that God could not make 
an empty space; that He could not create new species; that 
He could not make more than one planetary system, and that 
He could not give other than circular motions to the 
heavenly bodies. All these prohibitions hampered the 
freedom of scientific research; all of them in the long run 
turned out to be false. 
--R. Hooykaas, Religion and the Rise of Modern 
Science, p. 32 
The nominalists were not, therefore, abandoning the Greek 
notion of "science"; they were setting more realistic 
limits to its applicability. But one can see here the 
beginning of a new realization: if "science" is to be the 
best attainable knowledge of some domain, then the 
"science" of nature cannot be described in the traditional 
Euclidean terms. This will ultimately involve a 
modification in the notion of science itself. But the 
nominalists were not yet ready to make this modification. 
"Science" in the sense of unchanging necessary truths still 
seemed to them the goal of man's desire to know; the fact 
that he could not know nature in this way was simply an 
unhappy circumstance. So Buridan would say, 
characteristically: there is no true "science" of nature; 
not: there is a "science" of nature, but it has to be 
differently defined~ "science." 
--E. McMullin, "Empiricism and the Scientific 
Revolution," p. 340 
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On 7 March 1277, exactly three years after the death 
of Thomas Aquinas, the bishop of Paris, Stephen Tempier, 
condemned on pain of excommunication "certain obvious and 
loathsome errors" circulating at the university entrusted 
to his care.I The "outcome of doctrinal, philosophical, 
and personal animosities that rocked Paris in the 1260s and 
1270s," 2 this condemnation of 219 propositions has been 
called "the central event" of thirteenth century thought 
because of its far reaching effects on the philosophy, 
theology, and natural science of the late middle ages.3 
Because it represents the assertion of divine freedom 
against the staunch rationalism of Aristotelian thought, it 
is worth investigating why the Condemnation of 1277 took 
place and how it influenced the subsequent development of 
1. The text of the condemnation can be readily found in P. 
Mandonnet, O.P., Siger of Brabant et l'averroisme latin au 
XIIIme siecle, 2me partie, Textes inedits (2nd ed: Louvain, 
1908), pp. 175-191. Mandonnet has arranged the prohibited 
theses into categories: his edition is the basis for the 
English translation by Ernest L. Fortin and Peter D. 
O'Neill, found in Ralph Lerner and Mushin Mahdi, editors, 
Medieval Political Philosophy: A Sourcebook (Toronto: The 
Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), pp. 335-354. All of my 
citations are from this translation, but I have numbered 
the propositions as they were ordered in the Latin 
original. The fact that Aquinas died on 7 March 1274 is 
noted by R. Hooykaas, "Science and Theology in the Middle 
Ages," Free University Quarterly, 3 (1954), p. 89. 
2. Edward Grant, "The Condemnation of 1277, God's Absolute 
Power, and Physical Thought in the Late Middle Ages," 
Viator 10 (1979), p. 212. 
3. Fernand Van Steenberghen, The Philosophical Movement in 




Christianity has always been openly cautious, if not 
deeply suspicious, of pagan philosophy. Most Christian 
theologians have agreed with Clement of Alexandria that 
philosophy is best treated as a handmaiden to theology, not 
as a noblewoman worthy of praise in her own right. This 
was particularly true of the first millenium of Christian 
thought. For seven hundred years after the fall of Rome, 
theology's claim to the throne of knowledge was 
unchallenged, her reign as queen of the sciences unbroken. 
Philosophy, impoverished by the loss of her ancient 
treasures in the Latin West, could do no more than give 
passive obedience to her lord. Even in the early 
universities--Paris, Oxford, and Bologna all flourished 
before 1200--the arts faculties were geared exclusively to 
the preparation of students for higher studies in law, 
medicine and, above all, theology. In keeping with this 
aim, the curriculum emphasized grammar and logic, not 
philosophy, and the theologians, "themselves not greatly 
interested in philosophy," were determined "to keep the 
masters of arts within the fixed bounds of their province. 
Their function was, in the phrase of Van Steenberghen, to 
train the mind, not to feed it or fill it."4 
The same years which saw the rise of the first 
4. David Knowles, The Evolution of Medieval Thought 
(Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1962), p. 226. 
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universities also witnessed the recovery of a significant 
part of Greek science and philosophy~ works which had been 
unknown in the Latin West for nearly a thousand years began 
to reach European scholars from their counterparts in the 
Islamic empire.5 Of all the manuscripts which appeared at 
this time, the most important were the scientific books of 
Aristotle, the greatest natural philosopher before the 
scientific revolution. His systematic synthesis of 
scientific thought and common sense observation possessed 
remarkable explanatory power and depth of insight. Its 
impact on the arts masters was nothing short of 
spectacular--here was a body of knowledge which cried out 
for attention, which deserved to be studied for its own 
sake. Alas, Aristotle had been a pagan, a fact which had 
affected his works and which Christians dared not forget. 
His uncompromising assumption of naturalistic determinism 
was unacceptable, and his opinions on certain matters, if 
adopted by believers, would surely lead them to perdition.6 
In the face of such a challenge to their authority, 
theologians could only be expected to react with severe 
5. See David c. Lindberg, "The Transmission of Greek and 
Arabic Learning to the West," in Science in the Middle 
Ages, ed. Lindberg (Chicago: UP, 1978), pp. 52-90. 
6. For example, Aristotle had taught the eternity of the 
world, the total regularity of nature and the impossiblity 
of miracles, and that the soul does not survive the body. 
And his rejection of the Platonic notions of form and 
creation in time implied that God could not have known all 
species of things that he would eventually create. See 
Edward Grant, Physical Science in the Middle Ages (New 
York: John Wiley & Sons, 1971), p. 24. 
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disapproval. A series of official decrees beginning in 
1210 stirred the smoldering embers of disagreement, which 
burst in 1267 into the open flame of confrontation. 
Addressing a convocation of monks at Paris, St. Bonaventure 
decried the dangers of a new paganism and denounced those 
arts masters who taught the eternity of the world, the 
unicity of ·the human intellect, and the mortality of the 
soul. The latter two points were also the target of St. 
Thomas Aquinas' 1270 treatise On the Unicity of the 
Intellect against the Averroists, in which he attacked 
those philosophers who presumed to discuss theological 
matters and showed his annoyance with those who held that 
reason could affirm one truth while theology affirmed 
another. Then on 10 December of the same year, Tempier 
officially "condemned and excommunicated with all who 
taught or asserted ••• knowingly" thirteen articles as 
follows:7 
The first article is: That the intellect of all men 
is one and the same in number. 
2. That this is false or inappropriate: Man 
understands. 
3. That the will of man wills or chooses from 
necessity. 
4. That all things which are done here below depend 
upon the necessity of the celestial bodies. 
5. That the world is eternal. 
6. That there never was a first man. 
7. That the soul, which is the form of man as a human 
being, is corrupted when the body is corrupted. 
8. That the soul separated from death does not suffer 
7. The original document is in Chartularium universitatis 
Parisiensis I, 486f~ the translation here is that of Lynn 
Thorndike, University Records, pp. 80f. 
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from corporeal fire. 
9. That free will is a passive power, not active~ and 
that it is moved necessarily by appetite. 
10. That God does not know things in particular. 
11. That God does not know other things than Himself. 
12. That human actions are not ruled by divine 
Providence. 
13. That God cannot give immortality or 
incorruptibility to a corruptible or mortal thing. 
Four of these propositions (numbers 1, 5, 6, and 8) are 
found in treatises by Siger of Brabant, a radical 
Aristotelian.8 The others are not directly attributable to 
Siger or to anyone else, but we may assume their currency 
in the arts faculty on other grounds.9 
Yet the Condemnation of 1270 was apparently not enough 
to silence the radical Aristotelians, or there would have 
been no need for further action against them. On 1 April 
1272 the conservatives, under Alberic of Rheims, passed a 
8. See John F. Wippel, "The Condemnations of 1270 and 1277 
at Paris," The Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies 
7 (1977), p. 179. 
9. At around this time--perhaps in 1270, but not later than 
1276--Giles of Lessines sent a letter to Albertus Magnus in 
which he listed fifteen theses then being held by arts 
masters at Paris~ all thirteen of the above are included. 
See Wippel, pp. 182-183. The treatise Errores 
philosophorum, by Giles of Rome, dates from the same 
period. A member of the Order of the Hermits of St. 
Augustine, Giles studied under Aquinas at Paris from 1269 
to 1272. Errores philosophorum catalogues the various 
"errors" of Aristotle, Avicenna, Averroes, Algazel, 
Alkindi, and Maimonides, and castigates those Christians 
who held the erroneous views. Josef Koch's edition of the 
text is published with John O. Reidl's translation in 
Errores philosophorum (Milwaukee: Marquette University 
Press, 1944)~ a translation by Herman Shapiro appears on 
pp. 386-413 of his Medieval Philosophy (New York: Random 
House, 1964). 
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regulation forbidding arts masters to treat theological 
questions.IO The following year Bonaventure saw fit to 
repeat his attacks on the followers of Aristotle and the 
Peripatetics in his Easter Collationes in Hexaemeron. A 
university decree of 2 September 1276 prohibited all 
private teaching except for logic and grammar, a move which 
prevented any rebellious masters from promulgating 
heretical doctrines in secret. Less than three months 
later, on 23 November, Siger and two of his colleagues, 
Bernier of Nivelles and Gosvin de La Chapelle, were called 
before the French office of the Inquisition to answer 
charges of heresy, of which they were subsequently 
convicted. Someone must have informed the new pope, John 
XXI, of the dangerous ideas circulating at Paris, for on 18 
January 1277 he ordered Stephen Tempier to investigate 
certain errors and to make a report. Rarely has a command 
been executed with greater zeal. Assembling a committee of 
sixteen theologians, Tempier orchestrated the 
identification and wholesale condemnation of 219 
propositions on 7 March. Ten days later in a related 
event, the Archbishop of Canterbury, Robert Kilwardby, 
condemned 30 propositions circulating at Oxford. Although 
there is no evidence that the Holy Father saw Tempier's 
decree before it was issued--indeed on 28 April he wrote to 
him, asking for the names of those perpetrating errors but 
10. See Chartularium I, 499f, and Thornkike, University 
Records, pp. 85f. 
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making no mention of the condemnation itself--there can be 
little doubt that it pleased him, for he never made any 
attempt to revoke the decree or to limit its force. All 
the evidence points to a hasty job. Allowing time for 
Tempier to receive the papal letter and to gather around 
him a sizeable group of men, not more than four weeks could 
have been devoted to the preparation of the document. The 
prohibited articles were not listed in a logical order, 
they contained both repetitions and contradictions, and 
they included some perfectly orthodox opinions, among them 
several upheld by Aquinas.11 The fact that 7 March was the 
anniversary of Thomas' death has already been mentioned. 
Surely this was no coincidence~ Thomas had not endeared 
himself to Bonaventure and his followers, who were only too 
anxious to heap coals on the memory of the Angelic Doctor. 
As Peckham understood it, Thomas' system "despises the 
doctrines of the Fathers and bases itself almost completely 
on the doctrines of philosophers, so that the house of God 
is filled with idols."12 
But Aquinas was not the main target. The Condemnation 
of 1277 was "the brutal resolution of a crisis whose first 
symptoms had been manifest since the first years of the 
11. Some of these are identified by Armand A. Maurer, 
Medieval Philosophy (New York: Random House, 1962), p. 206. 
One such proposition was that the action of the will 
naturally follows upon the judgment the of reason. 
12. Quoted by Van Steenberghen, p. 104. 
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century: the crisis of the Christian intelligence, shaken 
by the wholesale invasion of pagan learning."13 It was 
Aristotle and his Arabian commentators who had shaken the 
Christian intelligence, and it was they who received the 
full brunt of the blow. Both the content and the spirit of 
profane philosophy were directly impugned. Each of the 
thirteen articles condemned in 1270 was condemned again, in 
one form or another, and many other opinions met the same 
fate. Some propositions were clearly counter to Christian 
doctrinel4: others encouraged immorality or denied its 
consequences.IS Several propositions betray a bitter 
professional rivalry between the theologians and the arts 
mastersl6, a situation clearly evident in these statements 
from Boethius of Dacia, one of those targeted by the 
Condemnation: "It is easier for the philosopher to be 
virtuous than anyone else": "When a man is engaged in 
[philosophical] activity he is in the best state possible 
13. Van Steenberghen, p. 103. 
14. Number 1: "That God is not triune ••• ": number 189: 
"That creation is not possible, even though the contrary 
must be held according to faith." 
15. Number 183: "That simple fornication, namely, that of 
an unmarried man with an unmarried woman, is not a sin": 
number 178: "That death is the end of all terrors.--The 
statement is erroneous if it excludes the terror of hell, 
which is the last": number 19: "That the separated soul in 
no way suffers from fire." 
16. Number 40: "That there is no more excellent state than 
to study philosophy": number 154: "That the only wise men 
are philosophers": number 152: "That the teachings of the 
theologian are based on fables": number 153: "That one does 
not know anything more by the fact that he knows theology." 
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to man."17 The preface of the decree explicitly banned the 
licentious book De deo amoris by one Andre le Chapelain,18 
a work on geomancy by an unnamed author, and other occult 
writings. Some sharp words were reserved for those who 
held the doctrine of the double truth. But above all, the 
Condemnation of 1277 was a declaration of God's absolute 
free will to do as he pleases, apart from rational and 
physical necessity. As Hooykaas has observed, the Parisian 
theologians were defending the "core of religion, namely, 
that creation depends on God and not God on creation.»19 
"That God of necessity makes whatever comes immediately 
from Him" (number 53): "That God cannot be the cause of a 
newly-made thing and cannot produce anything new" (number 
48): "That what is impossible absolutely speaking cannot be 
brought about by God or by another agent" (number 
147)--these and propositions like them were banned because 
they placed limitations on God's power or subjected His 
will to some external requirement. Such a step was wholly 
in keeping with the emphasis on voluntarism in Augustinian 
theology. 
Tempier's decree had several significant effects, but 
the most important was that medieval philosophy reaped a 
17. Quoted by Maurer, p. 204. 
18. See A.J. Denomy, "The De Amore of Andreas Capellanus 
and the Condemnation of 1277," Mediaeval Studies 8 (1946), 
107-23. 
19. "Science and Theology," p. 104. 
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harvest of nominalism, which emphasized the inscrutability 
of the divine will and the contingency of all created 
things.20 William of Ockham (ca. 1285-1349), the chief 
representative of this movement, taught that God was not 
obligated to any action.21 Thus he opposed all attempts to 
deduce the world~ priori. The knowledge that one thing 
exists, he said, does not allow us to infer the existence 
of any other thing, for there is no guarantee that ideas 
correspond to reality. Relations between objects can only 
be detected a posteriori, through the senses. Even then, 
we can have no certain knowledge of causal connections, for 
God can produce an effect in any way he pleases.22 
The impact of this "radical empiricism" on medieval 
natural philosophy has been the subject of considerable 
debate by historians of science.23 Pierre Duhem, the great 
Catholic apologist for medieval science, saw the birth of 
20. See Heiko Obermann, The Harvest of Medieval Theology 
(Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1963). 
21. In a commentary on the sentences, Ockham wrote: "Deus 
autem ad nullum actum potest obligarir et ideo eo ipso quod 
Deus vult, hoc est justum fieri." Quoted by Vernon J. 
Bourke, Will in Western Thou ht: An Historico-Critical 
Survey (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1964 , p. 174. 
22. See Edward Grant, "Late Medieval Thought, Copernicus, 
and the Scientific Revolution," JHI 23 (1962), 197-220, and 
Ernest Moody, "Empiricism and Metaphysics in Medieval 
Philosophy," The Philosophical Review 67 (1958), 145-63. 
23. I am relying here on the excellent summary accounts in 
Hooykaas, "Science and Theology," pp. 78-81, and Edward 
Grant, "Late Medieval Thought, Copernicus, and the 
Scientific Revolution." 
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modern science in nominalism and in certain propositions 
condemned in 1277, notably articles 34 ("That the first 
cause cannot make more than one world") and 49 ("That God 
could not move the heaven in a straight line, the reason 
being that He would then leave a vacuum"). In his opinion 
the Condemnation freed medieval science from its 
Aristotelian prejudices and stimulated the discussion of 
novel hypotheses about the physical world. Some of these 
hypotheses, he argued, particularly those about the motion 
of the world, fostered the development of a new mechanics 
which foreshadowed the work of Galileo and his 
contemporaries.24 On the other hand, Alexandre Koyr~ has 
insisted that the only effect of the condemnation on 
natural philosophy was to force the concession that God 
could do things in any manner that he chose, yet natural 
philosophers still seemed to assume that the world God had 
chosen to make was Aristotelian. 25 Thus they pursued their 
studies within the traditional world picture. Reijer 
Hooykaas prefers a more moderate line: "medieval theology 
did not hamper the development of science," but "in some 
respects it gave scope for [the] free development of 
science by liberating it from philosophical constraint," 
although "it did not directly stimulate scientific 
24. See volume 6 of Le systeme du monde (10 Vols.~ Paris, 
Hermann, 1913-59). 
25. See "Le Vide et l'Espace Infini au XVIe Siecle," 
Archives doctrinale et litteraire du Moyen Age 24 (1947), 
45-91. 
26 
research."26 Who is correct? What were the actual effects 
of the Condemnation of 1277 on late medieval science? In 
an attempt to answer these questions I will briefly 
consider the problems of the plurality of worlds and the 
motion of the earth as they were discussed in the 
thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. 
According to orthodox Aristotelian thought, there 
could only be one world. The arguments for this position 
are given in a commentary on the Sphere of Sacrobosco 
attributed to Michael Scot and written well before 1277.27 
If another world existed, the author said, it would have to 
be in a place different from that of our world, but then 
intermediate space would exist between the two worlds, 
space which would not be body but which could not be void 
because a void is impossible. Furthermore, the elements in 
another world would have to be the same as those in our 
world~ they would possess similar properties and would have 
the same natural motions. But this would cause confusion, 
for the element earth would tend to move both toward the 
center of our world and toward the center of the other 
world~ hence it would both fall and rise naturally, an 
absurdity. Michael therefore concluded that although God 
could have made other worlds, he obviously had not really 
done so, since nature lacked the capacity to recieve them. 
26. "Science and Theology," p. 77. 
27. See Grant, "The Condemnation of 1277," pp. 217-223. 
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After Tempier had condemned the proposition that God could 
not make more than one world, some continued to follow 
Michael's line of reasoning, holding that such an act on 
God's part, while possible in an absolute sense, would be 
utterly unintelligible. But others "took seriously the 
possibility that God could create other worlds than our own 
and, on the assumption that he did create them, sought to 
counter those of Aristotle's arguments that had previously 
been accepted more or less routinely. 11 28 In his French 
commentary (1377) on Aristotle's De caelo, Nicole Oresme 
admitted that "there never has been nor will there be more 
than one corporeal world," yet he tried to make sense of 
the claim that "God can and could in his omnipotence make 
another world besides this one or several like or unlike 
it."29 Oresme allowed that this created difficulties for 
the idea of natural place, but instead of denying the 
existence of other worlds, as Michael had done, Oresme 
redefined "heavy" and "light" in relative terms which made 
no reference to natural places. A "heavy" body was said to 
be "down" simply when it was surrounded by "light" bodies 
which were said to be "up." In intercosmic void space, a 
body would not be surrounded by others and hence would be 
neither "heavy" nor "light." It would not seek to move in 
any direction, but would come to rest. Therefore if an 
28. Ibid., p. 220. 
29. Quoted in ibid., p. 223. 
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earthy body from our world were to rise through the sphere 
of the stars, it would not continue to move toward the 
center of another world: being neither "heavy" nor "light," 
it would stay in the void between the worlds. As for this 
void--its very impossibility one of Michael Scot's 
objections against the plurality of worlds--Oresme simply 
assumed its possibility. Robert Holkot took a stronger 
stance. In his Four Books of Questions on the Sentences he 
assumed that God really could make another world, in which 
case he could put it anywhere. But what is now in the 
place where God could put such a world? Either a body or 
nothing: if nothing, as Holkot preferred to assume, then we 
must conclude that a vacuum presently exists beyond the 
world, for God can really put something there, and any 
place in which a body could be but is not constitutes a 
vacuum. It is significant that Holkot phrased this not in 
the customary subjunctive mood, but in the indicative: 
"extra mundum nihil est, et extra mundum potest esse 
corpus: ergo extra mundum est vacuum, quia ubi potest esse 
corpus, et nullum est, ibi vacuum est. Ergo vacuum modo 
est."30 For him, the real possibility that God could 
create another world led to the actuality that a vacuum 
presently exists beyond the world. Although he did not 
directly refer to any condemned articles, one can hardly 
avoid hearing the footsteps of 1277 in Holkot's deliberate 
30. Quoted in ibid., p. 224 n46. 
29 
stride. 
The impact of the Condemnation is equally apparent in 
late medieval discussions of the possible motion of the 
earth, something which was impossible in Aristotelian 
natural philosophy for several reasons. Since every 
rectilinear motion was necessarily from place to place and 
since the last heaven had no place, the world could not be 
moved in a right line. But suppose that it were to be 
moved: how could we know it, with no stationary body for 
our reference point? Again, if the earth were to move, a 
vacuum would be left behind, since a vacuum is a place 
where a body could be but is not, and a vacuum is 
impossible.31 Two of the many natural philosophers who 
responded to these arguments in an attempt to make the 
earth's possible motion intelligible were Jean Buridan and 
Nicole Oresme. Each undertook to redefine motion, and each 
cited article 49 of the Condemnation as a reason for doing 
so. If God can move the world in a straight line, said 
Buridan, then he can certainly move it circularly. Now 
such a motion would be undetectable if it were shared by 
all parts of the world~ nevertheless it would in fact be 
motion because God would be causing it and, presumably, he 
would know this. The same applies to the case of 
rectilinear motion. If all parts of the world were to be 
moved together by God in a straight line, there would be no 
31. These arguments are given in ibid., pp. 226-228. 
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relative motion to observe, yet the world would still be 
moving. Thus for Buridan, God functioned as the absolute 
reference for the motion of the world. There was no need 
to postulate places between which motion could occur. 
Oresme's answer was much the same. The motion of the world 
could occur in an imaginary space beyond the world, an 
absolute space not defined by reference to any body, a real 
space over which God ruled at his pleasure and through 
which he could transport the world if he so desired.32 
I have cited only a few examples of the impact of the 
Condemnation on late medieval science. There are many, 
many more. As Grant has observed, 
Frequent citation of, and implicit allusions to, 
numerous articles of the Condemnation of 1277 should 
convince us that it was taken seriously throughout 
the fourteenth century and that it encouraged 
innumerable invocations of God's absolute power in a 
variety of hypothetical physical situations. The 
supernatural alternatives which medieval scholastics 
considered in the wake of the condemnation 
conditioned them to consider possibilities outside 
the ken of Aristotelian natural philosophy, and 
usually in direct conflict with it. So widespread 
was the contemplation of such hypothetical 
possiblities in the late Middle Ages that it is no 
exaggeration to view them as an integral feature of 
late medieval thought.33 
God's absolute power, Grant goes on to say, was "a 
32. See ibid., pp. 229-32. As we shall see in a later 
chapter, Newton used the same arguments against Descartes' 
conception of relative motion, in defense of an absolute 
space in which God was omnipresent. 
33. Ibid., p. 239. 
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convenient vehicle" for the consideration of original 
physical hypotheses. But if the Condemnation caused some 
to challenge certain fundamental Aristotelian principles, 
he points out, it did not result in a new science of 
nature. The possibilities entertained by the nominalists 
were put forth secundum imaginationem, according to the 
imagination, not according to the truth. In spite of the 
vigor with which a few scholastics pursued the possibility 
of a moving earth, none of them, as far as is known, ever 
actually believed that the earth moves. The scientific 
revolution did not begin until Copernicus proclaimed the 
earth's motion as the true explanation of the phenomena. 
If the nominalist "atmosphere of uncertainty" had 
prevailed, Grant concludes, the scientific revolution 
probably could not have happened.34 
I find myself in agreement with Grant's main thesis, 
that medieval nominalism did not produce the scientific 
revolution. It will be my chief purpose in this essay, 
however, to demonstrate that the theology associated with 
the Condemnation of 1277 did in fact play a major role 
within the scientific revolution: to wit, it encouraged the 
development of a new view of scientific knowledge as 
deriving from phenomena rather than from propositions. In 
a provocative essay on "Empiricism and the Scientific 
34. This interpretation is developed in "Late Medieval 
Thought" and "Hypotheses in Late Medieval and Early Modern 
Science," Daedalus 91 (1962), 599-616. 
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Revolution,"35 Ernan McMullin has argued that "the history 
of science, from its Greek beginnings right down to the 
present, has been marked by a tension between two views 
concerning the nature of science, which we can call the 
conceptualist and the empiricist views." Where the 
conceptualist assumes "that a direct access to the essence 
or structure of natural objects is available," the 
empiricist believes "that evidence for a scientific 
statement" can be found "only in the singular observations 
on which the statement rests." Conceptualist science "will 
be certain and definitive": empiricist science "will be 
tentative, approximate, progressive." McMullin offers the 
following historical analysis in terms of these categories: 
Although challenged by the positivism of the later 
nominalists, "the dominant medieval theory of science was 
conceptualist." The science of the early seventeenth 
century "was still largely conceptualist," but it "became 
more and more empiricist in tone" as the century 
continued.36 This is precisely the pattern which emerges 
from the four case studies in the following pages: the 
conceptualism of Galileo and Descartes belonged to the 
first half of the seventeenth century, the empiricism of 
Boyle and Newton to the latter half. What I intend to show 
35. In Art, Science, and History in the Renaissance, ed. 
Charles S. Singleton (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1967), 
pp. 331-69. This article contains a brief rejoinder to 
Grant's view of Copernicus and nominalism. See pp. 341-44. 
36. Pages 332-34. 
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is that this change in philosophy of nature from 
conceptualism to empiricism was accompanied by a change in 
theology of creation from rationalism to voluntarism. What 
the medieval nominalists were unable to accomplish--the 
construction of a science of contingent truths deriving 
from phenomena--the seventeenth century voluntarists 
successfully carried out. 
CHAPTER TWO: 
GALILEO AND THE GOD OF REASON 
The possibility of an applied mathematics is an expression, 
in terms of natural science, of the Christian belief that 
nature is the creation of an omnipotent God. This belief 
is what replaced the Greek conception of nature as the 
realm of imprecision with the Renaissance conception of 
nature as the realm of precision. The Platonism of 
Renaissance natural science is not fundamentally Platonic, 
it is fundamentally Christian. Christian thought is 
adapting Platonism to its own ends, or begetting upon 
Platonism an idea which Platonism proper would never have 
originated or even tolerated. 
--R.G. Collingwood, An Essay on Metaphysics, p. 253 
By his free use of the word "nature," he [Galileo] does not 
mean to deny an ultimately religious interpretation of 
things. God, by his immediate creative knowledge of 
nature, thinks into the world that rigorous mathematical 
necessity which we reach only laboriously through 
resolutions and demonstrations--God is a geometrician in 
his creative labours--he makes the world through and 
through a mathematical system •••• It was this religious 
basis of his philosophy that made Galileo bold to declare 
that doubtful passages of scripture should be interpreted 
in the light of scientific discovery rather than the 
reverse. God has made the world an immutable mathematical 
system, permitting by the mathematical method an absolute 
certainty of scientific knowledge. The disagreements of 
theologians about the meaning of scripture are ample 
testimony to the fact that here no such certainty is 
possible. 
--E.A. Burtt, The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern 
Physical Science, pp. 82f 
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Giorgio Spini's remark that "our sources of 
information about Galileo's religiousness do not always 
allow us to reach a certainty beyond all reasonable doubt" 
greatly understates the case.I Apart from his letter to 
the Grand Duchess Christina, which was hardly a spontaneous 
effusion of deep religious conviction, Galileo never wrote 
at length on any religious topic, and some of the little 
that he did say--for example, the pious platitudes 
scattered sparingly throughout his works--can only be taken 
with a grain of salt. From all appearances, Galileo 
reflected his civic heritage: religion, while necessary for 
salvation, need not be an important part of one's private 
lifer public worship, not personal piety, was the rule for 
Florentine society.2 
1. "The Rationale of Galileo's Religiousness," in Galileo 
Reappraised, ed. Carlo L. Gelino (Berkeley: The University 
of California Press, 1966), p. 44. The standard edition of 
Galileo's works is the 20-volume Le Opere di Galileo 
Galilei, ed. Antonio Favaro (Florence: G. Barbera, 
1899-1909). Most of my references will be to English 
translations. 
2. See Gene A. Brucker, Renaissance Florence (New York: 
John Wiley & Sons, 1969), pp. 172-212. An ambivalent 
attitude toward the Church was a characteristic feature of 
Renaissance Florence. A host of cults and confraternities 
and periodic revivals gave Florentines ample opportunities 
to display their public religion. Yet Florence suffered 
heretics quite readily, and was more than once under the 
threat of an interdict: anticlericalism was virtually a 
sign of good citizenship. In financial matters the 
cittadini looked after their own interests first: if a 
number of highborn women ended up in nunneries, it was 
largely because their families could not afford to provide 
them with dowries. Galileo, who sent both of his daughters 
into cloisters, himself studied at a Vallombrosan monastery 
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It would be a serious mistake, however, to assume that 
Galileo had no faith at all. Too often he is depicted as a 
martyr for the church scientific, or a saint who strode 
forth like David to slay the Goliath of Catholic theology 
with his smooth stones of critical reasoning. Such 
accounts only serve to obscure the complexities of the 
historical reality: Galileo had his supporters in the 
Church, and some of his staunchest intellectual foes were 
Latin Averroists like Cesare Cremonini, Fortunio Liceti, 
and Antonio Rocco, outspoken libertines who had no time for 
Christianity. 3 The fact is that Galileo never repudiated 
his Catholicism publicly or privately--indeed he saw 
himself as saving the Church from error by championing the 
truth of Copernicanism.4 Furthermore, in confronting the 
virtual identification of mathematics with physics, and the 
justification he provided was couched in the language and 
concepts of theology. Some scholars, clinging tenaciously 
to their precious positivist picture of Galileo, refuse to 
allow that he ever engaged in serious metaphysical 
as a youth and even became a novice in that order before 
Vincenzio put a stop to a monastic career for his son. 
3. See Spini, pp. 57-58; Giorgio de Santillana, The Crime 
of Galileo (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955); 
Jerome J. Langford, Galileo, Science, and the Church (Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1966); and Stillman 
Drake, Galileo at Work (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1978), especially p. 288. 
4. See his Letter to the Grand Duchess Christina, ed. Drake 
in Discoveries and Opinions of Galileo (Garden City, NY: 
Doubleday, 1957), pp. 175-216. 
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speculation.5 Maurice Clavelin, I think, comes much closer 
to the truth: 
To hold that mathematical reason is capable of 
embracing reality, to assume that rational necessity 
is akin to natural necessity, to turn simplicity into 
a touchstone of scientific explanation is not to 
introduce so many ostensive definitions based on the 
evidence of our senses, but rather to choose a 
metaphysical position.6 
He did so consciously, above all in the Dialogue, where the 
debate between Salviati and Simplicio hinged on the 
relevance of mathematics to the physical world.7 In the 
ensuing discussion we shall see that Galileo's ideal of a 
5. For example, Stillman Drake, .£.E.• cit., and Edward w. 
Strong, "The Relationship between Metaphysics and 
Scientific Method in Galileo's Work," in Galileo: Man of 
Science, ed. Ernan McMullin (New York: Basic Books, 1967), 
pp. 352-364. 
6. The Natural Philoso h of Galileo, trans. A.J. Pomerans 
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1974 , p. 461. Edwin Arthur 
Burtt was an early proponent of The Metaphysical 
Foundations of Modern Physical Science (2nd ed.~ Lonson: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1932)~ so was Alexandre Koyre, 
Galileo Studies, trans. John Mepham (Atlantic Highlands, 
N.J.: Humanities Press, 1978), and "Galileo and Plato," JHI 
4(1943), 400-428. 
7. Simplicio maintained, "with Aristotle, that in physical 
[naturali] matters one need not always require a 
mathematical demonstration." Dialogue Concerning the Two 
Chief World Systems--Ptolemaic & Copernican, trans. 
Stillman Drake (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1953), p. 14. Simplicio did not come over to Salviati's 
position until the First Day of the Discourses, when he 
admitted that "if I were to begin my studies over again, I 
should try to follow the advice of Plato and commence from 
mathematics, which proceeds so carefully, and does not 
admit as certain anything except what it has conclusively 
proved." On the Second Day he added, "Truly, I begin to 
understand that although logic is a very excellent 
instrument to govern our reasoning, it does not compare 
with the sharpness of geometry in awakening the mind to 
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mathematical, a priori science of nature was grounded 
explicitly on a rationalistic understanding of God's 
relation to created objects and to created minds. 
The Perfect Creation of an Omnipotent God 
Philosophy, wrote Galileo in The Assayer, 
is·written in this grand book--! mean the 
universe--which stands continually open to our gaze, 
but it cannot be understood unless one first learns 
to comprehend the language and interpret the 
characters in which it is written. It is written in 
the language of mathematics, and its characters are 
triangles, circles, and other geometrical figures, 
without which it is humanly impossible to understand 
a single word of it1 without these, one is wandering 
about in a dark labyrinth.a 
The strong Platonic flavor of this passage and others like 
it has lent credence to the notion that Galileo can best be 
understood as a Platonist.9 To be sure, he styled himself 
as a champion of Plato's emphasis on mathematics and pure 
discovery [invenzione]." Two New Sciences, trans. Stillman 
Drake (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1974), pp. 
93 and 133. Hereafter these translations will be referred 
to as the Dialogue and the Discourses, respectively. 
8. From pp. 183f of Stillman Drake's translation, found on 
pp. 151-336 of The Controversy on the Comets of 1618, ed. 
Drake and C.D. O'Malley (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1960). All future references to The 
Assayer will be to this translation. 
9. See Burtt, .2£• cit.1 Koyre, .2£• cit., and "Newton, 
Galileo, and Plato," in his Newtonian Studies (London: 
Chapman and Hall), pp. 201-2201 Ernst Cassirer, "Galileo's 
Platonism," Studies and Essa sin the Histor of Science, 
ed. M. Ashley Montagu (New York: Schuman, 1946 , pp. 
277-297, and "Mathematical Mysticism and Mathematical 
Science," in Galileo: Man of Science, pp. 338-351. Compare 
th~ correctives offered by Dudley Shapere, "Descartes and 
Plato," JHI 24 (1963), 573-5761 A.C. Crombie, "Galileo's 
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reason, as over and against Aristotle's reliance on 
dialectic and direct sense experience: in the great 
Renaissance debate immortalized in Raphael's "School of 
Athens," Galileo followed Plato's upraised arm rather than 
Aristotle's earthbound gesture.IO But Plato's god differed 
profoundly from Galileo's, and consequently so did his 
conception of science. Although the Demiurge had wanted to 
make a perfect world, he had been limited by a recalcitrant 
matter. Necessity--not natural law but its very 
antithesis, an indeterminate, unintelligible chaos 
--had required to be persuaded to cooperate with Reason in 
producing the world. Alas, Reason had not been wholly 
successful, so the product was only an imperfect copy of 
the ideal reality. Physical things, as flawed images in 
the world of becoming, merely "participated" in number: 
they did not perfectly embody the mathematical forms of the 
world of being which alone were fully comprehensible. 
Physics, the study of physical objects, could therefore be 
only a "likely story," not a true science capable of giving 
knowledge.11 
Conception of Scientific Truth," in Literature and Science, 
Proceedings of the Sixth Triennial Congress of the 
International Federation for Modern Language and Literature 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1955), pp. 132-138: Ernan 
McMullin, "Galileo, Man of Science," in Galieo: Man of 
Science, pp. 3-51: and Thomas P. McTighe, "Galileo's 
Platonism: A Reconsideration," ibid., pp. 365-387. 
10. I.B. Cohen uses the same example in "A Sense of History 
in Science," American Journal of Physics 18 (1950), 343-59. 
11. Francis Macdonald Cornford, Plato's Cosmology (London: 
Kegan Paul, 1937), pp. 23, 34, 171-172. 
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For Galileo, however, the "great book of nature" was 
"the creation of the omnipotent Craftsman," not of a mere 
Demiurge. The world was "most perfect, being the chief 
work of God." It was therefore "of necessity, most 
orderly, having its parts disposed in the highest and most 
perfect order among themselves." This principle being 
established, said Salviati, it follows that "straight 
motion cannot be natural for any body," for "whatever moves 
straight changes place," and "if that were the motion which 
naturally suited it, then at the beginning it was not in 
its proper place," which contradicts the assumption of 
perfect order. Only circular motion and rest were suitable 
for a perfect world.12 God's perfect creative act was 
likewise the formal cause of circular motion in the 
heavens. Twice in the First Day of the Dialogue and once 
more in the Fourth Day of the Discourses, Galileo 
speculated on the origin of the solar system.13 Each time 
conception to himself (under the pseudonym of the "Lincean 
Academician" or a similar conceit). From this and from the 
fact that he apparently believed that he had mathematically 
verified it, we must conclude that Galileo took his 
"Platonic" cosmogony quite seriously. It is not really 
Platonic--nothing resembling it can be found in 
12. Dialogue, pp. 3, 14, 19, and 31-32. 
13. Pages 20-21, 29-30~ and 232-234, respectively. 
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Plato.14 Nevertheless Galileo believed that he was 
"illustrating a Platonic concept" whose foundations, which 
he had discovered by "removing their poetical mask or 
semblance, show it in the guise of a true story [verace 
istoria]."15 According to Sagredo, Plato had said that 
God, after having created the moveable celestial 
bodies, in order to assign to them those speeds with 
which they must be moved perpetually in equable 
circular motion, made them depart from rest and move 
through determinate spaces, ••• successively 
accelerating. And he added that these having been 
made to gain that degree [of speed] which it pleased 
God that they should maintain forever, He turned 
their straight motion into circulation, the only kind 
that is suitable to be conserved equably, turning 
always without retreat from or approach toward any 
14. Samuel Sambursky has speculated that Galileo was 
inspired by sections 30A, 38C-39A, and 43B of the Timaeus. 
See "Galileo's Attempt at a Cosmogony," Isis 53 (1962), 
460-464. Alexandre Koyre says flatly, "the theory in 
question is not in Plato." See "Newton, Galileo, and 
Plato," in his Newtonian Studies (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1965), pp. 201-220. Galileo's presumably 
unsuccessful effort to provide a mathematical foundation 
for his scheme is explored in I.B. Cohen, "Galileo, Newton, 
and the Divine Order of the Solar System," in Galileo: Man 
of Science, pp. 207-231; and Shigeru Nakayama, "Galileo and 
Newton's Problem of World-Formation," Japanese Studies in 
the History of Science 1 (1962), 76-82. 
15. Dialogue, p. 29; Discourses, p. 233. I cannot resist 
quoting Cornford's comment about the Timaeus: "Some have 
regarded the mythical character of the dialogue as a 'veil 
of allegory,' which can be 'stripped off,' and have 
imagined that they could state in literal terms the meaning 
which Plato has chosen to disguise •••• But there 
remains an irreducible element of poetry, which refuses to 
be translated into the language of scientific prose. Plato 
declares that his account, so far from being exact, cannot 
even be consistent with itself. The inexactness and 
inconsistency are inherent in the nature of the subject: 
they cannot be removed by 'stripping off the veil of 
allegory'." Plato's Cosmology, p. 32. 
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pre-established goal desired by them.16 
More importantly, perfection meant that God's 
mathematical ideas had been completely realized in the 
objects he had created. Even the complexities of real 
bodies were subject to the exacting scrutiny of geometry.17 
Simplicio, the plodder who represented Aristotelian 
philosophy in the Dialogue, argued that while 
mathematicians may prove their propositions well enough in 
theory, things happened otherwise in practice. Ideal 
spheres were not material spheresr the imperfection of 
matter prevented "things taken concretely from 
corresponding to those considered in the abstract." 
Galileo's spokesman Salviati denied the charge: 
SALV. Are you not saying that because of the 
imperfection of matter, a body which ought to be 
perfectly spherical and a plane which ought to be 
perfectly flat do not achieve concretely what one 
imagines of them in the abstract? 
SIMP. That is what I say. 
SALV. Then whenever you apply a material sphere to a 
material plane in the concrete, you apply a sphere 
which is not perfect to a plane which is not perfect, 
and you say that these do not touch each other in one 
point. But I tell you that even in the abstract, an 
immaterial sphere which is not a perfect sphere can 
16. Discourses, p. 233. 
17. As Crombie has pointed out, Galileo differed with Plato 
on the matter of essentialism: where Plato maintained that 
the physical world was a poor copy of mathematical forms, 
Galileo held that it "actually consisted of the 
mathematical primary qualities and their 'Iaws, and that 
these laws were discoverable in detail with absolute 
certainty." Op. cit., p. 135, his italics. William R. 
Shea, GalileoT's Intellectual Revolution (New York: Science 
History Publications, 1977), agrees. See page xi. 
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touch an immaterial plane which is not perfectly flat 
in not one point, but over a part of its surface, so 
that what happens in the concrete up to this point 
happens the same way in the abstract •••• Just as 
the computer who wants his calculations to deal with 
sugar, silk, and wool must discount the boxes, bales, 
and other packings, so the mathematical scientist 
[filosofo geometra], when he wants to recognize in 
the concrete the effects which he has proved in the 
abstract, must deduct the material hindrances, and if 
he is able to do so, I assure you that things are in 
no less agreement than arithmetical computations. 
The errors, then, lie not in the abstractness or 
concreteness, not in geometry or physics, but in a 
calculator who does not know how to make a true 
accounting.18 
Although nature might not be simple, it was nevertheless 
wholly explicable in mathematical terms. As McTighe has 
put it, for Galileo there was "no intractable surd in the 
things of nature which defies rationalization."19 Failure 
to plumb the depths of the created order was due not to the 
intrinsic recalcitrance of an imperfect matter, but rather 
to the mathematical incompetence of the human investigator. 
Galileo's assumption that, because the Divine geometer 
had fully carried out His intentions nature was at root 
mathematical, amounted to the identification of 
mathematical form as the intelligible essence of bodies. I 
have said, "of bodies," not "of substances," for Galileo 
emphatically denied that we could know the true essences of 
18. The discussion begins on p. 203 and closes with this 
quotation from pp. 207f. Cf. Discourses, pp. 12f. 
19. 2£• cit., p. 369. 
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substances in this temporal world.20 But the essences of 
mathematical forms could in fact be known--properties could 
be deduced from definitions. To learn about a circle, we 
should begin with one of the simplest properties, and 
"taking this for the definition of a circle, proceed by 
reasoning" to other properties. God, who simply apprehends 
"the circle's essence, knows without time-consuming 
reasoning all the infinity of its properties." To the 
degree that we, too, could know the essence of a form, to 
that same degree we could share in the Divine knowledge.21 
If one were unable to reduce a thing to intelligible 
essences--to regular geometric figures--then one could not 
know its properties.22 The regular geometric forms--the 
sphere, the cube, the pyramid, etc.--were "equally eternal 
20. Letters on Sunspots, trans. Stillman Drake, in his 
Discoveries and Opinions of Galileo (Garden City, NY: 
Doubleday, 1957), pp. 123f. Cf. Dialogue, p. 234. 
21. Dialogue, pp. 103f~ cf. p. 204. 
22. Regular lines, Galileo wrote in The Assayer (p. 197), 
are "susceptible of definition and of having their 
qualities and properties demonstrated. Thus the spiral is 
regular, and its definition originates in two uniform 
motions, one straight and the other circular~ so is the 
ellipse, which originates from the cutting of a cone or a 
cylinder~ and so on. But irregular lines are those which 
have no determinacy whatever and are indefinite and casual, 
and hence indefineable~ no property of such lines can be 
demonstrated, nor in a word can anything be known about 
them. Hence to say, 'Such events take place by reason of 
an irregular line' is the same as saying, 'I do not know 
why they occur.' The introduction of such lines is in no 
way superior to the sympathy, antipathy, occult properties, 
influences, and other terms employed by some philosophers 
as a cloak for the correct reply, which would be: 'I do not 
know.' " 
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and prior to the creation of heaven and earth,"23 by which 
Galileo probably meant that God was the Divine geometer in 
a literal sense: as constant objects of his intellect, 
geometrical forms had always existed in his mind, and were 
thereby "co-eternal with God," to borrow a Nee-Platonic 
phrase from Johannes Kepler.24 Galileo therefore equated 
science, true and necessary knowledge of nature, with 
mathematics, true and necessary demonstration. Probable 
arguments were not good enough: conclusions not "proved by 
necessary demonstrations from their primary and 
unquestionable foundations" did not belong in science. 
Natural truths "must follow necessarily, in such a way that 
it would be impossible for them to take place in any other 
manner," for "just as there is no middle ground between 
truth and falsity in physical things, so in rigorous proofs 
one must either establish his point beyond any doubt or 
else beg the question inexcusably."25 "The method that we 
shall follow," Galileo proclaimed in De motu, "will be 
always to make what is said depend on what was said before, 
and, if possible, never to assume as true that which 
23. Postil 113 to Orazio Grassi's Ratio ponderum librae et 
simbellae, quoted by Shea, .£P.· cit., p. 90. Elsewhere 
Galileo described the circle as "more regular so to say, 
than any other [form]." Quoted in ibid., p. 107 n32. 
24. "Geometrical reasons are co-eternal with God," Epitome 
of Copernican Astronomy, Book IV, trans. Charles Glenn 
Wallis, Great Books of the Western World (Chicago: UP, 
1952), Vol. 16, p. 863. 
25. Discourses, pp. 15f: Dialogue, p. 424: The Assayer, p. 
252. Cf. Dialogue, pp. 157ff. 
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requires proof."26 The contradiction of geometry was "the 
bald denial of truth."27 
In Galileo's opinion, then, scientific conclusions 
ought to have the force of "necessary and eternal" 
conclusions.28 But this would only be possible if God 
himself, as Author of the great book of the universe, 
guaranteed that nature displayed the same characteristics 
as the mathematical language in which it was written, and 
further guaranteed that the human mind was capable of 
reading that language. Galileo claimed nothing less. 
Since he took "matter to be inalterable--that is, always 
the same," it was evident that for any "eternal and 
necessary property, purely mathematical demonstrations can 
26. Galileo Galilei On Motion and On Mechanics, trans. I.E. 
Drabkin and Stillman Drake (Madison: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1960), p. 50. Galileo and Descartes 
clearly held a common view of knowledge. Ironically they 
differed on the role of mathematics in their respective 
systems. Descartes shunned a truly mathematical science 
for an essentially Aristotelian method of necessary 
demonstration from qualitative~ priori principles, taking 
geometry as a "paradigm of intelligibility" but not in 
itself as a significant component of science. Galileo, on 
the other hand, actually equated geometry with physical 
science. See McTighe, .2£• cit., p. 376. 
27. The Assayer, p. 164. 
28. This is the substance of his critique of William 
Gilbert in the Dialogue, p. 406. The Italian here is 
"conclusioni naturali, necessarie ed eterne." (Favaro VII, 
356) Salusbury rendered this as "natural, necessary, and 
lasting conclusions," which is not the literal meaning. 
Mathematical Collections and Translations (London, 1661), 
Tome I, p. 370. The Salusbury translation was reprinted in 
a slightly modified form as the Dialogue on the Great World 
Systems, revised and annotated by Giorgio de Santillana 
(Chicago: UP, 1953). See page 415. 
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be produced that are no less rigorous than any others."29 
As "the obedient executrix of God's commands," nature was 
"inexorable and immutable," never transgressing "the laws 
imposed upon her."30 The human mind could comprehend those 
laws specifically because God allowed it "to partake of 
divinity" by understanding numbers. Within the limited 
range of mathematical demonstration, human "knowledge 
equals the Divine in objective certainty, for here it 
succeeds in understanding necessity, beyond which there can 
be no greater sureness."31 Indeed this certainty was 
inborn--by means of the thought experiment, one discovered 
the truth which was already present in his own mind. 
Presumably it had been implanted there by God, "who has 
endowed us with sense, reason, and intellect ••• to give 
us knowledge." Holy Scripture itself could be interpreted 
in more than one way. But necessary demonstration yielded 
unique, certain conclusions which could--and should--aid 
29. Discourses, p. 13. Galileo's words here are the same 
as before: "eterna e necessaria." (Favaro VIII, 51) The 
translation of Henry Crew and Alfonsio de Salvio reads as 
follows: "Since I assume matter to be unchangeable and 
always the same, ••• we are no less able to treat this 
constant and invariable property in a rigid manner than if 
it belonged to simple and pure mathematics." Dialogues 
Concerning Two New Sciences (New York: Macmillan, 1914), p. 
3. 
30. Letter to the Grand Duchess Christina, p. 182. Cf. the 
Letters on Sunspots, p. 136. In a letter to Diodati of 16 
July 1611 (Favaro XI, 149), Galileo referred to nature as 
the "inexorable and immutable minister of God." Quoted by 
McTighe, ~- cit., p. 375. 
31. Dialogue, pp. 11 and 103. For Galileo's Platonic 
theory of knowledge, see Shea, pp. 150-155. 
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even "in the true exposition of the Bible and in the 
investigation of those meanings which are necessarily 
contained therein, for these must be concordant with 
demonstrated truths."32 The Book of Nature and the Book of 
Scripture had in fact the same Author, but the Divine 
geometer had spoken a different language than the Holy 
Spirit, and had written with greater clarity and force. 
Divine Transcendence and the Limits of Human Reason 
Rationalism in theology, according to M.B. Foster, "is 
the doctrine that the actvity of God is an activity of 
reason. It implies the corollary that the activity of 
reason in man, in so far as it is pure, is itself 
divine."33 This, the dominant theme of Galileo's theology, 
served as the foundation for his ideal of a deductive 
science of necessary truths. Yet Galileo never lost sight 
of his only limited capacity to participate in God's 
unlimited understanding of the creation. He believed that 
"the human understanding can be taken in two modes, the 
32. Letter to the Grand Duchess Christina, p. 183. 
Galileo's position in this letter and in the controversy 
which provoked it was always to maintain, with Bellarmine, 
that only an absolutely certain physical demonstration 
could be the basis for interpreting scripture contrary to 
the consensus opinion of the Church Fathers. A merely 
probable demonstration was not enough. Of course Galileo 
thought he had a certain demonstration of the earth's 
motion in his explanation of the tides. See pp. 163f, 166, 
169, 177, 183f, 194f, and 199. Also see Langford, .£.E.• 
cit., pp. 50-78. 
33. "Christian Theology and Modern Science of Nature," Mind 
45 (1936), p. 1. 
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intensive or the extensive." Intensively, with regard to 
"understanding some proposition perfectly, I say that the 
human intellect does understand some of them perfectly," 
and here it "equals the Divine in objective certainty, for 
here it succeeds in understanding necessity, beyond which 
there can be no greater certainty." But extensively, with 
regard to the infinite number of intelligibles, "the human 
understanding is as nothing even if it understands a 
thousand propositions~ for a thousand in relation to 
infinity is zero." And God knows all the infinite 
propositions in a way "exceedingly more excellent than 
ours. Our method proceeds with reasoning by steps from one 
conclusion to another, while His is one of simple 
intuition." While our intellect moves laboriously from one 
step to the next, the Divine mind moves 
like light in an instant~ which is the same as saying 
that everything is always present to it. 
I conclude from this that our understanding, as 
well in the manner as in the number of things 
understood, is infinitely surpassed by the Divine~ 
but I do not thereby abase it so much as to consider 
it absolutely null. No, ••• I recognize and 
understand only too clearly that the human mind is a 
work of God's, and one of the most excellent.34 
Thus for Galileo, our minds differ from God's both in kind 
and in degree~ his knowledge of things is immediate and 
complete, ours only discursive and partiaI.35 
34. Dialogue, pp. 103f. 
35. Burtt, ..2£· cit., p. 82. In the notes (p. 115) to his 
edition of the Dialogue, Santillana attributes to Augustine 
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The discussion about extensive and intensive 
understanding rounded out the First Day of the Dialogue. 
Just before this, the three interlocutors were actively 
debating what the surface of the moon might be like, and 
whether life could be found there. After some guarded 
remarks about the severity of lunar conditions, Salviati 
noted that any creatures living there would have to be 
unimaginably different from terrestrial species, "for this 
seems to me to fit with the richness of nature and the 
omnipotence of the Creator and Ruler." Sagredo nodded 
assent; those who would "make human abilities the measure 
of what nature can do" are extremely rash, for not a single 
effect in nature is fully understood by anyone.36 Indeed 
Galileo confessed in The Assayer that he was "almost 
totally blind when it comes to penetrating the secrets of 
Nature." The more his science partook of perfection, the 
fewer were the conclusions it could demonstrate.37 Instead 
of trying to subsume every effect of nature under an 
all-embracing world system, Galileo contented himself with 
trying to grasp just a small portion of the cornucopia of 
created phenomena.38 His cautious, intellectually modest 
the view "that God can conceive the infinity of numbers as 
a whole and see it in action in His own mind, sine 
cogitationis alternatione." See De Civitate Deixii, 17. 
36. Page 101. 
37. Pages 260 and 189. 
38. See Samuel Sambursky, "The Influence of Galileo on 
Boyle's Philosophy of Science," in Actes au Symposium 
International des Sciences Physiques et Mathematiques dans 
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rationalism--which constrasts so sharply with Cartesian 
presumptiveness--revealed his constant consciousness of and 
deep appreciation for the richness of nature. Nowhere is 
this clearer than in his parable of the cicada, about a 
bird lover who studied the causes of musical sounds.39 He 
learned that sweet songs could arise from an amazing 
variety of sources--hollow sticks, taut strings, squeaky 
hinges, glass goblets, and beating insect wings. Then, 
when he had come to believe that he had exhausted all the 
possibilities, he heard a new sound which he could not 
explain, the song of the cicada. After many false starts 
he finally succeeded in locating a possible mechanism, the 
shaking of certain thin, hard ligaments in the chest. But 
his efforts to determine whether this really was the source 
were too coarse, and he managed only to kill the little 
creature. Now he would never know for sure just what the 
source of the sound had been. From then on, when asked how 
sounds are generated, he would "reply tolerantly that 
although he knew some of the ways, he was certain that many 
more existed which were unknown and unimaginable." Nature 
was so bounteous that even our senses and experience were 
not always sufficient to teach us the means by which an 
effect was produced. 
Because God's thoughts were often above ours, nature 
la Premiere Moitie au XVIIe Siecle (Pisa and Venice, 1958), 
pp. 142-146, and Shea, pp. 90-92. 
39. The Assayer, pp. 235-237. 
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was not open to human reason at every point. God was not a 
Pythagorean: one could not derive the universe from pure 
number.40 Indeed one could not even discover~ posteriori 
the precise pattern of the heavens. In a letter to 
Gallenzone Gallenzoni, Galileo distinguished three classes 
of proportions: the perfect, between proximate numbers: the 
less perfect, between "more remote prime numbers": and the 
imperfect, between incommensurables, these being 
inexplicable. If it were up to us to arrange the motions 
of the celestial bodies, said Galileo, 
we should have to rely on proportions of the first 
type, which are the most rational: God, on the other 
hand, not bothering about symmetries that man can 
understand, has ordered these motions with the help 
of proportions that are not only incommensurable and 
irrational but totally inaccessible to our 
intelligence.41 - --
Again, if a famous architect were to distribute the fixed 
stars throughout the vault of heaven, he would employ 
regular geometric figures and familiar ratios that provide 
the best proportions. But God, "by apparently scattering 
them at random, impresses us as having arranged them 
40. Dialogue, pp. 10-12. 
41. Letter of 16 July 1611 (Favaro XI, 149-150), quoted by 
Clavelin, pp. 447f, emphasis mine. Here Galileo was almost 
certainly following Nicole Oresme, who had argued that the 
ratios of the celestial motions were likely to be 
incommensurable, so that no astrological Great Year of the 
planets could occur. See Edward Grant, ed. and trans., 
Nicole Oresme, De ro ortionibus ro ortionum and Ad auca 
respicientes Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 
1966), pp. 111-122. 
53 
without heeding any rules or any demands of symmetry and 
elegance."42 The problem of the finiteness or infinity of 
the world was also beyond human determination. It is one 
of those questions, Galileo told Liceti, which is "happily 
inexplicable to human reason, and similar perchance to 
predestination, free will, and such others in which only 
Holy Writ and divine revelation can give an answer to our 
reverent remarks."43 God's reasons were his own, not 
man's, and we must not presume to know them. When 
Simplicio objected that Copernican cosmology put a vast, 
useless space between the orbit of Saturn and the fixed 
stars, Salviati replied that "it is brash for our 
feebleness to attempt to judge the reason for God's 
actions," and to label this space superfluous. How inept, 
added Sagredo, are those who would have God make the 
universe "more in proportion to the small capacity of their 
reason than to His immense, His infinite power."44 
* * * * * 
Precisely because God's reasons are often inscrutable, 
Galileo believed it fruitless to speculate on what might 
happen if God, by his absolute power, were to perform an 
42. Loe. cit. 
43. Letter of 10 February 1640 (Favaro XVIII, 293ff), 
quoted by Alexandre Koyre, From the Closed World to the 
Infinite Universe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1957), 
p. 98. 
44. Dialogue, pp. 367-370. 
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act outside the normal course of nature. Unlike his 
medieval predecessors, Galileo rejected arguments based on 
supernatural possibilities, neither taking them seriously 
when introduced by his opponents nor employing them in his 
own natural philosophy, not even in thought experiments, 
the traditional vehicle for the consideration of 
supernatural possibilities. An ideal place to have invoked 
divine intervention would have been in his treatment of a 
body dropped into a tunnel through the earth. Twice 
Galileo suggested this problem, and twice he declined to 
attribute the construction of the tunnel to the power of 
God. The first time he wrote, "if the earth were tunneled 
through the center": the second time, "if the terrestrial 
globe were pierced by a hole." Neither time did he suggest 
an agent.45 Had he accepted the medieval mode of arguing 
secundum imaginationem, surely he would have employed it 
here. 
Equally he refused to accept supernatural 
possibilities proposed by others. Several times in the 
Diaglogue, Simplicio quoted from an anti-Copernican work, 
Disguisitiones mathematicae de controversiis ac novitatibus 
astronomicis, by Christopher Scheiner's pupil Locher. One 
of Lecher's objections was cast in the form of a 
supernatural possibility. If, "by Divine power, or by 
means of some angel, a very large cannon ball were 
45. Ibid., pp. 22 and 236. 
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miraculously transported" to the orbit of the moon and then 
dropped, it is incredible that the ball should remain 
always over the same spot on the earth's surface, if the 
earth is really rotating. At first Salviati took the 
opportunity to calculate how long such a fall would take, 
in order to refute Locher's absurd figure of six days. 
Then the conversation turned to the question of whether an 
internal or an external principle would be sufficient to 
keep the ball moving along with the earth. Locher claimed 
that it could be neither. If an external prfnciple, does 
God cause it by a continuous miracle? Or an angel? The 
air? It could be none of these. Before Simplicio could 
read the arguments, Salviati abruptly cut him off: 
Do not bother to read the objection, for I am not one 
of those who assign such a principle to the 
surrounding air. As to the miracle or the angel, I 
rather lean that way, because whatever begins with a 
Divine miracle or an angelic operation, such as the 
transportation of a cannon ball to the moon's orbit, 
is not unlikely to do everything else by means of the 
same principle.46 
They proceeded to a second argument. If the earth were to 
stop by God's will, would objects on its surface stop, too? 
Would the seagull be unable to hover over the fish? 
Salviati's tongue found his cheek at once: if the earth 
should stop whirling by the will of God, "the birds would 
46. Pages 219 and 237. Galileo's sarcasm betrays his 
disgust with scholastic arguments generally, not just with 
theological ones. Simplicio rightly accused Salviati of 
taking Locher's arguments in jest (p. 240). Cf. p. 258. 
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do whatever that same will of God desired."47 Simplicio 
tried again at the close of the Fourth Day, taking his 
argument this time not from Locher but from "a most eminent 
and learned person," none other than Maffeo Barberini, Pope 
Urban VIII. Referring to Galileo's "proof" of the earth's 
motion from the tides, Simplicio asked whether "God in His 
infinite power and wisdom could have conferred upon the 
watery element its observed reciprocating motion" by some 
means other than that proposed by Salviati. Anticipating 
that his friends would concede that God could have done 
this in many ways beyond our comprehension, Simplicio 
concluded that "it would be excessive boldness for anyone 
to limit and restrict the Divine power and wisdom to some 
particular boldness of his own," echoing the argument that 
Salviati had earlier used against him. Salviati's reply is 
worth quoting in full. 
An admirable and angelic doctrine, and well in accord 
with another one, also Divine, which, while it grants 
to us the right to argue about the constitution of 
the universe (perhaps in order that the working of 
the human mind shall not be curtailed or made lazy) 
adds that we cannot discover the work of His hands. 
Let us, then, exercise these activities permitted to 
us and ordained by God, that we may recognize and 
thereby so much the more admire His greatness, 
however much less fit we may find ourselves to 
penetrate the profound depths of His infinite 
wisdom.48 
47. Page 240. 
48. Page 464. The Pope was understandably very offended by 
the fact that Galileo gave his argument to the foolish 
Simplicio, thus undermining its force and holding him up to 
ridicule. A similar passage appears in the preface (p. 6), 
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I am unable to believe that Galileo meant this sincerely. 
In the Letters on Sunspots, he had rejected just this kind 
of reasoning. The technical apparatus of Ptolemaic 
astronomy, he noted, was "merely assumed by mathematical 
astronomers in order to facilitate their calculations." It 
was 
not retained by philosophical astronomers who, going 
beyond the demand that they somehow save the 
appearances, seek to investigate the true 
constitution of the universe--the most important and 
most admirable problem that there is. For such a 
constitution exists~ it is unique, true, real, and 
could not possibly be otherwise ••• 49 
Galileo's inclusion of the Pope's argument can be explained 
only as a conciliatory gesture, so that he could claim 
(falsely) that he had obeyed the Church's instruction not 
to teach Copernicanism as the true system of the world. 
Earlier in the Fourth Day, as the interlocutors were just 
beginning to discuss the tides, Simplicio had stated that 
unless someone could show him a more reasonable cause for 
where Galileo stated, "It is not from failing to take count 
of what others have thought that we have yielded to 
asserting that the earth is motionless, and holding the 
contrary to be a mere mathematical caprice, but (if for 
nothing else) for those reasons that are supplied by piety, 
religion, the knowledge of Divine Omnipotence, and a 
consciousness of the limitations of the human mind." 
49. Page 97. "Galileo had pointed out that there is no 
sense in looking for many probable reasons if we can find 
the mathematical one, for that single reason becomes 
necessity itself. And this is what the pope could in no 
wise accept." Giorgio de Santillana, "Necessity, 
Contingency, and Natural Law," in M~langes Alexandre KoyrG, 
ed. I.B. Cohen and Rene Taton (2 Vols.~ Paris: Hermann, 
1964) II, 458-470, at p. 463. 
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the ebb and flow of the sea than Salviati's explanation 
(based on the double motion of the earth), he would 
conclude that it is a supernatural effect. Then Salviati 
asked, "do you not believe that the terrestrial globe could 
be made moveable supernaturally, by God's absolute power?" 
Of course, answered Simplicio. All right, said Salviati, 
since we must introduce a miracle, then "let us make the 
earth miraculously move with that motion by which the 
oceans are naturally moved," for this would be far simpler 
and involve fewer miracles than making an immense bulk of 
water perform all the intricate movements associated with 
the tides. Lest we take this seriously, lest we think that 
Salviati had adorned himself with his opponent's mantle, 
Galileo added a warning through the mouth of Sagredo: let 
us not have recourse to miracles unless natural 
explanations fail. Though indeed, he added piously, "to my 
mind all works of nature and of God appear miraculous." I 
feel the same way, said Salviati, with doubtful sincerityr 
"saying that the natural cause of the tides is the motion 
of the earth does not exclude this operation from being 
miraculous."50 
The Ideal of a Deductive Science 
The major emphasis of Galileo's theology of creation 
was on the ability of the human mind to participate in 
50. Pages 42lf. 
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divinity, to read the mathematical language of the 
perfectly written Book of Nature. Therefore his concept of 
science was heavily weighted toward~ priori demonstration. 
This is not to deny that Galileo gave ample room to 
empirical factors--one must not forget that it was his 
telescope which first opened the heavens to modern 
astronomical observation. It is only to assert that his 
ideal science, the kind of science he advocated from the 
beginning of his career and brought to full fruition in the 
Discourses, to wit, the science of mechanics, was given at 
heart much more to deductive demonstration than to 
inductive investigation. I am not claiming that Galileo's 
physics divorced reason from reality, mathematics from 
experience. There can be no doubt that he experimented~ he 
was not the pure abstractionist of Koyre's Galileo Studies. 
Clearly experiment was an essential element in the process 
of discovery. Yet the role he assigned it in his published 
writings was a very different one. In the context of 
justification, it took a back seat to necessary 
mathematical reason. 
The well-known inclined plane experiment from the 
Third Day of the Discourses is a good example of the true 
function of experimentation in Galileo's ideal science.51 
It is Simplicio--the naive sense empiricist--not Salviati, 
who calls for an experimental check on the demonstrated 
51. Pages l69f. 
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conclusions~ this experiment is therefore introduced for 
polemical, not strictly methodological, reasons.52 True 
enough, Salviati says that experiments are "usual and 
necessary" when applying mathematics to the physical world 
and that the Author [Galileo] himself has "not failed to 
make them." Closer attention shows, however, that Galileo 
could not have performed some of the experiments he claimed 
to have performed. This should not be surprising. If, as 
Galileo repeatedly said, a true science consists only of 
necessary mathematical demonstrations, it ought to follow 
that true scientific conclusions require no direct 
confirmation from experience and might even contradict that 
experience. In the Dialogue, when the discussion turns to 
a stone falling from the mast of a ship, Salviati makes the 
claim that "experiment shows ••• that the stone always 
falls" at the foot of the mast, whether or not the ship is 
moving. Now Galileo had in fact done this experiment--at 
least he said as much in his Reply to Ingoli,53 and there 
is no reason to doubt it--but Salviati does not argue on 
that basis. Simplicio rhetorically asks whether Salviati, 
who freely declares the result to be certain, has made the 
test even once. "Without experiment," comes the reply, "I 
52. For this and the following point, see McTighe. 
53. "I have made the experiment--before which, physical 
reasoning had persuaded me that the effect must turn out as 
it indeed does." Quoted in Drake, Galileo at Work, p. 294. 
Note that Galileo's emphasis, even here, is on the 
demonstration, not the verification. 
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am sure that the effect will happen as I tell you, because 
it must happen that way"; and what is more, Simplicio, you 
know it, too. What follows is not a real experiment, the 
dropping of a ball from the mast of a moving ship, but a 
series of thought experiments intended to convince 
Simplicio that he really does "know" the truth of the 
matter already. Similarly Galileo needed no experimental 
confirmation for his conclusions about artillery; "having 
gained by demonstrative reasoning the certainty that the 
maximum of all ranges of shots is that of elevation at half 
a right angle, the Author demonstrates to us something that 
has perhaps not even been demonstrated through experiment," 
the fact that two shots fired at complementary angles will 
travel equally far. Causal knowledge of one effect 
(maximum range occurs at 45 degrees) leads to "the 
understanding and certainty of other effects without need 
of recourse to experiment. 11 54 As he told Pietro Carcavy, 
even if it is not the case that experience supports the 
conclusions, "my demonstrations founded on my supposition 
lose nothing of their force and conclusiveness. 11 55 Or, as 
he wrote to Baliani, "it would matter little" [poco ~ ~ 
importerebbe] whether demonstrated conclusions correspond 
well to the "accidents" of nature.56 
54. Discourses, pp. 245f. 
55. Letter of 5 June 1637 (Favaro XVII, 90-91), quoted by 
McTighe, p. 374. 
56. Letter of 17 January 1639 (Favaro XVIII, 12-13); 
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Little wonder, then, that Galileo plainly contradicted 
experience on more than one occasion. It is not true, for 
example, that two pendulums, one with a narrow arc and the 
other with a wide arc, will swing together for hundreds of 
oscillations, as Galileo claimed in the Discourses.57 Nor 
is it true that if a wooden ball and a lead ball are 
dropped together, the former at first moves more swiftly 
than the latter, and then the latter overtakes and passes 
the former. Yet Galileo explicitly said, in the essay 
~ersion of De motu, that he had "often tested" this.58 In 
fairness to Galileo, let me add that he later stated the 
correct law~ nevertheless he did claim experimental 
verification for this "fact." Perhaps the most glaring 
contradiction of experience was his "proof" of the earth's 
motion from the tides. According to his theory, high and 
low tides ought to be twelve hours apart. Unfortunately, 
as every sailor in Italy knew all too well, they are only 
six hours apart. In his first treatise on the subject, an 
unpublished but widely circulated work from 1616, Galileo 
flatly rejected this fact, calling it a "fallacy which has 
led writers to imagine many useless fantasies."5 9 In the 
Dialogue he admitted the six hour interval for the 
McTighe, loc. cit. 
57. An "experiment gives firm assurance of this." Pages 
226f. 
58. On Motion and On Mechanics, p. 107. 
59. Favaro v, 388f~ quoted by Shea, p. 177. Shea's 
excellent treatment (pp. 172-186) of this topic accents the 
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Mediterranean, but attributed it to secondary causes~ the 
primary cause (the earth's double motion) was still 
credited with producing just one full cycle per day. 
This is not to deny that observation and experiment 
had an essential function in Galilean science. Reason can 
err~ a true conclusion can be obtained from false premises. 
Shea has convinced me that Galileo discovered this for 
himself in his early work on floating bodies, and that he 
subsequently paid more attention to what Shea has called 
"the regulative use of experiment," whereby Galileo would 
try experimentally to confirm at least one conclusion of a 
theory.60 Galileo was concerned that the world he was 
deducing would not be just a world on paper, but the world 
of our sense experiences. There was nothing wrong with 
inventing motions and deriving properties, but he wanted to 
discover the motion which freely falling bodies actually 
have in nature. He was confident that he had done so, 
"chiefly for the very powerful reason that the essentials 
successively demonstrated by us correspond to, and are seen 
to be in agreement with, that which physical experiments 
show forth to the senses."61 The world could only be 
mathematical, but which mathematical laws it incorporated 
was a matter for empirical determination. 
~ priori nature of Galileo's science. 
60. See pp. 14-44. 
61. Discourses, p. 153. 
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Galileo's God of Pure Reason 
I introduced this study of Galileo's thought with the 
observation that the theology expressed in his scientific 
works met an apologetic need: the new science of nature 
required a new metaphysics for its justification. Although 
it has not been my primary purpose to prove this assertion, 
I believe it is a correct assessment of the facts. A 
significant commitment to a mathematical science of ideal 
bodies is evident very early in Galileo's career, surely in 
De motu if not before. I can find no evidence of a similar 
commitment to a theology of creation prior to the sixth 
decade of his life, when he was openly confronting the 
Aristotelianism that had so thoroughly entrenched itself in 
the European intellectual establishment. I am aware of 
nothing which would support the claim that Galileo's 
philosophy of nature derived in any way from his theology 
of creation. It appears rather that Galileo's theology was 
designed specifically to undergird an approach to nature 
which he had already embraced for other reasons. 
My primary purpose has been to examine the elements of 
that theology, in order ultimately to determine the impact 
of voluntarism on early modern science. Galileo believed 
that an omnipotent God had fully thought into the world the 
very patterns and figures of mathematical forms. Mortals 
could share in the objective certainty of the divine mind 
whenever they could think God's thoughts after him through 
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the deductive rigor of geometry. Some things, such as the 
precise order established in the heavens, were forever 
beyond the reach of human reason. Other things, aspects of 
the richness of creation, limited the scope of our inquiry. 
Nevertheless it was possible to attain enough certain 
truths to constitute a demonstrative science of nature. A 
Platonic "likely story" simply would not suffice. Thus 
Galileo's was a cautious rationalism~ but rationalism, not 
voluntarism, it primarily remained. God's will had no 
place in Galilean natural philosophy. And if God's power 
was the acknowledged source of nature's bounty, the notion 
that that power might inhibit our search for causes was 
laughed out of court. The principal function of divine 
omnipotence was to insure that God's geometrical thoughts 
would be embodied perfectly in the objects of his making, 
so that the ideal world of circular motions and regular 
geometric forms would indeed be directly applicable to the 
world of experience. And since the world was mathematical 
to the core, our failure completely to know God's works was 
due more to the defect of a finite understanding than to 
the exercise of divine freedom. Thus it was largely "from 
within," as Maurice Clavelin has concluded, "that Galileo's 
rationalism was forced to take stock of its own 
limitations, that it came to appreciate its true scope and 
thus armed itself against an oversimplified interpretation 
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of reality. 11 62 
62. Page 447. 
CHAPTER THREE: 
GOD, MAN, AND NATURE: THE PROBLEM OF CREATION 
; 
IN THE NATURAL PHILOSOPHY OF RENE DESCARTES 
The physics of Descartes, therefore, depends in a 
particular way upon his metaphysics~ it provides merely the 
lower stages in an hierarchical system that definitely 
reaches back to God. Descartes is prepared to work out a 
whole system of the universe, starting with matter (or with 
what the philosophers call extension) on the one hand, and 
movement, purely local motion, on the other. Everything 
was to be accounted for mathematically, either by 
configuration or by number. His universe, granting 
extension and movement in the first place, was so based on 
law that no matter how many different universes God had 
created--no matter how different from one another these 
might be at the start--they were bound, he said, to become 
like the universe we live in, through the sheer operation 
of law upon the primary material. Even if God had created 
a different universe at the beginning, it would have worked 
itself round to the system that now exists • 
• • • He tells us in the Discourse on Method that from 
one or two primary truths that he had established he was 
able to reason his way by the deductive method to the 
existence of the heavens, the stars and the earth, as well 
as water, air, fire, minerals, etc. When it came farther 
than that--to the more detailed operations of nature--he 
needed experiment to show him in which of the alternative 
ways that were possible under his system God actually did 
produce certain effects~ or to discover which of the 
effects--amongst a host of possible alternatives that his 
philosophy would have allowed or explained--God had 
actually chosen to produce. 
--H. Butterfield, The Origins of Modern Science, 
pp. 125f 
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Descartes' relationship with the Church provides a 
sharp contrast to that of the feisty Galileo.I In an 
effort to avoid controversy over his Copernican views, 
Descartes repressed his early treatise Le Mende and 
cautiously guarded his statements about cosmology in his 
later Principia philosophiae. The quiet Frenchman, whose 
motto was "bene qui latuit, bene vixit," lived abroad for 
most of his adult life in order to steer clear of clerical 
interference. His writings, both public and private, are 
filled with avowed refusals to touch on questions of 
revealed theology, which Descartes believed "must not be 
subjected to human reasoning." Theology, he thought, 
should be kept as simple as possible~ subjecting its truths 
to critical examination had led to "sects and heresies" and 
was unnecessary, for even "simple country folk" had as much 
1. The standard edition of Descartes' letters and writings 
is the Oeuvres de Descartes, edited by Charles Adam and 
Paul Tannery, 12 Vols. (Paris: Leopold Cerf, 1897-1913). I 
will usually quote from one of the many reliable English 
translations, which will be cited as they appear~ when 
quoting from Descartes' correspondence, I will give the 
location of the letter in Adam and Tannery, which will be 
abbreviated simply as AT, followed by the volume number and 
the page(s). If no other source is given, then the 
translation is my own. Adrien Baillet's two volume La Vie 
de Des-Cartes (Paris: Daniel Horthemels, 1691), which has 
recently been reprinted in one binding (Geneva: Slatkine 
Reprints, 1970), was also printed in an abridged form 
(Paris: LaVeuve Marbre Cromoysi, 1693) which was translated 
into English by someone identified only as "S.R." (London: 
R. Simpson, 1693). A good modern biography in English is 
Jack R. Vrooman, Rene Descartes, a Biography (New York: 
Putnam, 1970). 
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chance of attaining heaven as the most learned scholar.2 
Whatever God had revealed concerning his own person or his 
actions, Descartes was content to believe, whether or not 
he could comprehend it.3 Like his Jesuit teachers at 
LaFleche, Descartes left his skepticism at the church door, 
thereby remaining orthodox in his faith if not always in 
his philosophy. 
Nevertheless Descartes made every endeavor to develop 
a rational theology, if not a revealed theology. His 
entire system of knowledge, notably including his natural 
philosophy, was grounded upon the bedrock of God's 
existence and attributes. God had established certain laws 
in nature, and had imprinted notions of them in our souls. 
The natural world was nothing other than "the order and 
2. Descartes' Conversation with Burman, trans. and ed. by 
John Cottingham (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1976), pp. 
46f. See the similar passage in the first part of the 
Discourse on Method, as found in Paul J. Olscamp, trans., 
Discourse on Method, O tics, Geometr, and Meteorolo 
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965 , p. 8. In the future, 
Cottingham's translation will be cited as Burman. 
References to Olscamp's translation will indicate the 
relevant treatise and section (for example: Meteorology 
II), followed by the page number(s) in Olscamp. 
3. Passages to this effect are not difficult to find. Two 
of the clearest are found in the Principles of Philosophy, 
trans. by Valentine Rodger Miller and Reese P. Miller 
(Boston: Reidel, 1983), propositions I.25 and IV.207 (pp. 
13 and 288, respectively). Hereafter this translation will 
be called Principles. Another good example appears in the 
Objections and Replies II, trans. by Elizabeth S. Haldane 
and G.R.T. Ross in the second volume of their two-volume 
set, The Philosophical Works of Descartes (New York: Dover, 
1955), p. 47. Hereafter this set will be abbreviated as 
HR, with the number of the appropriate volume. 
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disposition" of things laid down by God in the creation, 
and human nature was nothing other than a "complexus" of 
things given by God.4 Thus his philosophy of nature 
embraced the three elements of the classical Christian 
doctrine of creation--God, man, and nature--and the 
relations among them (see Figure 1). With his radical 
emphasis on the unity of God's will and intellect, 
Descartes denied the traditional distinction between these 
two aspects of God's being, yet his thought exhibits all 
too clearly a tension between them which manifested itself 
in his methodology as a tension between empirical and~ 
priori elements.5 Descartes believed that, "because God 
alone is the true cause of all things which are or can be, 
it is obvious that we shall be following the best method of 
philosophizing if we strive to deduce the explanation of 
the things created by him from the knowledge of God Himself 
{and the notions innate in us}"; so that "from a 
4. Method V (Olscamp, p. 34); Meditations VI (HR I, 192). 
The natural light of reason, for which Descartes is so well 
known, was "natural" only in the scholastic sense of being 
a creation of God, completely dependent on him. For 
Descartes, God was the source of all truth, both 
metaphysically and epistemologically. See Michael A. 
Grill, "Descartes: A Re-interpretation of His Metaphysics 
and Science," doctoral dissertation at the University of 
Kansas (1975), pp. ii-iv. 
5. Like much seventeenth century thought, that of Descartes 
is characterized by a "genuine sense of contingency and 
[human] limitation being in conflict with a tendency to 
regard the power of the rational mind as virtually 
limitless." Bernard Williams, "Descartes," in The 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Paul Edwards (New York: 
Macmillan, 1967), Vol. 2, p. 349. 
Figure 1: 
God, Man, and Nature 
God 
Nature~<'----..~ Man 
(Created order) (Created mind) 
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consiaeration of his attributes we can investigate the 
truth of ••• things, since he is their cause."6 Taking 
this as my chief clue, I will try to show how Descartes' 
conception of God's attributes informed both the content 
ana the methoa of his natural philosophy. Those attributes 
which were most important for his natural philosophy were 
Goa's infinite perfection, his immense power, and his 
veracity and immutability as manifested in his infallible 
aecrees.7 As we shall see, it was God's perfection which 
determined the outcome of the aialogue between his power 
ana his immutability. 
The Relation between Goa ana His Creation 
Descartes was content to allow God to be God in all of 
his transcendence. In contrast to all other possible 
entities, God was the only necessary being~ existence was 
linked inextricably with his nature.8 Fixed between man 
and God, creature and Creator, was an awesome gulf, 
unbridgeable by finite minas. Undoubtedly this emphasis on 
6. Principles I.24 and 75 (Miller, 12f ana 35)~ the phrase 
in brackets appears only in the French edition. 
7. Among those things most to our advantage, Descartes told 
the Princess Elisabeth, "the first ana principal is that 
there exists a God upon whom all things depend, whose 
perfections are infinite, power immense, decrees 
infallible ••• " Letter of 15 September 1645 (AT IV, 
288)~ trans. by John J. Blom in his Descartes, His Moral 
Philosophy and Psychology (New York: UP, 1978), p. 150. In 
the future this translation will be called "Blom." 
8. See Meditations V (HR I, 18lf) and Objections and 
Replies I (HR II, 20). 
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what Boyce Gibson has called God's "amplitude" derived from 
Descartes' strong orientation to the Augustinian theology 
of the Oratorians. From 1626 to 1628, while he was in 
Paris, Descartes was in close touch with Gibieuf, whose De 
libertate dei et creaturae (1632) denied that human 
standards were applicable to God and asserted God's 
indivisible unity and unrestricted freedom.9 In the same 
manner Descartes denied to Aquinas and the scholastics the 
right to reason analogically from man to God, undermining 
any attempt to make God in man's own image. As an 
inseparable unity of will and reason, God was radically 
free, his will not subject to constraint by his 
intellect.IO Descartes' theology of an infinite, 
transcendent God interacted with his nascent physical 
theory in three main places, which I will discuss in turn 
as follows: the boundless size of the universer the 
9. See A. Boyce Gibson, The Philosophy of Descartes 
(London: Methuen, 1932), pp. 23f. There are "marked 
resemblances between the original elements of the two men's 
[Descartes and Gibieuf] theories of the relation of God to 
the world." (p. 45) 
10. See Norman Kemp Smith, New Studies in the Philosophy of 
Descartes: Descartes as Pioneer (New York: St. Martin's 
Press, 1953), pp. 163-168, and Etienne Gilson, Laliberte 
chez Descartes et la theologie (Paris: F. Alcan, 1913), 
passim. Cf. passages, quoted below, on the eternal truths. 
Professor Richard Greaves has kindly called to my attention 
the interesting fact that the English Puritan (and 
voluntarist) William Ames was teaching at Franeker while 
Descartes was enrolled there in 1629-30. Whether this is 
significant or not I am unable to say. See Keith L. 
Sprunger, The Learned Doctor William Ames7 Dutch 
Back rounds of En lish and American Puritanism (Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press, 1972 , p. 80. 
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impropriety of teleological explanations~ and the nature of 
the eternal truths.11 
It is "the nature of the infinite," Descartes wrote in 
the third Meditation, "that my nature, which is finite and 
limited, should not comprehend it ••• "12 When confronted 
with infinite quantities, conventional mathematics was 
powerless to avoid falling into paradoxes. Any number that 
we could comprehend could not be infinite.13 Because God 
alone could be said positively to have no limits in any 
respect, Descartes reserved for him the term "infinite." 
All other things--numbers, stars, parts of a body, the 
extension of the world--were said negatively to be 
"indefinite" because they had no discernible limits~ 
because this apparent lack of limits resulted from "the 
11. These correspond to Kemp Smith's "three stages in 
Descartes' conversion to this new theology." Note, 
however, his admission that "How far they came in actual 
succession, or how far they may have overlapped, remains a 
matter of conjecture." (p. 170) My concern is the 
substance, not the order, of the stages. 
12. HR I, 166. 
13. See the well known letter to Mersenne, 15 April 1630 
(AT I, 146f), quoted by Kemp Smith,.££· cit., p. 171. 
Mersenne had stated that the number of feet [pieds] in an 
infinite line would be three times greater than the number 
of yards [toises], so that the latter number could not be 
infinite. Descartes replied that we have no basis for 
comparing infinite quantities. What ground, he asked 
Mersenne, "have you for judging whether one infinite can or 
can not be greater than another? It would no longer be 
infinite, were we able to comprehend it." Actual, or 
completed, infinities have disturbed philosophers and 
mathematicians from Aristotle to Cantor. The apparent 
intractability of infinity has often been associated with 
the inscrutable but omniscient mind of God. 
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weakness of our own understanding rather than from the 
nature of these things," they could not be construed as 
limitless in a positive sense.14 This position, which 
reflected real theological and philosophical concerns, was 
not without practical benefits for Cartesian natural 
philosophy. If Descartes denied the motion of the earth 
"more carefully than Copernicus and more truthfully than 
Tycho," he also denied the infinity of the world more 
subtly than anyone else: 
We shall find no difficulty in the indefinite 
extension of the World, if only we would consider 
that, in saying it is indefinite, we are not denying 
that perhaps in the very truth of the matter it may 
be finite, but we are only denying that there are any 
bounds or extremities which can be comprehended by 
our intellect. The which estimate seems to me much 
saner and safer than that of those who, in affirming 
the world to be finite, dare to prescribe limits to 
the works of God.15 
As Descartes well knew, this argument for an apparently 
boundless universe as an expression of God's infinite power 
had been used by Nicolas of Cusa and others.16 It was 
14. Principles I.26-27 (Miller, p. 13f); see also 
Objections and Replies I (HR II, 17) and Burman, p. 33. 
Alexandre Koyr~ has covered this in From the Closed World 
to the Infinite Universe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 
1957), pp. 100-124. 
15. Excerpta ex Cartesio: MS de Leibniz (AT XI, 656), 
quoted by Albert G.A. Balz, Descartes and the Modern Mind 
(New Haven: Yale UP, 1952), p. 360. Cf. the letter to 
Chanut of 6 June 1647 (AT v, 50ff) and Principles III.19-20 
(Miller, 91), where the remark about Copernicus and Tycho 
can be found. 
16. See the letter to Chanut mentioned in the previous note 
(Blom, 219f). On Cusa, see Alexandre Koyre, From the 
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intended partially to answer the serious objection that, in 
an infinite (or at least indefinitely large) universe, the 
place of humanity would be too insignificant and might even 
render God incapable of special providences. Descartes' 
two prominent female correspondents voiced this argument, 
which he did not accept. A finite power, he replied, might 
be exhausted by such a world, but "the more we esteem the 
works of God to be great, the more we note the infinity of 
his powerr and the more this infinity is better known to 
us, the more we are more greatly assured it extends to all 
the particular actions of men."17 The real problem, as 
Descartes saw it, was not so much with our inadequate 
conception of God's power as with our exalted conception of 
our own place in the creation. Men commonly suppose, he 
told Burman, that 
they themselves are the dearest of God's creatures, 
and that all things are therefore made for their 
benefit. They think their own dwelling place, the 
earth, is of supreme importance, that it contains 
everything that exists, and that for its sake 
everything was created. But what do we know of what 
God may have created outside the earth, on the stars 
and so on?l8 
Closed World to the Infinite Universe, pp. 5-24. 
17. From Descartes' letter to Elisabeth of 6 October 1645 
(AT IV, 304ffr Blom, 163). Elisabeth expressed her 
reservations in a letter of 30 September 1645 (AT IV,30lffr 
Blom, 154ff)r Queen Christina of Sweden conveyed her 
opinions through Chanut, the French ambassador to her 
court, in his letter of 11 May 1647 (AT X, 617ffr Blom, 
213-218). Descartes answered Chanut on 6 June 1647 (ATV, 
50ffr Blom, 218-224). 
18. Page 36. Also see Principles III.2 and the letter to 
Hyperaspistes from August 1641 (AT III, 422), in Anthony 
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Apart from the revelation of Scripture, we are not privy to 
God's eternal counsel: "we ought not to presume so much of 
ourselves as to think that we are the confidants of his 
intentions." Therefore "we shall not undertake any 
reasonings from the end which God or nature set himself in 
creating these things, {and we shall entirely reject from 
our Philosophy the search for final causes}."19 Even if we 
could know the purpose of a thing, arguing from ends--which 
was "Aristotle's greatest fault"--could never lead to a 
knowledge of the thing itself.20 
Nowhere is Descartes' confession of God's absolute 
power more apparent than in his doctrine of the eternal 
truths, mathematical or logical propositions and statements 
pertaining to the essences of entities:21 for example, "the 
Kenny, Descartes: Philosophical Letters (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1981), p. 117. Hereafter 
this translation will be abbreviated as K. 
19. Principles I.28 (Miller, 14): the bracketed phrase is 
found only in the French edition. That Scripture can tell 
us certain of God's purposes is clear from Burman (p. 19) 
and elsewhere. 
20. Burman, loc. cit.: also see Meditations IV (HR I, 173). 
Gassendi's objectons to Descartes' amputation of final 
causes from physics is found in Objections and Replies V 
(HR II, 174-176): Descartes' reply is on p. 222: "We cannot 
pretend that certain of God's purposes rather than others 
are openly displayed: all seems to be equally hidden in the 
abyss of his inscrutable wisdom." 
21. Several studies have focused on this aspect of 
Cartesian thought. In addition to Gilson, .2£• cit., and 
portions of the general literature, see Emile Brehier, "The 
Creation of Eternal Truths in Descartes' System," in 
Descartes: A Collection of Critical Essa s, ed. by Willis 
Doney (New York: Macmillan, 1967 , pp. 192-208: T.J. 
Cronin, "Eternal Truths in the Thought of Descartes and His 
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whole is greater than its part," "two plus two equals 
four," "it is impossible for the same thing to be and not 
to be at the same time," and "he who thinks cannot not 
exist while he is thinking."22 The orthodox position was 
the scholastic doctrine of created essences as found in 
Aquinas' Contra gentiles: God can know particulars because 
his essence contains in itself the essences of all possible 
particulars. Eternally related to God's understanding, 
these uncreated possible essences could take on actual 
existence by an-act of divine will with the creation of the 
bodies to which they applied. Hence Aquinas put into the 
mind of God archetypes which depended upon his essence or 
Adversary," JHI 21 (1960), 553-559, and Objective Being in 
Descartes and in Suarez (Rome: Gregorian UP, 1966): Harry 
Frankfurt, "Descartes on the Creation of the Eternal 
Truths," The Philosophical Review 86 (1977), 36-57: Amos 
Funkenstein, "Descartes, Eternal Truths, and the Divine 
Omnipotence," SHPS 6 (1975), 185-199: A. Boyce Gibson, "The 
Eternal Veritiesand the Will of God in the Philosophy of 
Descartes," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society n.s. 30 
(1929-30), 31-54: Michael Heyd, Between Orthodoxy and the 
Enlightenment: Jean-Robert Chouet and the Introduction of 
Cartesianism in the Academy of Geneva (The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1982), and "From a Rationalist Theology to 
Cartesian Voluntarism: David Derodon and Jean-Robert 
Chouet," JHI 40 (1979), 527-542: Anthony Kenny, "The 
Cartesian Circle and the Eternal Truths," Journal of 
Philosophy 67 (1970), 685-700: Margaret J. Osler, "Eternal 
Truths and the Laws of Nature: The Theological Foundations 
of Descartes' Philosophy of Nature," unpub. paper; and 
Norman J. Wells, "Descartes' Uncreated Eternal Truths," The 
New Scholasticism 56 (1982), 185-199. Only Funkenstein and 
Osler have tried to relate the eternal truths to Cartesian 
natural philosophy. Only Osler has tried to make a 
specific connection to Descartes' methodology. Although my 
argument was formed independently of hers, I have 
benefitted greatly from her paper. 
22. See Principles I.49 (Miller, 22); Burman, 34; the 
letter to Mersenne of 17 May 1638 (AT II, 134ff; K, 55); 
among other places. 
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nature but not upon his will.23 Though owing allegiance to 
nothing outside God's nature, the divine will nevertheless 
could not endorse things which were inherently impossible 
and was bound to accept the truths presented to it by the 
divine intellect. Thus God could not "make a genus not 
predicable of its species, or bring it about that the radii 
of a circle are not equal, or that a rectilinear triangle 
should not have its three angles equal to two right 
angles."24 Suarez taught, beyond this, that God knows the 
eternal truths necessarily, because they are true in 
themselves; "man is a rational animal" was true because the 
idea of man itself contains the idea of rationality. In 
his Disputationes metaphysicae, a work which Descartes 
cited in his reply to Arnauld's objections, Suarez wrote: 
"Habent perpetuam veritatem, non solum ut sunt in divine 
intellectu, sed etiam secundem se ac praescindendo ab 
illo." 25 
Descartes' own views on the eternal truths are found 
in several letters from the 1630s and 1640s, in his replies 
23. Summa contra gentiles I, 54. See Brehier, pp. 194f, 
and Frankfurt, p. 38. 
24. Aquinas, Contra gentiles I, 84 and 25, quoted by 
Gibson, The Philosophy of Descartes, p. 272, and Kenny, 
"The Cartesian Circle and the Eternal Truths," p. 695, 
respectively. 
25. Disp. XXXI, sec. 12, no. 40, quoted by Brehier, p. 195. 
Also see Cronin, "Eternal Truths," pp. 557-559. Descartes' 
citation of Suarez can be found at AT VII, 235 (HR II, 
107). 
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to the fifth and sixth sets of objections, and in the 
Conversation with Burman.26 Perhaps for prudence' sake, 
Descartes did not specify the theologian(s) against whose 
position he was reacting. Gilson denies that it was Thomas 
or any schoolman; Garin argues that it was Suarez.27 In 
any case his general position was diametrically opposed to 
the prevailing Renaissance conception in which both God and 
man were bound by inexorable laws.28 Descartes stated his 
views most clearly in his letter to Mersenne of 15 April 
1630, from which I quote at length: 
{A} The mathematical truths which you call eternal 
have been laid down by God and depend on him entirely 
no less than the rest of his creatures. Indeed to 
say that these truths are independent of God is to 
talk of him as if he were Jupiter or Saturn and to 
subject him to the Styx and the Fates. {B} Please do 
not hesitate to assert and proclaim everywhere that 
it is God who has laid down these laws in nature just 
as a king lays down laws in his kingdom. There is no 
single one that we cannot understand if our mind 
turns to consider it. They are all inborn in our 
minds just as a king would imprint his lawsonthe 
26. The letters to Mersenne of 15 April, 6 May, and 27 May 
1630 (AT I, 145-6, 149-50, 151-3), and 17 May 1638 (AT II, 
138); to Mesland on 2 May 1644 (AT IV, 118f); to Arnauld on 
29 July 1648 (AT v, 223f); and to More on 5 February 1649 
(ATV, 272f); all of these have been translated by Kenny. 
The other locations are HR II, 226 and 248f, and Burman, 22. 
27. Gilson,~· cit., pp. 34-75; P. Garin, Theses Car-
tesiennes et Theses Thomistes (Paris: Desclee de Brouwer, 
no date), pp. 130-138. For useful summaries of the 
considerable literature on this subject, see the appendix 
to Cronin, Objective Being in Descartes and Suarez, and 
Wells, "Descartes and the Scholastics Briefly Revisited," 
The New Scholasticism 35 (1961), 172-190. 
28. See James D. Collins, Descartes' Philosophy of Nature 
(American Philosophical Society Quarterly Monograph Series, 
5; Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1971), p. 10. 
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hearts of all his subjects if he had enough power to 
do so. • • • 
{C} It will be said that if God had established 
these truths he could change them as a king changes 
his laws. To this the answer is: 'Yes he can, if his 
will can change.' 'But I understand them to be 
eternal and unchangeable.'--'I make the same 
judgement about God.' 'But his will is free.' -- 'Yes, 
but his power is incomprehensible.' {D} In general we 
can assert that God can do anything that we can 
comprehend but not that he cannot do what we cannot 
comprehend. It would be rash to think that our 
imagination reaches as far as his power.29 
To aid in discussing this passage, I have divided it into 
four sections (A through D). 
{A} and {D}: God's Absolute Power Over the Eternal Truths 
Descartes refused to allow that anything could be 
independent of God. He could not accept any view which 
subordinated God's will to his reason or failed adequately 
to distinguish between our finite minds and God's infinite 
mind. The eternal verities did not exist in any sense 
apart from God and were true only because God had willed 
them to be so, for "the existence of God is the first and 
most eternal of all possible truths and the one from which 
alone all others derive."30 As the efficient and total 
cause of all things, as author of both the essence and the 
existence of every creature, God had created the eternal 
truths freely. Just as 
29. K, llf. The italicized words represent Latin words in 
a French letter. 
30. Letter to Mersenne, 6 May 1630 (K, 14). 
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he was free not to create the world, so he was no 
less free to make it untrue that all the lines drawn 
from the centre of a circle to its circumference are 
equal. And it is certain that these truths are no 
more necessarily attached to his essence than other 
creatures are.31 
God's creative acts had been radically free, undetermined 
by any considerations whatsoever. 
God did not will to create the world in time because 
he saw that it would be better thus than if he 
created it from all eternity7 nor did he will the 
three angles of a triangle to be equal to two right 
angles because he knew that they could not be 
otherwise. On the contrary, because he worked to 
create the world in time it is for that reason better 
than if he had created it from all eternity7 and it 
is because he willed the three angles of a triangle 
to be necessarily equal to two right angles that this 
is true and cannot be otherwise7 and so in other 
cases •••• 
For if any reason for what is good had preceded his 
preordination, it would have determined him toward 
that which it was best to bring about7 but on the 
contrary because he determined himself towards those 
things which ought to be accomplished, for that 
reason, as it stands in Genesis, they are very good7 
that is to say, the reason for their goodness is the 
fact that he wished to create them so •••• Hence 
neither should we think that eternal truths depend 
upon the human understanding or on other existing 
things7 they must depend on God alone, who, as the 
supreme legislator, ordained them from all 
eternity.32 
Here, as in {B} from the letter to Mersenne quoted above, 
Descartes employed the voluntarist metaphor of God as the 
ruler of creation who sovereignly imposed on his kingdom 
laws of his own choosing, the products of his free will and 
31. Letter to Mersenne, 27 May 1630 (K, 15). 
32. Objections and Replies VI (HR II, 248-251). 
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not of a rational necessity external to himself. Nothing 
could be farther from the Greek conception of creation as 
found, for example, in Galen,33 or in the (post-
Cartesian) Protestant rationalist David Derodon, who held 
that God's wisdom and goodness necessitated the creation of 
the world and that his creative act was limited to the 
actualization of possible entities whose essences were 
intrinsic to themselves.34 Thomas Aquinas and John Calvin 
had argued that divine goodness was the reason for 
creation, although they had denied that there had been any 
necessity in this--while God of necessity willed his own 
being, he did not of necessity will other beings--rather he 
had had freedom of indifference.35 
33. With regard to omnipotence, said Galen, "the doctrine 
of Moses differed from that of Plato and of all the Greeks 
who have correctly approached the study of Nature. For 
Moses, God has only to will to bring matter into order, and 
matter is ordered immediately. We do not think in that 
way; we say that certain things are impossible by nature 
and these God does not even attempt; he only chooses the 
best among the things that come about." On the Uses of the 
Parts IX, 14, quoted by Francis Macdonald Cornford, Plato's 
Cosmology (London: Kegan Paul, 1937), p. 36. 
34. Disputatio de libertate (Geneva, 1662); see Michael 
Heyd, Between Orthodoxy and the Enlightenment, p. 60. For 
Derodon, possible essences were co-eternal with God: "Non 
est autem absurdum ut sint actu duo entia aeterna, quorum 
unum sit actu aeternum ens simpliciter, absolute et 
perfecte, scilicet Deus. Alterum vero sit actu aeternum 
ens secundum quid, conditionale et imperfecte, scilicet res 
possibilis." Quoted by Heyd, "From a Rationalist 
Theology," p. 534. 
35. Summa theologica I, 19, 11-111; Summa contra gentiles 
I, 74-82; Institues of the Christian Religion I.V.6. See 
Heyd, "From Rationalist Theology," p. 531. Descartes' 
insistence on the unity of God's will and God's intellect 
led him into deep water in several places, among them the 
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For Descartes, God's omnipotence required him to be 
able to perform even what we understand to be logically 
impossible. The limits of human reason were only that--the 
limits of human reason, not of possible truths. The 
eternal verities were "inherently as contingent as any 
other propositions" which God could have freely willed to 
create.36 God could have made it untrue that twice four is 
eight or that one and two make three, though if he had done 
so, the minds he in fact gave us would be incapable of 
comprehending it, for God has so created our minds "as to 
be able to conceive as possible things which God has wished 
to be in fact possible," but not those things "which God 
could have made possible, but which he has in fact wished 
to make impossible." So we perceive as necessary those 
truths which God has willed to be necessary, but this did 
question of necessity and indifference as applied to God. 
Thus he told Burman (pp. 32f) that, "although God is 
completely indifferent with respect to all things, he 
necessarily made the decrees he did, since he necessarily 
willed what was best, even though it was of his own will . 
that he did what was best. We should not make a separation 
here between the necessity and the indifference that apply 
to God's decrees: although his actions were completely 
indifferent, they were also completely necessary •••• In 
reality the decrees could not have been separated from God: 
he is not prior to them or distinct from them, nor could he 
have existed without them. It is clear enough[!?] how God 
accomplishes all things in a single act." This amazing 
passage might be explained away by attributing to Burman an 
incorrect transcription or to Descartes a change of 
opinion, but I prefer to interpret it as simple confusion, 
the outcome of Descartes' position that an act of free 
divine will ("his actions were completely indifferent") was 
simultaneously an act of rational intellection ("they were 
also completely necessary"). 
36. Quoting Frankfurt, "Descartes on the Creation of the 
Eternal Truths," p. 42. 
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not mean "that he willed them necessarily: for it is one 
thing to will that they be necessary, and quite another to 
will them necessarily, or to be necessitated to will 
them."37 It would be rash indeed to think that our 
imagination reaches as far as his power. 
But there was still one thing which even God could not 
do. He could not act against his own perfect nature, for 
then he would not be God. Although he could, by his 
absolute power, have made it untrue that two plus two is 
four, he could not make it untrue that "God exists"--he 
could not deprive himself of existence, for that would be 
an imperfection.38 Hence there were two kinds of eternal 
truths in Cartesian philosophy. Uncreated eternal truths, 
which could not be otherwise, flowed necessarily from God's 
essence. Created eternal truths, free products of the 
divine will, appeared to the human mind to be necessary but 
could have been otherwise if God had so willed.39 Clearly, 
37. Letter to Mesland, 2 May 1644 (K, 151): Objections and 
Replies VI (HR II, 251). Cf. the letters to Beeckman on 17 
October 1630 (AT I, 156ff) and to Arnauld on 29 July 1648 
(AT v, 223f), in which Descartes refused to maintain that 
God could not perform certain things, such as logical 
contradictions (K, 17 and 236f). Descartes' position here 
appears to be identicle to that of those medievals who 
taught that there was a theological logic superior to 
ordinary logic. Professor Edward Grant kindly pointed this 
out to me. 
38. Letter to***, March 1642 (AT v, 544). 
39. See Wells, "Descartes' Uncreated Eternal Truths." J.D. 
Collins further divides the uncreated eternal truths into a 
single "most eternal" truth--that God exists--and several 
"more eternal" truths of the divine being and nature. See 
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the uncreated eternal truths were not subject to 
change--they were in fact "eternal." But what of the 
created truths? If they were wholly dependent on God's 
unfettered will and not upon any external standard of 
reason, how could they be eternally valid, and how could 
they possibly be discovered by the human mind? These are 
separate questions, and the answer to each lies buried in 
Descartes' understanding of God's attributes, especially 
his perfection. 
{C}: Divine Unity and Perfection 
The eternal validity of the created truths obviously 
hinged upon the immutability of God's will, for if he were 
able to change his will, he would be able to change the 
eternal truths. In a definite break with scholastic 
tradition but fully in keeping with his emphasis on divine 
transcendence, Descartes refused to accept any distinction 
between God's will and his reason--a distinction, he 
thought, which told nothing of God but reflected a purely 
human limitation. In reality, he said, God's nature was an 
indivisible unity of will and reason.40 Therefore a change 
in God's will would entail a change in his understanding, 
but a change in his understanding would be an imperfection, 
since at some time his understanding would have been 
Descartes' Philosophy of Nature, pp. 13-15. 
40. Principles I.23 (Miller, 12); letter to Mesland of 2 
May 1644 (K, 151); Burman, 3lf. 
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mistaken or incomplete7 therefore God's will could not 
change.41 "Concerning the decrees of God which have 
already been enacted," Descartes told Burman, "it is clear 
that God is unalterable with regard to these, and, from the 
metaphysical point of view, it is impossible to conceive 
the matter otherwise."42 Thus, although Descartes did not 
think that "the essence of things, and those mathematical 
truths which may be known about them," were independent of 
God, he nevertheless affirmed "that because God so wished 
it and brought it to pass, they~ immutable and 
eternal."43 
In the opinion of Boyce Gibson, Descartes established 
a division, irreconcilable with his doctrine of God's 
unity, at the moment of God's decision to create a specific 
eternal verity. Prior to that moment, his will was supreme 
over his intellect, in that no proposition necessarily 
required his assent~ but once he had determined which 
propositions would be true eternally, his intellect gained 
41. This is M.J. Osler's interpretation, which I find very 
convincing. See "Eternal Truths and the Laws of Nature." 
42. Page 32. In the same place Descartes discussed the 
efficacy of prayer in light of God's immutable decrees, 
concluding that "God is indeed quite unalterable, and that 
he has decreed from eternity either to grant me a 
particular request or not to grant it." Cf. the similar 
passage in Descartes' letter to Elisabeth of 6 October 1645 
(AT IV, 304ff~ Blom, 163f) and the resignation of his 
letter to Huygens upon the death of Huygens' wife (20 May 
1637, AT I, 371). 
43. Objections and Replies V (HR II, 226), emphasis his. 
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the upper hand, for he could not change his mind.44 It is 
not clear to me that Descartes believed what Boyce Gibson 
assumes he did--to wit, that God created the eternal truths 
in time and not from eternity--although he did believe that 
the world had been created in time.45 It remains true that 
Descartes' God could have done things differently, even 
outlandishly so, but what he had done could not be undone. 
When Burman asked if God could have commanded a creature 
even to hate him, Descartes could see no reason to deny it. 
"We simply do not know what he could have done," he said, 
but "God could not now do this."46 
Descartes heavily stressed God's immutable nature as 
one of his perfections. It was another divine perfection 
to be 
immutable and completely constant in the way he acts. 
Thus, with the exception of those changes which 
either manifest experience or divine revelation 
renders certain, and which we perceive or believe to 
occur without any change on the part of the Creator~ 
we must not suppose that there are any others in his 
works, for fear of accusing him of inconstancy. From 
this it follows that it is completely consistent with 
reason for us to think that, solely because God moved 
44. The Philosophy of Descartes, p. 277. 
45. The key passage would appear to be Objections and 
Replies VI (HR II, 248), part of which was quoted above at 
note 32. 
46. Page 22, emphasis mine. A related proposition, "that 
God might have made creatures independent of him," is 
considered in Descartes' letter to Mesland of 2 May 1644 
(AT IV, 110). Descartes called this an "evident 
contradiction," yet refused to say that God was bound by it 
(K, 151). 
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the parts of matter in diverse ways when he first 
created them, and still maintains all this matter 
exactly as it was at its creation, and subject to the 
same law as at that time; he also always maintains in 
it an equal quantity of motion.47 
This understanding of divine immutability was a curious one 
indeed: "that God is immutable and that, acting always in 
the same way, he always produces the same effect."48 To 
hold that God's nature and will did not change was entirely 
orthodox, but to hold in addition that God always acts in 
the same way was not the usual interpretation. Even John 
Calvin, who staunchly defended the constancy of God's will, 
readily admitted that God's actions could change.49 For 
Descartes, however, divine immutability meant the constancy 
47. Principles II.36 (Miller, 58). 
48. Le Monde: ou Traite de la lumiere, trans. by Michael 
Sean Mahoney (New York: Abaris Books, 1979), p. 69. 
Hereafter this translation will be called Mahoney. 
49. Speaking of divine repentance, Calvin said that "we 
ought not to understand anything else under the word 
'repentance' than change of action, because men are wont by 
changing their action to testify that they are displeased 
with themselves. Therefore, since every change among men 
is a correction of what displeases them, but that 
correction arises out of repentance, then by the word 
'repentance' is meant the fact that God changes with 
respect to his actions. Meanwhile neither God's plan nor 
his will is reversed, nor his volition altered; but what he 
had from eternity foreseen, approved, and decreed, he 
pursues in uninterrupted tenor, however sudden the 
variation may appear in men's eyes." Institutes of the 
Christian Religion I.17.13, trans. by Ford Lewis Battles 
and ed. by John T. McNeill (2 Vols.; London: SCM Press, 
1960) I, 227. Descartes' view of prayer (see note 42 
above) was not very different from this, but Calvin seems 
to have been unperturbed by the notion of God acting in 
different ways at different times--always, of course, in 
harmony with his immutable decrees. 
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of his action in the world as manifested in the 
conservation of quantity of motion, whereby God maintained 
every motion precisely as it was at that moment, and not as 
it had been an instant before. Apart from external 
causes--collisions with other bodies were the only possible 
agents--bodies at rest would remain at rest and those in 
motion would continue in motion. Rectilinear motion could 
be apprehended in a single instant, and so was the most 
fundamental of all.50 God was therefore the active 
efficient cause of motion, just as he was "the cause of 
created things, not only in respect of their coming into 
existence, but also in respect of their continuing to 
exist," for "in order to be conserved in each moment in 
which it endures, a substance has need of the same power 
and action as would be necessary to produce and create it 
anew, supposing it did not yet exist"~ the distinction 
between creation and conservation was "solely a distinction 
of the reason."51 For Descartes, then, the laws of nature 
were not simply decrees, they were enactments whereby God 
immutably and universally sustained what he had fully 
50. Principles II.36-39 (Miller, 58-61)~ Le Monde, chap. 7 
(Mahoney, 71-73). As Peter Machamer has pointed out, 
Descartes was following the traditional Neoplatonic and 
Christian-Aristotelian practice of connecting a phenomenon 
directly to one of God's attributes. See "Causality and 
Explanation in Descartes' Natural Philosophy," in P.K. 
Machamer and R.G. Turnbull, eds., Motion and Time, Space 
and Matter: Interrelations in the Histor and Philoso h of 
Science Columbus: Ohio State UP, 1976 , pp. 168-199. 
51. Objections and Replies V (HR II, 219)~ Meditations III 
(HR I, 168)~ also see Method V (Olscamp, 37). 
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determined.52 
Yet decrees they no less remained, immutable and 
universal in their efficacy. In spite of his voluntaristic 
conception of freely ordained, direct divine action in 
nature, Descartes placed over nature not the providential 
miracle worker of the Bible, but the constant preserver of 
the coming Enlightenment. A God who performed miracles 
could stand in the way of the universal demonstrative 
science that Descartes so earnestly desired to create.53 
Apart from those actions which "divine revelation renders 
certain"54--and these did not include the Eucharist55 
--Descartes displayed a skeptical attitude towards 
miracles.56 He also mitigated God's sovereignty with his 
belief that, while the regular laws of nature were the 
direct result of divine superintendence of motion, the 
actual, highly irregular paths of particles were produced 
52. J.D. Collins, .£E.• cit., pp. 48f. "Laws of nature are 
quite pregnantly laws for nature, in the sense of being 
dependent and instrumental expressions of the manner in 
which the divine power conveys movement to the whole field 
of material particles." (p. 27) 
53. Le Monde, chap. 7 (Mahoney, 77). 
54. Principles II.36 (Miller, 58); I take this to refer 
implicitly to miracles. 
55. See his natural explanation in Objections and Replies 
IV (HR II, 116ff) and in his letter to Mesland of 9 
February 1645 (AT IV, 16lff; K, 154-159). 
56. See the letters to Mersenne of 19 June 1639 (AT II, 
557-568) and 28 October 1640 (AT III, 205-221), and Method 
V (Olscarnp, 37). 
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by "the diverse disposition of matter," for which God was 
apparently not responsible.57 Indeed at one point 
Descartes was willing to entertain the thought that God 
might have created the world in a state of chaos from which 
he brought order by his laws,58 but he later abandoned this 
as unbecoming to the character of God.59 
{B} God and Human Knowledge: Certainty and Innate Ideas 
If it is one thing to assert that God made certain 
propositions true for all eternity, it is quite another to 
assert that the human mind is capable of discovering them 
and of recognizing them as truths. Descartes raised this 
question in the Third Meditation: 
But when I took anything very simple and easy in the 
sphere of arithmetic or geometry into consideration, 
e.g. that two and three together made five, and other 
things of the sort, were not these present to my mind 
so clearly as to enable me to affirm that they were 
true? Certainly if I judged that since such matters 
could be doubted, this would not have been so for any 
other reason than that it came into my mind that 
perhaps a God might have endowed me with such a 
nature that I may have been deceived even concerning 
things which seemed to me most manifest. But every 
time that this preconceived opinion of the sovereign 
power of a God presents itself to my thought, I am 
constrained to confess that it is easy to him, if he 
wishes it, to cause me to err, even in matters in 
57. Le Mende, chap. 7 (Mahoney, 75). 
58. LeMonde, chap. 6 (Mahoney, 55); Cf. Method V (Olscamp, 
35). This reminds one of Genesis 1:1-3. 
59. Principles III.47 (Miller, 107f), especially the French 
version. 
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which I believe myself to have the best evidence.60 
The God who created us could do all things, and "we do not 
know whether he chose to make us in such a way that we are 
always mistaken, even about those things which appear to us 
to be the best known of all."61 But the God who created us 
was yet perfect, and Descartes recognized "it to be 
impossible that he should ever deceive me7 for in all fraud 
and deception some imperfection is to be found, and •• 
the desire to deceive without doubt testifies to malice or 
feebleness, and accordingly cannot be found in God."62 
This proposition, "that God cannot lie," was "the 
foundation of faith and all our belief"7 those theologians 
who denied it, in opposition to Augustine and Aquinas, 
would "have to abandon all certainty." Precisely because 
God "is veracious in the highest degree," Descartes 
believed that it followed "that all things which we clearly 
perceive are true," beyond any possibility of doubt, or 
else God would be a deceiver. Thus our conceptions of the 
eternal truths of mathematics and other propositions 
perceived clearly and distinctly were in fact true.63 As 
60. HR I, 158. 
61. Principles I.5 (Miller, 4). 
62. Meditations IV (HR I, 172)7 cf. Principles I.29 (Mi 
ller, 15). 
63. See the letter to Mersenne of 21 April 1641 (AT III, 
358ff7 K, 99) and Principles I.29-30 (Miller, 15)7 cf. 
Method IV (Olscamp, 32). 
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the ruler of creation, God had implanted in the human mind 
certain "innate" ideas, "such as the idea of God, mind [or 
soul], body, triangle, and in general all those which 
represent true immutable and eternal essences," that is, 
the eternal truths.64 
The process whereby Descartes established the eternal 
truths as eternal truths closely paralleled the methodic 
doubt for which he is well known. Having denied that God 
was subject to any rational constraint whatsoever, 
Descartes was nevertheless faced with the hard fact that a 
perfect God could not act against his own nature by 
changing his mind, and therefore whatever he had freely 
chosen to make true would remain true for all eternity. 
The human investigator might doubt the truth of any 
proposition except the proposition that the ability to 
doubt implied the existence of the doubter; the clarity and 
distinctness of this indubitable .truth became the 
cornerstone for the edifice of certain knowledge. The evil 
genius who haunted the sleep of reason was God shorn of His 
veracity, the creator of arbitrary and continually changing 
64. Letter to Mersenne of 16 June 1641 (AT III, 383; K, 
104); cf. Method IV (Olscamp, 33). The idea of God was 
"the mark of the workman imprinted on his work," the very 
imago dei. (Meditations III~ HR I, 170) In the early 
Regulae, Descartes had spoken of "certain primary germs of 
truth implanted by nature" rather than implanted directly 
by God. (HR I, 12) His mature works are more explicitly 
theistic. 
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essences.65 Doubt was transformed into the means for 
arriving at eternal truths, "an acid for etching away what 
does not belong to a thing's essence."66 In the absence of 
prejudices--to wit, by sticking to the Cartesian method of 
doubt--all men would clearly perceive the same set of 
eternal truths, the very essences ordained by God.67 What 
is more, if we were unable to conceive of something, if we 
"found a contradiction in attempting to conceive it 
clearly," we could then conclude that it did not exist at 
all,68 which is just what Descartes did with regard to 
atoms and the void. He could not conceive of matter apart 
from extension, nor extension apart from matter~ the idea 
of body was contained in the idea of space no less than the 
idea of a mountain was contained in the idea of a valley. 
To imagine "that God removes all the air in a room without 
putting any other body in its place," he wrote to Mersenne, 
"you will have to suppose~ ipso that the walls of the 
room will touch each other; otherwise you will be thinking 
65. See Brehier, "The Creation of the Eternal Truths," pp. 
200-201. 
66. Jonathan Ree, Descartes (London: Allen Lane, 1974), p. 
71. Ree stresses the "reductive ideal" of Cartesian 
thought rather than the "deductive ideal" found by many 
other scholars and upon which I will build the rest of my 
argument. 
67. Principles I.SO (Miller, 22). 
68. Meditations VI (HR I, 185): "For there is no doubt that 
God possesses the power to produce everything that I am 
capable of perceiving with distinctness, and I have never 
deemed that anything was impossible for him, unless I found 
a contradiction in attempting to conceive it clearly." 
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a self-contradictory thought." Hence a vacuum was 
impossible.69 Again, because matter and extension were 
inseparable, an atom was necessarily an extended body which 
was clearly and distinctly divisible, and anything clearly 
and distinctly conceived to be divisible had in fact to be 
divisible, at least by God if not by human agents. So 
atoms could not exist either.70 The same issue came up 
again in Descartes' letter to Arnauld of 29 July 1648 and 
in his letter to More of 5 February 1649.71 In both places 
Descartes tempered his earlier position (in the 
Principles), conceding that he could not place limits on 
God's absolute power to perform a contradicton. But the 
thrust of each passage was to affirm anew that Descartes 
could not comprehend such an act, so that as far as he was 
concerned, it could not be considered a live possiblilty. 
As he said in his reply to the authors of the Sixth 
Objections, "it is useless to inquire how God could from 
all eternity bring it about that it should be untrue that 
twice four is eight": "it would be irrational to doubt 
concerning that which we correctly understand, because of 
that which we do not understand and perceive no need to 
69. Letter of 9 January 1639 (AT II, 479: K, 62). See the 
forceful treatment of matter and extension in the Regulae 
(HR I, 58f): cf. Principles II.4-18 (Miller, 40-48). 
70. Principles II.20 (Miller, 48f). 
71. ATV, 219-224 and 267-279 (K, 233-245). 
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understand."72 Metaphysical doubt gave way to practical 
certainty. In the last resort, as Reijer Hooykaas has 
noted, "human reason became the measuring-rod for the truth 
of existence!"73 
The Relation between Created Minds and Created Objects 
Descartes recognized that the possibility of certain 
knowledge depended solely on the knowledge of God. Once 
God was known in all of his veracity and constancy, 
Descartes had "the means of acquiring a perfect knowledge 
of an infinitude of things, not only of those which relate 
to God himself and other intellectual matters, but also of 
those which pertain to corporeal nature in so far as it is 
the object of pure mathematics."74 First of all, he "tried 
to discover the general principles, or first causes, of all 
that is or can be in the world, without for this purpose 
considering anything but God alone, its Creator, and 
without deriving these principles from anything but certain 
seeds of truth which are naturally in our souls."75 In 
72. HR II, 251. 
73. Religion and the Rise of Modern Science (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 1972), p. 42. His analysis rings true: "There 
cannot be a void, not because God could not have made it, 
but because He does not will it to be, and I know this 
because my reason cannot conceive how a void could possibly 
exist." 
74. Meditations V (HR I, 185)~ cf. Principles III.43 
(Miller, 104f). 
75. Method VI (Olscamp, 52). One's view of the Cartesian 
method in natural philosophy is in large part determined by 
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spite of appearances, Descartes did not see himself as an 
ivory tower philosopher who built a world on paper 
according to his personal whims. The actually existing 
world is what he wanted to explain, and this could not be 
done with imaginary principles "established through the 
caprice of several armchair thinkers."76 It was 
nevertheless true that, as G.A.J. Rogers has said, "a large 
part of [Cartesian] physics could be done in an 
armchair."77 With the infinite perfections of God as his 
sole starting point, Descartes "tried to demonstrate all 
those laws about which we might have any doubt, and to show 
that they are such that even if God had created many 
worlds, there would have been none of them where these laws 
failed to be observed."78 The knowledge of those laws--the 
three laws of motion and the eternal truths of 
mathematics--was 
which passages one chooses to take as normative. Some 
scholars rely heavily on the second part of the Discourse 
on Method, but I agree with the bulk of Cartesian 
scholarship in taking the sixth part of the Discourse as 
the most definitive statement. The rest of this passage 
will be quoted below. 
76. From a lost letter to Villebressieu, indirectly 
recorded by Baillet and quoted by Collins,.££• cit., p. 29. 
Even the most~ priori thinker of all, Plato, fully 
acknowledged the role of the senses at the most fundamental 
level~ the very sight of the heavens, said Timaeus (47A), 
"has caused the invention of number" and motivated science. 
Cornford, Plato's Cosmology, p. 157. 
77. See "Descartes and the Method of English Science," 
Annals of Science 29 (1972), 237-255, at p. 240. 
78. Method V (Olscamp, 35f). 
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so natural to our souls that we cannot but judge them 
infallible when we conceive them distinctly, nor 
doubt that, if God had created many worlds, the laws 
would be as true in all of them as in this one. 
Thus, those who can examine sufficiently the 
consequences of these truths and of our rules will be 
able to know effects by their causes and (to explain 
myself in the language of the schools) will be able 
to have demonstrations~ priori of everything that 
can be produced in that new world.79 
For Descartes, then, it was not enough merely to know a set 
of laws that described or explained selected phenomena. 
The laws of physics had to be necessary truths, valid in 
all possible worlds and capable of yielding certain 
knowledge through~ priori demonstration. If God did 
indeed create many worlds, each with its own sun, there was 
only one kind of world, one which the human mind could 
penetrate completely because God had established certain 
truths both in the world and in the minds of men. Only the 
certainty of mathematics, which he deeply wished his 
physics should resemble, was acceptable to him. Unless it 
could be deduced from indubitable common notions with the 
force of a mathematical demonstration, a proposition could 
not be accepted as true. Even this was not enough. If he 
could only say how things could be, without showing that 
they could not be otherwise, Descartes would think he knew 
nothing.BO 
79. Le Monde, chap. 7 (Mahoney, 75-77). 
80. Objections and Replies II (HR II, 131)~ Principles 
II.64 (Miller, 76f)~ letter to Mersenne of December 1640 
(AT III, 258). 
99 
This is not to say that Cartesian physics was 
mathematical--its sparse use of mathematics was perhaps its 
greatest flaw--but rather that mathematics was, for 
Descartes, the paradigm of science, the model of certain 
knowledge. He admired mathematics not so much for its 
content as for its method of moving from one proposition to 
another, by which the certainty of the antecedent flowed 
undiminished down to the consequent. Perceived clearly and 
distinctly by the light of reason alone, the innate ideas 
functioned as seeds of truth from which, by deduction, the 
tree of knowledge grew. Now for Descartes, deduction was 
not limited to syllogistic reasoning, but included any 
sequence of propositions in which could be perceived a 
clear and distinct relation between the premises and the 
conclusion. At least in part, deduction was an ampliative 
process whereby intuition moved to extend itself to embrace 
previously uncertain notions. It was the natural light of 
reason, not the form of the argument, which established the 
validity of a proposition.Bl 
Having "thus discovered certain principles as regards 
81. See Desmond Clerke, "Physics and Metaphysics in 
Descartes' Principles," SHPS 10 (1979), 89-112, esp. p. 
lOOf, and "Descartes' Use of 'Demonstration' and 
'Deduction'," The Modern Schoolman 54 (1977), 333-344; 
Charles Larmore, "Descartes' Empirical Epistemology," in 
Stephen Gaukroger, ed., Descartes: Philosophy, Mathematics 
and Physics (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1980), pp. 6-22; N. 
Kemp Smith, New Studies, pp. 67-71; and A. Boyce Gibson, 
The Philosophy of Descartes, p. 155. Descartes expounded 
his view of deduction at length in parts two through seven 
of the Regulae (HR I, 4-21). 
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material objects, derived not from the prejudices of our 
senses but from the light of reason, so that their truth is 
indubitable," Descartes went on to consider "whether we are 
able to explain all the phenomena of nature by these 
principles alone: and we must begin with those phenomena 
which are the most universal and on which the rest depend, 
namely, the general structure of this whole visible 
world."82 Proceeding to reconstruct the world, Descartes 
examined what were the first and most ordinary 
effects that we could infer from these causes. And 
it seems to me that I thereby discovered the skies, 
the stars, an earth, and even, on the earth, water, 
air, fire, minerals, and certain other such things, 
which are the commonest and simplest of all, and thus 
the easiest to understand.83 
The first and most ordinary effects mentioned here were the 
basic parts of the heavens and the earth (the subject of Le 
Mende), though later (in the Principles) Descartes seems to 
have limited them to celestial phenomena alone.84 Whatever 
they were, he claimed to have "discovered" them, by which 
he could only have meant that he had successfully derived 
them from first principles, so that their causes had been 
found. That he believed he had found such causes for the 
82. Principles III.I. Here I have quoted from two 
different translations, first from Elizabeth Anscombe and 
Peter Geach, Descartes: Philosophical Writings (New York: 
Scribner's, 1954), p. 222, and then from Miller, p. 84. 
83. I have returned to the passage in Method VI (Olscamp, 
52). 
84. See the introductory letter and principle III.42 
(Miller, xxiv-xxv and 104). 
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general effects cannot be questioned. Assuredly, he said, 
if the principles I use are very obvious, if I deduce 
nothing from them except by means of a Mathematical 
sequence, and if what I thus deduce is in exact 
agreement with all natural phenomena; it seems {to 
me} that it would be an injustice to God to believe 
that the causes of the effects which are in nature 
and which we have thus discovered are false. For we 
would then be accusing him of having made us so 
imperfect as to be liable to make mistakes, even when 
correctly using our reason {which he has given us}.85 
For Descartes, then, science was rooted in 
metaphysics, the first part of true philosophy, and 
achieved a sure and certain knowledge of nature by holding 
to what I will call the deductive ideal: from indubitable 
first principles derived from the divine perfection and 
immutability, one could deduce the world and all that is 
therein.86 But God was more than perfect and changeless; 
85. Principles III.43 (Miller, 104f); bracketed portions 
are found only in the French edition. 
86. See the introduction to the French edition of the 
Principles. Most commentators have agreed that the primary 
thrust of Descartes' method was deduction from first 
principles, however much he may have allowed for empirical 
factors. A few scholars, most notably Olscamp and Clerke, 
have pushed the opposite view to the point where they would 
make of Descartes a modern, hypothetico-deductivist. The 
view I am defending here gives ample consideration to 
empirical elements without losing sight of the overall 
structure of Cartesian thought. Errors result from giving 
too much weight either to Descartes' pressing philosophical 
goals or to his work in natural science, as if he were 
either a philosopher or a scientist but not both. See the 
introduction to Olscamp's translation of the Discourse on 
Method, Optics, Geometry, and Meteorology and the following 
works by Desmond Clerke: "The Ambiguous Role of Experience 
in Cartesian Science," PSA 1976 ed. Frederick Suppe and 
Peter D. Asquith (East Lansing: Philosophy of Science 
Association, 1976), Vol. 1, pp. 151-164; "Physics and 
Metaphysics in Descartes' Principles," SHPS 10 (1979), 
102 
he was also omnipotent, and his unlimited power could and 
did produce an unlimited variety of effects. To be sure, 
there could be only one universe--only one general fabric 
of the world--but within this framework were an infinity of 
possible particulars. Thus when Descartes wanted to 
descend to those effects that were more particular, 
so many diverse ones presented themselves to me that 
I did not believe it possible for the human mind to 
distinguish between the forms or species of objects 
that are on the earth, and an infinity of other ones 
which could have been, if it had been the will of God 
to put them there. Nor, as a result, did I believe 
it possible to direct them to our use, unless it be 
by arriving at their causes through their effects and 
by using many particular experiments.87 
If the particular effects could not be predicted from 
metaphysical truths--rather, if far too many particulars 
followed therefrom--then how was Descartes to know what the 
effects actually were? Simple observation would tell him. 
Clearly he already knew what phenomena he wished to 
explain; his problem was to "discover" them by showing that 
they followed from first principles and the general 
89-112; and Descartes' Philosophy of Science (University 
Park: The Pennsylvania State UP, 1982). Also see Laurens 
Laudan, "The Clock Metaphor and Probabilism: The Impact of 
Descartes on English Methodological Thought, 1650-65," 
Annals of Science 22 (1966), 73-104. 
87. Method, loc. cit. On 5 April 1632 Descartes wrote to 
Mersenne tha~"inthe treatise which I now have in hand 
[Le Monde], after the general description of the stars, the 
heavens and the earth, I did not originally intend to give 
an account of particular bodies on the earth but only to 
treat of their various qualities. In fact, I am now 
discussing in addition some of their substantial forms, and 
trying to show the way to discover them all in time by a 
combination of experiment and reasoning." (AT I, 242; 
K, 22) 
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effects. Once he had "reflected upon all the objects that 
[had] ever presented themselves" to his senses, that is, 
once he had determined what the actual effects were, 
Descartes ventured to say 
that I never noticed a single thing about them which 
I could not explain quite conveniently through the 
principles I had discovered. But I must also confess 
that the power of nature is so ample and so vast, and 
these principles so simple and so general, that I 
almost never notice any particular effect such that I 
do not see right away that it can be derived from 
these principles many different ways; and my greatest 
difficulty is usually to discover in which of these 
ways the effect is derived. And to do that I know no 
other expedient than again to search for certain 
experiments which are such that their result is not 
the same when we explain the effect by one 
hypothesis, as when we explain it by another.88 
Descartes saw the impossibility of a purely~ priori 
physics all the way down to the last detail. If the 
general effects could be deduced from first principles 
alone, the particulars could not. In a letter to Mersenne, 
Descartes revealed his dream of an~ priori physics while 
confessing his inability to create it: 
For the last two or three months I have been rapt in 
the heavens. I have discovered their nature and the 
nature of the stars we see there and many other 
things which a few years ago I would not even have 
dared to hope; and now [I have] become so rash as to 
seek the cause of the position of each fixed star. 
For although they seem very irregularly distributed 
in various places in the heavens, I do not doubt that 
there is a natural order among them which is regular 
and determinate. The discovery of this order is the 
key and foundation of the highest and most perfect 
science of material things which men can ever attain. 
88. Ibid. 
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For if we possessed it we could discover a priori all 
the different forms and essences of terrestrial 
bodies, whereas without it we have to content 
ourselves with guessing them~ posteriori from their 
effects •••• I think that the science I describe 
is beyond the reach of the human mind: and yet I am 
so foolish that I cannot help dreaming of it though I 
know that this will only make me waste my time as it 
has aleady done for the last two months.89 
Why did such a physics come to naught? Early on, in 
the Regulae, Descartes conceded that some things were 
beyond the reach of human knowledge, but not because of a 
defect in intelligence. Rather because "the nature of the 
problem itself," or the fact that the investigator is 
human, could prevent one from learning what he wanted to 
know: success might depend "upon a certain experiment which 
he is unable to perform" or it might be "that the knowledge 
desired wholly exceeds the limits of the human 
intelligence. 11 90 In his later works, starting with the 
sixth part of the Discourse on Method (quoted above), 
Descartes developed this theme at greater length, stressing 
interchangeably now the fecundity of his principles, now 
the complexity of nature, and now the creative power of 
God. The principles we have discovered, he said, "are so 
vast and so fertile that their consequences are far more 
numerous than the observable contents of the visible 
universe": they were "so simple and so general" and the 
power of nature was "so ample and so vast" that a given 
89. Letter of 10 May 1632 (AT I, 250-252: K, 23f). 
90. Rules VII and VIII (HR I, 20-28). 
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phenomenon could be explained in any number of ways.91 Of 
course this was only to say that his principles were so 
vague and so imprecise that they appeared to possess great 
fecundity--from virtually any initial arrangement of 
particles and motions, he thought, he could deduce the 
present form of the world.92 The objects of physics were 
"composite," that is, they were characterized by a 
multiplicity of detail, which contrasted with the 
simplicity of mathematics.93 The indeterminate nature of 
the particulars was attributed also to the inscrutability 
of God's willr reason alone was insufficient to determine 
which of the possible objects God had chosen to create. 
Similarly, although we could be certain that the universe 
consisted of one and the same matter, that this matter was 
divisible into parts with essentially cyclical motions, and 
that the quantity of motion in the world was always 
conservedr nevertheless the unaided human reason was unable 
to determine the exact sizes, shapes, speeds, and 
trajectories of these particles, for God could have 
91. Principles III.4, quoting from Anscombe and Geach, .2£· 
cit., p. 223r Method, loc. cit. 
92. Principles III.47 (Miller, 107f). Cf. passages in note 
58 above. That the initial state of the world should be 
almost irrelevant to its present state was a curious claim 
for a deterrninist--indeed it shows how undeterministic (in 
a mathematical sense, at least) Cartesian physics really 
was. See Bernard Williams, Descartes: The Project of Pure 
Enquiry (Hassocks, Sussex: Harvester, 1978), pp. 270-275. 
93. Meditations I (HR I, 147). See Boyce Gibson, The 
Philosophy of Descartes, pp. 192-194. 
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arranged them "in an infinity of ways; experience alone 
should teach us which of all these ways he chose. 11 94 As 
Descartes cautioned his readers in the opening paragraphs 
of the third part of the Principles, "we must pay attention 
to two things": God's infinite power and our limited 
reason.95 
* * * * * 
Experiment was thus an essential part of Cartesian 
science, since many questions could not be answered without 
it.96 Although the law of refraction could not be 
determined from experience, the index of refraction of a 
substance could be found only by an appeal to the 
phenomenon.97 In order to deduce the motion of the blood, 
the disposition of the organs of the heart and of the parts 
of the body had to be known.98 Since he lacked "the 
94. Method, loc. cit.; Principles III.46 (Milier, 106). 
95. III.1-2 (Miller, 84). The chief purpose of these two 
principles, of course, was to lay the foundation for a 
universe of indefinite dimensions. 
96. On Descartes as experimentalist, see Baillet, La Vie I, 
195-197; the works by Desmond Clerke cited above; L.J. 
Beck, The Method of Descartes: A Study of the "Regulae" 
(Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1952), pp. 239ff; and Spyres 
Sakellariadis, "The Role of Evidence in Descartes' 
Scientific Method," doctoral dissertation at the University 
of Pittsburgh (1980), esp. chapter 2, "The Problem of 
Descartes' Experimental Practice"; and "Descartes's Use of 
Empirical Data to Test Hypotheses," Isis 73 (1982), 68-76. 
97. Regulae VIII (HR I, 23f) and Dioptrics II (Olscamp, 
81), respectively. 
98. Method V (Olscamp, 41); letter to Elisabeth of May 1646 
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required experimental evidence," he would not dare to 
undertake an explanation of human embryology.99 So many 
experiments were needed for the progress of human knowledge 
that Descartes despaired of ever having the time and the 
resources to complete them. In order to do all the 
experiments of use to him, he told Mersenne, he would have 
to be wealthier than the King of China.100 
The need for experiment in Cartesian physics was 
critical, yet its place was subordinate to the dictates of 
reason. Experience was unambiguous "only when dealing with 
the wholly simple and absolute." Ingenious experiments 
were called for only at the latter stages of investigation~ 
if performed too early, they were likely to mislead us. In 
the beginning, it was better to rely on ordinary sense 
experience.101 Indeed, when Mersenne asked Descartes to 
tell him how to make useful experiments, the latter replied 
that, without devoting excessive attention to minor 
details, one ought to make general surveys of the most 
common things, for these were certain and could be known 
(AT IV, 406~ Blom, 180). 
99. Letter to the Princess Elisabeth of 31 January 1648 (AT 
V, 112). Descartes nevertheless did undertake this 
explanation. 
100. Letter of 20 October 1642 (AT III, 590). On the need 
for experiments, see Method VI (Olscamp, 52f), the preface 
and article IV.188 of the Principles (Miller, xxvi and 
275f), and the letter to Huygens of 4 December 1637 (AT I, 
506f). 
101. Regulae VIII (HR I, 23f)~ Method VI (Olscamp, 51). 
See Desmond Clerke, "The Ambiguous Role of Experience." 
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without expense--has Descartes had Bacon for breakfast? 
But with regard to the more particular experiments, it was 
impossible not to make many that were superfluous, or even 
false, if one did not know the truth of things before 
making them.102 Quite so--as Gilson has observed, 
Descartes was concerned principally with explanations, not 
with facts.103 Nowhere is this clearer than in his opinion 
of Galileo: 
It seems to me that he lacks a great deal in that he 
is continually digressing and never stops to explain 
one topic completely, which demonstrates that he has 
not examined them in an orderly fashion and that, 
without having considered nature's first causes, he 
has sought only the reasons for a few particular 
effects, and thus he has built without a sure 
foundation.104 
If Descartes could not place an experiment into the context 
of his own system of nature, he disregarded it. 
Experiments performed by others, he wrote in the Discourse 
on Method, were too clouded with extraneous ingredients to 
yield a clear truth: beyond this, "because those who 
performed these experiments have forced themselves to make 
102. Letter of 23 December 1630 (AT I, 195f). 
103. Etudes sur le role de la pensee medievale dans la 
formation du systeme cartesien (Paris: J. Vrin, 1930), 
p. 137. 
104. From the letter to Mersenne of 11 October 1638 (AT II, 
379), quoted by Vrooman, Descartes, p. 115. Predictably 
enough, Descartes rejected Galileo's conclusions about the 
fall of bodies in vacuo as "without foundation"--if Galileo 
had truly understood the nature of gravity, he would have 
known that bodies could have no weight in a vacuum (if a 
vacuum could even exist). 
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them appear to conform to their principles," almost all of 
them were "badly explained, or even false."105 Though 
Harvey's hypothesis of the contraction of the heart 
appeared to be confirmed by a convincing experiment [par 
une experience fort apparente], for Descartes this proved 
only that experiments could deceive us when we had 
insufficient knowledge of all the causes which could be 
involved. The same effect might have a different cause 
than the one Harvey had proposed--a good mechanistic cause, 
of course, not an "occult" contraction--only further 
experimentation could render a definitive verdict.106 When 
Beeckman and Mersenne measured the acceleration of a 
pendulum bob and their results differed from Descartes' 
theoretical value, he ignored their work, for it could not 
be explained by reason.107 Experiment had validity only in 
the context of a priori argument: induction completed 
deduction, which could not pass beyond a certain level of 
particularization. It served to close lines of inquiry, 
not to originate them. In order to learn the nature of the 
105. Part Six (Olscamp, 58), emphasis mine. See 
Sakellariadis, "Descartes's Use of Empirical Data," and 
Beck, The Method of Descartes, pp. 26lff. 
106. Description du Corps Humain, XVIII (AT XI, 24lf). See 
J.A. Passmore, "William Harvey and the Philosophy of 
Science," Australasian Journal of Philosophy 36 (1958), 
85-94, and Alan Gewirth, "Experience and the 
Non-Mathematical in the Cartesian Method," JHI 2 (1941), 
183-210, esp. p. 199. 
107. I am following Sakellariadis' analysis of Descartes' 
correspondence with Mersenne from the latter part of 1629. 
See "Descartes's Use of Empirical Data." 
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magnet, the Cartesian physicist, who has reflected "that 
there can be nothing to know in the magnet which does not 
consist of certain simple natures evident in themselves" 
--that is, who shares Descartes' confident knowledge of the 
essences of things--"will have no doubt how to proceed." 
After collecting all possible observational data, "he will 
next try to deduce the character of that inter-mixture of 
simple natures" which explains the data. But in the event 
that the magnet should contain "any sort of nature the like 
of which our mind had never yet known"--such as action at a 
distance, I am compelled to suggest--it would be "hopeless 
to expect that reasoning will ever make us grasp it"~ it 
would be enough to "discern with all possible distinctness 
that mixture of entities or natures already known which 
produces just those effects which we notice in the 
magnet. 11 108 
* * * * * 
As we have seen, the first principles of Cartesian 
physics were separated from the particulars of everyday 
experience by God's omnipotence and freedom. Just as there 
might be two clocks made by the same craftsman, equally 
good time-keepers and with exactly the same faces, yet 
constructed internally with completely different 
combinations of wheels~ so the supreme Craftsman 
108. Regulae X and XII (HR I, 47 and 55), emphasis mine. 
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undoubtedly could have produced all that we see in many 
diverse ways.109 The deductive ideal had broken down. 
There was no necessary connection between first principles 
and particular phenomena: one could not determine by reason 
alone which of the possible explanations was the actual 
explanation of a given effect. This logical gap could be 
bridged only by hypotheses. Since God could have arranged 
the shapes, sizes, and motions of particles in countless 
ways, we were free to make any assumptions we pleased about 
them, provided that the consequences agreed with 
experience.110 
Descartes spoke of hypotheses in two different senses. 
Pragmatically, he presented as hypotheses propositions 
which he believed he could deduce from first principles but 
preferred not to do so, whether for fear of censorship or 
for sheer convenience. At the same time, he urged his 
readers to accept hypotheses for true explanations in 
themselves, as demonstrated by their heuristic value in 
accounting for a wealth of phenomena. With regard to 
light, he wrote to Vatier, 
if you look at the third page of the Dioptrics, you 
will see that I said there expressly that I was going 
to speak about it only hypothetically. Indeed, since 
the treatise which contains the whole body of my 
physical theory is named On Light [this refers to Le 
Monde], and since in it I explain light with greater 
109. Principles IV.204 (Miller, 286). 
110. Ibid., III.46 (Miller, 106). 
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detail and at greater length than anything else, I 
did not wish to write again what I had written there, 
but only to convey some idea of it by comparisons and 
hints, so far as seemed necessary for the subject 
matter of the Dioptrics • 
• • I cannot prove~ priori the hypotheses I 
proposed at the beginning of the Meteors without 
expounding my whole physical theory~ but the 
phenomena which I have deduced necessarily from them, 
and which cannot be deduced in the same way from 
other principles, seem to me to prove them 
sufficiently~ posteriori •••• I chose this manner 
of expounding my thoughts for two reasons. First, 
believing that I could deduce them in order from the 
first principles of my Metaphysics, I wanted to pay 
no attention to other kinds of proofs~ secondly, I 
wanted to try whether the simple exposition of truth 
would be sufficient to carry conviction without any 
disputations or refutations of contrary opinions • 
• • • And indeed it is not always necessary to have a 
priori reasons to convince people of a truth.111 
The assuptions he had made about light, although in reality 
"conclusions" derived solely from "the axioms on which 
geometers base their demonstrations," to wit, the eternal 
truths, were nonetheless "proved by everything that comes 
after."112 What he had written about refraction was thus a 
demonstration, to the extent that one could be given 
"without a previous demonstration of the principles of 
physics by metaphysics," which was not forthcoming until 
the Principia philosophiae of 1644.113 In the absence of 
this demonstration, however, Descartes was content to deal 
111. Letter of 22 February 1638 (AT I, 562f~ K, 47f)~ cf. 
the very similar passage in Method VI (Olscamp, 60f). 
112. Letter to Plempius, 20 December 1637 (AT I, 476~ K, 
43f). 
113. Letter to Mersenne, 17 May 1638 (AT II, 141~ K, 55). 
The date in AT (27 May) is incorrect. 
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in probabilities rather than certainties. To ask for 
geometrical demonstrations in physics was "to ask the 
impossible." Archimedes in mechanics, Witello in optics, 
and Ptolemy in astronomy had demonstrated nothing 
geometrically, but no one criticized them for this. It was 
enough in such matters that their hypotheses were not 
manifestly contrary to experience and that their arguments 
were logically sound, even though their hypotheses might 
not have been strictly true.114 Having concluded willingly 
that God was free to arrange things as he wished and not 
necessarily as we might have, Descartes claimed that he had 
done enough if those things which he had written 
corresponded accurately with all natural phenomena, whether 
or not he had found the true causes. For practical 
purposes, no more was required.115 Such things were "held 
to be morally certain, that is, to a degree which suffices 
for the needs of everyday life~ although if compared to the 
absolute power of God, they are uncertain." Suppose, for 
example, that one were trying to read a ciphered message. 
If by substituting B for A, C for B, and so on, one were 
114. Ibid. "I say that there are only two ways to refute 
what I have written. One is to prove by experience or 
reason that the hypotheses I have made are false~ the other 
is to show that what I have deduced from them cannot be 
deduced from them •••• But if people simply say that 
they do not believe what I have written, because I deduce 
it from certain hypotheses which I have not proved, then 
they do not know what they are asking or what they ought to 
ask." (K, 56). 
115. Principles IV.204 (Miller, 286). 
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able to obtain a sensible message, then he would conclude 
that he had guessed the true pattern of the cipher, even 
though it is possible that the writer had actually written 
a different message in another cipher. Possible? perhaps~ 
but probable? It would "be so difficult for this to 
happen, {especially if the message contains many words}, 
that it does not seem credible."116 Moreover there were 
some things 
which we judge to be absolutely, and more than 
morally, certain, of which we judge that it is 
impossible that the thing should be other than as we 
think it. This certainty is founded on the 
metaphysical ground that as God is supremely good and 
cannot err, the faculty which he has given us of 
distinguishing truth from falsehood, cannot be 
fallacious so long as we use it aright, and 
distinctly perceive anything by it. Of this nature 
are mathematical demonstrations, the knowledge that 
material things exist, and the evidence of all clear 
reasoning that is carried on about them. Amongst 
these truths it seems to me that there should be 
counted those conclusions which have been arrived at 
in this treatise, {at least the principal and more 
general [au moins les principales & plus generales]}, 
if it be considered that they are derived in a 
continual series from the first and most simple 
principles of human knowledge •••• for these facts 
being admitted, all the others, at least the more 
general [au moins les plus generales] doctrines which 
I have advanced about the world and the earth, appear 
116. Principles IV.205 (Miller, 287)~ the bracketed phrase 
is only in the French edition. On moral certainty, see 
John Morris, "Descartes and Probable Knowledge," Journal of 
the History of Philosophy 8 (1970), 303-312. Descartes 
believed in something akin to Whewell's "consilience of 
inductions": if a single cause, however hypothetical, could 
be assigned to several diverse effects, one could assume 
that the true cause had been found. See the letters to 
Morin of 13 July 1638 (AT II, 197-200~ K, 57-59), to 
Plempius (for Fromondus) of 30 October 1637 (AT I, 406~ K, 
40), and to Huygens of June 1645 (AT IV, 224f)~ also see 
Burman, p. 38. 
115 
to be the only possible explanations of the phenomena 
they present.117 
* * * * * 
The Cartesian universe consisted of two storeys (see 
Figure 2). The general effects, the world of Le Monde, 
resided in the upper storey, the realm of absolute 
certainty and~ priori demonstration. Here the very 
structure of the world lay exposed for all to see. The 
lower storey, the realm of practical certainty, yielded its 
secrets more reluctantly. The appeal to experience was 
required to augment the power of reason~ the deductive 
ideal had broken down. The filter of experiment was called 
upon to separate reality from possibility, actuality from 
contingency.118 Yet even though experimentation was an 
integral part of the pursuit of truth, it remained 
subordinate to rational necessity, implemented only after 
one had discovered the general causes of things by pure 
117. Principles IV.206, quoting from HR I, 30lf instead of 
from Miller (p. 287f). The French and Latin versions of 
this article are substantially different. For some reason, 
the Miller translation has not considered these differences 
to be important. I have added the braketed phrase to the 
text in HR. See AT IX, 324f. On 28 October 1640, 
Descartes wrote to Mersenne that, although one could 
explain a given particular effect in many different ways, 
things in general had only one explanation, which was the 
true one. (AT III, 212) 
118. The role of experimentation was "to answer the 
questions set by reason at the outset of the deduction 
during the preliminary survey of the ground, and at each 
stage of the deduction when a logical bifurcation is 
possible." Beck, The Method of Descartes, p. 251. 
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intuition. To be sure, nature might not be completely 
predictable--it might dictate which effects really exist 
and which combinations of entities suffice to explain 
them--but it could never surprise us with something wholly 
new. For those who followed the Cartesian method, the 
universe was like a second-rate opera: the basic plot was 
known even before the curtain was raised: only the 
incidentals remained to be found.ll9 
Voluntarism, Rationalism, and Demonstrative Science: 
A Consideration of the Foster Thesis 
It is now time to consider the validity of the Foster 
thesis when applied to Rene Descartes: was there in fact a 
connection between his theology of creation and his 
119. For roughly similar analyses of Descartes' method in 
natural philosophy, see Ralph M. Blake, "The Role of 
Experience in Descartes' Theory of Method," in Theories of 
Scientific Method: The Renaissance through the Nineteenth 
Century, ed. by Edward H. Madden (Seattle: University of 
Washington Press, 1960), pp. 75-103: Gerd Buchdahl, 
Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science: The Classical 
Origins: Descartes to Kant (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1969): 
A.C. Crombie, "Some Aspects of Descartes' Attitudes to 
Hypothesis and Experiment," in Actes du Symposium 
International des sciences physiques et Mathernatiques dans 
la premiere moitie du XVIIe siecle (Paris and Venice, 
1958), pp. 192-201: D. Garber, "Science and Certainty in 
Descartes," in Descartes: Critical and Inter retive Essa s, 
ed. by Michael Hooker Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 19 8 , 
pp. 114-151: Charles Larmore, "Descartes' Empirical 
Epistemology," in Descartes: Philoso h, Mathematics and 
Physics, ed. by Stephen Gaukroger New York: Barnes & 
Noble, 1980), pp. 6-22: M.J. Osler, "Eternal Truths and the 
Laws of Nature," unpub. paper, cited above: G.A.J. Rogers, 
"Descartes and the Method of English Science," cited above: 
A.I. Sabra, Theories of Light, From Descartes to Newton 
(London: Oldbourne, 1967): N. Kemp Smith, New Studies in 
the Philosophy of Descartes: and Bernard Williams, 
Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry. 
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understanding of scientific method? I will begin by noting 
that Foster's own view of Descartes betrays an inadequate 
grasp of his scientific method and an unfamiliarity with 
his conception of the eternal truths. Cartesian natural 
philosophy, he stated, can not demonstrate the existence of 
the material world by pure reason: sense perception is 
required here. But once the world is known to exist, 
argued Foster, "no further element of contingency is held 
to belong to the nature of particular material things, and 
consequently the science of them can rely upon the method 
of demonstration alone."120 This is not correct. As we 
have seen, Descartes was unable to determine, without an 
appeal to the phenomena, which particular effects God chose 
to create and which mechanisms he used to produce them. In 
determining which of his ideas to embody, God exercised his 
arbitrary will. Apparently Foster did not see this, for he 
described "this further element of voluntarism," which he 
found in Leibniz's theology, as "over and above that which 
Descartes had recognized."1 21 He likewise missed seeing 
the voluntarism manifest in Descartes' belief that God was 
utterly free to choose the eternal truths in any manner he 
wished. Hence his mistaken analysis of the Cartesian 
position: 
120. "Christian Theology and Modern Science of Nature," 
Mind 45 (1936), p. 19. 
121. Ibid., p. 20. 
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His Rationalist doctrine of nature corresponds with 
his Rationalist doctrine of God: as he cannot 
conceive of a voluntary activity in God, so he cannot 
conceive the reality of a contingent element in 
nature, and his identification of matter with 
extension is the inevitable consequence of his 
identification of the divine activity with 
thought.122 
Why was Foster so wide of the mark in his characterization 
of Descartes as wholly rationalist in both theology and 
science? Two considerations are relevant here. First of 
all, Foster was writing at a time when Cartesian natural 
philosophy was almost universally equated with intellection 
alone, an opinion derived from an over attention to the 
Regulae, the Meditations, the second part of the Discourse 
on Method, and the first half of the Principles, to the 
relative neglect of the sixth part of the Discourse, the 
Dioptrics, and the latter half of the Principles. 
Secondly, Foster probably read little, if any, of 
Descartes' extensive correspondence, only a tiny fraction 
of which was then available in English. Unfortunately it 
was primarily in letters that Descartes outlined his highly 
voluntaristic views on the eternal truths. 
Granted that Foster's conclusions about Descartes are 
erroneous, is there still any merit to his basic thesis? 
Is there in fact a clear relationship between Decartes' 
theology and his natural philosophy, if both are properly 
122. "The Christian Doctrine of Creation and the Rise of 
Modern Natural Science," Mind 43 (1934), p. 466. 
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understood? I believe that there is, if we look closely 
enough at the individual elements of Cartesian thought, 
keeping in mind the dialectic nature of Christian theology. 
The essence of the Christian doctrine of creation is that 
God, of his own free will, gave existence to an ordered 
world which continues to exist at his pleasure. It would 
therefore be heretical to hold either that the world is God 
or that it is not God to the extent that it exists 
independently of God. The logical space between these two 
assertions is the maneuvering room for Christian 
theologians. In a like manner, Descartes found himself 
between the rock of asserting that God's creative acts are 
entirely conformable to human reason and the hard place of 
asserting that they are wholly beyond our comprehension. 
On the ground between these propositions he erected his 
system of thought: that this system contains elements of 
both rationalism and voluntarism only reflects tensions 
inherent to the Christian doctrine of creation.123 
Starting from God's utter transcendence, Descartes 
denied that any limits could be placed on God's power to 
create a boundless universe or eternal truths 
123. In an excellent (unpublished) article on "Eternal 
Truths and the Laws of Nature," M.J. Osler correctly states 
that "since both intellectualists and voluntarists ascribed 
both will and intellect to God, the difference between them 
is largely one of emphasis." Osler's argument is very 
similar to mine, but less detailed and more limited in 
scope. We differ somewhat in our evaluations of the 
suitability of applying Foster's criteria to Descartes. 
120 
incomprehensibly different from those actually perceived by 
the human mind (see Figure 3). However because God was 
perfect and his will and intellect were one, he could not 
change his mind once he had chosen which truths to create. 
If we could gain knowledge of these truths, that knowledge 
would be permanent and necessary, not contingent. Without 
question, here Descartes took a step away from the radical 
voluntarism from which he began. Yet in and of itself this 
did not lead to scientific rationalism. A stable set of 
truths is surely a necessary condition for an~ priori 
science of nature--if God can change his mind, then we can 
never be sure of our knowledge--but a sufficient condition 
it is not, for it provides no guarantee that we can know 
those truths. The key question for Descartes was not 
whether God could have created a different set of eternal 
truths or even whether He could now change those truths; 
rather the key question was whether we could in fact know 
the eternal truths for what they were: did the truths in 
our minds correspond to those in the created order? And at 
this point his answer was a resounding, rationalistic 
'Yes!' A perfect God could not deceive us by implanting in 
our souls seeds of error rather than seeds of truth. It 
was on this bedrock of certainty that Descartes erected a 
demonstrative science. 
But if God's freedom to employ his absolute power was 
confined to the period prior to the creation, it was not 
Figure 3: 
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altogether denied. Initially to determine which 
propositions to make true and which mechanisms to place in 
nature remained the privilege of the divine will, not the 
human mind. Results of that determination were shared only 
partially--the eternal truths were revealed to mankind by 
the light of reason, but the actual mechanisms only by 
experience. In spite of this unmistakable element of 
voluntarism, however, Descartes' ideal of science remained 
essentially rationalistic~ the God who reigned sovereignly 
over the eternal truths and the laws of nature, the God who 
functioned as efficient cause of motion, was ultimately out 
of step with the scientific enterprise as Descartes 
conceived it. For a demonstrative science to be possible, 
God's absolute power had to be constrained by God's 
ordained power. The sovereign God of truth could not be 
allowed to change his decrees~ the Lord of nature must not 
disobey his own laws by performing miraculous acts~ the 
Sustainer of the world had always to act in the same way. 
It is therefore apparent that theological voluntarism, 
in itself, need not lead to an empirical science of nature. 
It depends on where that voluntarism asserts itself. By 
deliberately mitigating the strong voluntarism of his 
initial position, above all by his strident announcement 
that God gave us minds which could not but think aright 
when properly employed, Descartes established the 
theological basis for his~ priori science of nature. 
CHAPTER FOUR: 
DIVINE FREEDOM, HUMAN LIMITS, AND EMPIRICISM 
IN ROBERT BOYLE'S NATURAL PHILOSOPHY 
To find a well-balanced position, to evade the Scylla of an 
arrogant and scientifically sterile rationalism, without 
falling into the Charybdis of a pseudo-religious blind 
faith, meant also to find a solid basis for empirical and 
experimental science. This problem occupied the Christian 
thinkers who tried to solve it in different ways since the 
twelfth century. 
--R. Hooykaas, "Science and Theology in the Middle 
Ages," Free University Quarterly 3 (1954), p. 85 
It is difficult to overestimate the significance of Boyle's 
keen sense of God's "arbitrary" freedom vis-a-vis even the 
laws of nature. Like Newton, he felt no compulsion to 
construct a completely detailed natural philosophy tied to 
divine attributes. At the same time, both men expressed 
man's responsibility to observe the regularities of 
phenomena according to experience and experiment. 
--Eugene Klaaren, Religious Origins of Modern 
Science, p. 169 
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"I am not a Christian, because it is the religion of 
my country, and my friends," wrote Robert Boyle; "when I 
chuse to travel in the beaten road, it is not, because I 
find it is the road, but because I judge it is the way."l 
His was an intelligent, informed decision not made in 
ignorance of contemporary philosophical currents. Aware of 
the new science and difficulties in biblical 
interpretation, Boyle was no naive literalist, though his 
traditional stance on miracles and doctrine might suggest 
otherwise. Careful to distinguish between "what the 
1. The Works of the Honourable Robert Boyle, ed. Thomas 
Birch, is available in a five volume folio (London, 1744) 
and a six volume quarto (London, 1772). All of my 
references will be to the latter, which has recently been 
reprinted with an introduction by Douglas McKie 
(Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1965). I have quoted here from 
Some Considerations about the Reconcileableness of Reason 
and Religion (Works IV, 155), a tract published in 1675 by 
"T.E. a layman," usually assumed to have been Rober[T] 
Boyl[E]. See Samuel Halkett and John Laing, ed., 
Dictionary of Anonymous and Pseudonymous English Literature 
(9 Vols.; London: Oliver and Boyd, 1926-1962) v, 305; their 
reference to the DNB is incorrect, however. The earliest 
(and most reliable)identification of Boyle as the author 
of Reason and Religion that I can find is in Edward Jones, 
A Catalogue of the Philosophical Books and Tracts Written 
by the Hon. Robert Boyle, esq.; together with the order of 
time, wherein each of them hath been publish'd 
res ectivel • To which is added a catalo ue of the 
theological books, written by the same author London, 
1689). The catalogue was apparently prepared by an unnamed 
French physician, almost certainly Denis Papin, who 
collaborated with Boyle for several years on many 
experiments. The catalogue includes Reason and Religion as 
a work considered to be Boyle's. The title page of Boyle's 
The Excellency of Theology, published (in 1674) just one 
year before Reason and Religion, transparently disguised 
the author as "T.H.R.B.E." (The Honourable Robert Boyle, 
Esq.). Perhaps Boyle simply used the first and last 
letters of this pseudonym in his next theological book. 
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scripture itself says, and what is only said in the 
scripture," he recognized that biblical passages on nature 
spoke "rather in a popular than accurate manner." Holy 
Writ, he claimed, was "designed to teach us rather divinity 
than philosophy," echoing the Augustinian notion of 
accommodation which had been adopted by Calvin and had 
proved so convenient for Galileo and Kepler.2 If he 
remained ever conscious of doing science willingly within 
the bounds of Christian theism, he never attempted, as van 
Belmont did, to derive the content of his science from the 
Bible. 
Boyle's views on ecclesiastical polity reveal the same 
reasoned consideration. Like many other Restoration 
intellectuals, Boyle found himself attracted to the 
moderate wing of the Anglican Church, the so-called 
Latitudinarians who sought to steer a middle course between 
Romanists, on the one hand, and radical Protestants, on the 
other. His compulsion for moral living, his focus on 
essential doctrines rather than trivialities, his 
toleration and compassion for dissenters, and his abiding 
2. Some Considerations touching the Style of the Holy 
Scriptures (II, 260 and 319) and Some Considerations 
touching the Usefulness of Experimental Natural Philosophy 
(II, 19). Also see Calvin's commentaries on Genesis 1:6 
and 1:16, and Psalms 19:4-6, 24:2, 58:4-5, and 136:7~ 
Galileo's Letter to the Grand Duchess Christina, trans. 
Stillman Drake in his Discoveries and Opinions of Galileo 
(Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1957), pp. 173-215~ and the 
introduction to Kepler's Astronomia Nova, in Thomas 
Salusbury, Mathematical Collections and Translations 
(London, 1661), Tome I, part I, pp. 461-67. 
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interest in the rational underpinnings of the Christian 
faith all reflected Latitudinarian concerns, as several 
scholars have noted.3 My interest in this chapter, 
however, will be not the social relations of science and 
religion--nor, as the Jacobs would have it, the social and 
political roots of science--but their intellectual 
relations as seen in the thought of one Latitudinarian, 
Robert Boyle. The question I propose to answer is this: 
specifically how did Boyle's understanding of God's 
relation to the world influence his conception of natural 
philosophy? 
Piety and Sovereignty: Boyle's Voluntarism 
Boyle's piety is a matter of historical record. While 
still a very young man, he wrote an autobiography, "An 
3. Best known are James R. Jacob and Margaret C. Jacob, who 
have summarized the socio-political argument they have 
propounded at greater length elsewhere in "The Anglican 
Origins of Modern Science: The Metaphysical Foundations of 
the Whig Constitution," Isis 71 (1980), 251-267. James 
Jacob's Robert Boyle and~ English Revolution: A Study in 
Social and Intellectual Change (New York: Franklin, 1977) 
applies their thesis to Boyle. For some limitations to 
this approach, see Nicholas Steneck, "Greatrakes the 
Stroker: The Interpretations of Historians," Isis 73 
(1982), 161-177, and J.R. Jacob's acerbic reply on pp. 
164-74 of his Henr Stubbe, Radical Protestantism and the 
Early Enlightenment Cambridge: UP, 1983 • Louis Trenchard 
More, The Life and Works of the Honourable Robert Boyle 
(Oxford: UP, 1944), Mitchell Salem Fisher, Robert Boyle, 
Devout Naturalist: A Study in Science and Religion in the 
Seventeenth Century (Philadelphia: Oshiver Studio Press, 
1945), and Richard McMaster Hunt, The Place of Religion in 
the Science of Robert Boyle (Pittsburgh: UP, 1955), all 
connect Boyle with the moderate Anglicans and show how this 
influenced his natural philosophy. 
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Account of Philaretus in his Minority," an essentially 
religious work in which God, ever mindful of the care of 
his own, brings Boyle safely into manhood and personally 
into the fold of the righteous. It is clear from his 
deeds, if not also from his words, that Boyle never lost 
the deep sense of gratitude to divine providence that so 
permeates his own record of his early years. He gave 
ungrudgingly of his substance, in life for the propogation 
of the gospel in Ireland, America, and elsewhere, in death 
for the establishment of annual lectures to prove the truth 
of the Christian religion "against notorious infidels." 
Even if he did not write the Free Discourse against 
Customary Swearing,4 he certainly could have (and probably 
did), for his opposition to oaths and his veneration of God 
4. In "Robert Boyle's Anonymous Writings," Isis 68 (1977), 
284-87, Joseph Agassi opposes Boyle's authorship of the 
Discourse on the grounds that "the vulgarity of some of its 
anecdotes (especially the one about two friends 
accidentally meeting in a whorehouse) makes it beyond 
dispute that the author is not the gentle and pious Boyle." 
Has Agassi forgotten that, in the "Account of Philaretus," 
Boyle tells of visiting a Continental brothel (from which 
he nevertheless emerged innocent) and expresses his disgust 
with two mendicants who tried to bugger him? J.F. Fulton 
accepts the Discourse as authentic, but has reservations 
about the aforementioned Reason and Religion, which most 
scholars accept. See A Bibliography of the Honourable 
Robert Boyle, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961). "An 
Account of Philaretus" can be found (abridged) in Birch's 
The Life of the Honourable Robert Boyle, which is bound 
with the first volume of the Works and is still the basic 
biography, and (complete) in R.E.W. Maddison, The Life of 
the Honourable Robert Boyle, F.R.S. (London: Taylor & 
Francis, 1969), a disappointing book. Flora Masson, Robert 
Boyle, A Biography (London: Constable, 1914), and Roger 
Pilkington, Robert Boyle, Father of Chemistry (London: John 
Murray, 1959), are less scholarly but better written. 
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were well known in his day. He is said to have paused 
routinely before uttering the name of God;5 if so, then he 
wrote as he spoke. Before discoursing Of the High 
Veneration Man's Intellect Owes to God, Boyle paused to 
consider his subject: 
Upon this occasion I shall take leave to declare, 
that it is not without some indignation, as well as 
wonder, that I see some men, and some of them divines 
too, who little considering what God is, and what 
themselves are, presume to talk of him and his 
attributes as freely and as unpremeditatedly, as if 
they were talking of a geometrical figure, or a 
mechanical engine: so that even the less presumptuous 
discourse, as if the nature and perfections of that 
unparalleled Being were objects, that their 
intellects can grasp: and scruple not to dogmatize 
about those abstruse subjects, as freely as about 
other things, that are confessedly within the reach 
of human reason, or perhaps are to be found among the 
more familiar objects of sense. 
It is probable, he continued, "that God may have diverse 
attributes, and consquently perfections, that are, as yet, 
unknown to us •• " Neither "the contemplation of his 
works" nor "the study of his word ••• will suffice to 
acquaint us with all his perfections." Not even "the idea 
of a Being supremely or infinitely perfect" sufficed to 
show us all of his attributes. God had probably made other 
worlds and "displayed in some of the creatures, that 
5. Birch tells us that Boyle "had so profound a veneration 
for the Deity that the very name of God was never mentioned 
by him without a pause and a visible stop in his discourse; 
in which Sir Peter Pett, who knew him for almost forty 
years, affirms that he was so exact, that he did not 
remember to have observed him once to fail in it." Works 
I, cxxxviii. 
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compose them, diverse attributes, that we have not 
discovered by the help of those works of his, that we are 
acquainted with." And scripture, which discloses to us the 
whole counsel of God insofar as it is necessary for 
salvation, yet affirms our inability to know perfectly the 
nature, attributes, and providence of God.6 
What Boyle did know is that God is wise, powerful, 
and, above all, free. The outstanding feature of Boyle's 
theology is in fact not his Latitudinarianism, but his 
voluntarism. Perhaps Boyle's piety produced in him a 
voluntaristic conception of God~ perhaps it was the other 
way around. Deep personal piety often indicates a profound 
sense of divine transcendence. In any case, all of Boyle's 
theological works and, to a lesser extent, many of his 
scientific works display a strong voluntaristic 
orientation.7 The central theme of voluntarist theology is 
God's unrestricted freedom to do as he pleases. For Boyle 
this meant that God "needs not the services of men," and 
was not obliged to create us. From "the same lump of 
earthy matter, of which he formed the body of the first 
6. Works V, 130-32. Boyle's lack of confidence in the 
ontological argument, vis-a-vis Descartes, displays his 
fundamentally different theological orientation. 
7. The only studies of Boyle's voluntarism of which I am 
aware are Eugene Klaaren, Religious Origins of Modern 
Science (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1977)~ Mary E.C. Bowen, 
"'This great automaton, the world': The Mechanical 
Philosophy of Robert Boyle, F.R.S.," doctoral dissertation 
at Columbia University (1976)~ and J.E. McGuire, "Boyle's 
Conception of Nature," JHI 33 (1972), 523-42. 
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man, he might, if he had pleased, as easily have formed a 
dog, or an ape." His love for us was just as free and 
unmerited.8 It did not even follow from God's power and 
wisdom that he was bound to make the best possible world. 
When 
he made the world, and established the laws of 
motion, [he] gave them to matter, not to himself: and 
so being obliged to none, as his superior or 
benefactor, he was not bound to make, or administer, 
corporeal things after the best manner, that he 
could, for the good of the things themselves ••• 
Boyle therefore based his theodicy on the voluntaristic 
premise that God is entitled to dispose of his works "as he 
thinks best for his own glory~ ••• he may have designs 
••• which we men are too short sighted to discern. . . n9 
Indeed the Christian religion embraced diverse truths "that 
reason, left to itself, would never have been able to find 
out, nor perhaps to have so much as dreamed of," because 
they "depend upon the free will and ordination of God," and 
"consequently are not to be explicitly known but by his 
revelation~ which he has not, that appears, vouchsafed to 
us in any other book than the scripture." The creation of 
the world in six days, the incarnation, the virgin birth, 
the resurrection of the dead, the last judgment--all these 
were free decrees of God, beyond the determination of 
8. The Christian Virtuoso (VI, 767) and Seraphick Love 
(I, 266). 
9. A Free Inquiry into the Vulgarly Received Notion of 
Nature (V, 195-97). 
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reason.10 The point here is not that Boyle admitted that 
certain doctrines depended on the will of God--any 
Christian would have admitted this--the point is that, as a 
voluntarist, he repeatedly emphasized it. Once these 
truths had been revealed to us, however, reason could 
readily embrace them. While above reason in that they were 
unknowable apart from revelation, they were not contrary or 
repugnant to reason. For examples of this distinction, 
Boyle turned to Galileo's telescopic observations of the 
Jovian moons and the phases of Venus, neither of which 
could have been anticipated by unaided reason~ yet both 
made sense once discovered.11 Thus for Boyle both the word 
and the works of God reflected the voluntarist dialectic 
between God's will and intellect. Neither could be 
determined by the human mind alone, yet neither, once made 
known, mocked the human mind with truths against its 
nature. 
* * * * * 
If God revealed some of his decrees in scripture, he 
revealed his matchless power and unequaled wisdom in the 
10. Christian Virtuoso (V, 542f) and Style of the 
Scriptures (II, 284). Also see A Discourse of Thins Above 
Reason (IV, 406f and 450). In Seraphick Love (I, 267 and 
The Excellency of Theology (IV, 15f), Boyle declined to 
delve into such mysteries as whether or not God could have 
redeemed mankind without the passion of Christ. 
11. Christian Virtuoso (V, 546)~ cf. Excellency of Theology 
(IV,9 • 
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creation. The "immense quantity of corporeal substance, 
that the divine power provided for the framing of the 
universe~ and the great force of the local motion, that was 
imparted to it, and is regulated in it," spoke volumes of 
God's omnipotence. Within such a vast and beautiful world, 
our proper response was awe and wonder at the richness of 
the creation, a richness which only mirrored the fecundity 
of the Creator. 
Thus heaven goes under one name, but contains so many 
fixed stars and planets, and they, by their diversity 
of motions, exhibit so many phaenomena, that though 
they have employed the curiosity of astronomers for 
many ages, yet our times have, in the celestial part 
of the world, made discoveries as considerable, if 
not as numerous, as all those of the antients~ and as 
our optick glasses have detected many fixed stars, 
and divers planets, that were unknown to former 
times, so our navigators, by their voyages beyond the 
line, have discovered divers whole constellations in 
the southern hemisphere: so that though heaven be an 
object, that has been perpetually and conspicuously 
exposed to men's view and curiosity for some 
thousands of years, yet it still affords new subjects 
for their wonder~ and I scarce doubt, but by the 
farther improvements of telescopes posterity will 
have its curiosity gratified by the discovery both of 
new constellations, and of new stars in those that 
are known to us already. We need not therefore fear 
our admiration of God should expire, for want of 
objects to keep it up. That boundless ocean contains 
a variety of excellent objects, that is as little to 
be exhausted, as the creatures, that live in our 
sublunary ocean, or lie on the shores, that limit it, 
can be numbered.12 
The telescope, the microscope, the anatomical knife, and 
the chemical furnace were but instruments of God's glory. 
12. High Veneration (IV, 132 and 153). One is immediately 
reminded of Newton's famous remark about pebbles on the 
shore. 
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When Boyle studied the book of nature and consulted "the 
glosses of Aristotle, Epicurus, Paracelsus, Harvey, 
Helmont, and other learned expositors of that instructive 
volume," he found himself "reduced to exclaim with the 
Psalmist, How manifold are thy works, O Lord? in wisdom 
hast thou made them all!"13 All of nature's engines, 
animate and inanimate, great and small, pointed to the most 
excellent craftsmanr but the exquisite construction, 
symmetry, variety, and economy of the organic world did so 
with the greatest force. Though it be true, said Boyle, 
"that the greater works of God do as well declare his great 
wisdom as his power," yet no less did his wisdom appear in 
lesser creatures. God, "in these little creatures, 
oftentimes draws traces of omniscience, too delicate to be 
liable to be ascribed to any other cause." The mole was no 
less wonderful than the elephantr nature's clocks were no 
more wonderful than her watches.14 
Almost all natural philosophers of the scientific 
revolution expressed awe and amazement when confronted with 
the majestic and intricate works of nature. Even Robert 
Hooke, not a particularly pious man, described the effects 
of nature as "wonderful because every natural production 
may be truly said to be a wonder or miracle if duly 
13. Seraphick Love (I, 262). 
14. High Veneration (IV, 136f) and Usefulness (II, 22)r cf. 
A Disquisition about the Final Causes of Natural Things 
(V, 403). 
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considered."15 For Boyle, however, the religious dimension 
of scientific investigation was almost overwhelming. He 
considered himself a priest in the temple of God's works, 
an interpreter of the book of creation.16 Far from 
divorcing design from science, Boyle insisted that it was 
"injurious to God, as well as unwarrantable in itself, to 
banish from natural philosophy the consideration of final 
causes. " In abandoning the argument from design, he 
thought, the Cartesians had thrown away an argument "which 
the experien-ce of all ages shews to have been the most 
successful (and in some cases the only prevalent one) to 
establish, among philosophers, the belief and veneration of 
God." The innate idea of God might suffice to show his 
15. From "A Discourse of Earthquakes," in The Posthumous 
Works of Robert Hooke, ed. Richard Waller (London, 1705), 
pp. 423f. John Calvin, who never denied the reality of 
secondary causes, once said that "there are as many 
miracles of divine power, as many tokens of goodness, and 
as many proofs of wisdom, as there are kinds of things in 
the universe, indeed, as there are things either great or 
small." Institutes of the Christian Religion, ed. John T. 
McNeill and trans. Ford Lewis Battles (2 Vols.: London: SCM 
Press, 1960), I.14.21 (Vol. I, p. 181). 
16. Final Causes (V,401) and Usefulness (II, 3lf). See 
Harold Fisch, "The Scientist as Priest: A Note on Robert 
Boyle's Natural Theology," Isis 44 (1953), 252-65. Boyle 
attributed the metaphor of the world as a temple to 
classical antiquity. Calvin used a similar expression, 
calling the world "this most beautiful theater": see 
Institutes I.5.8., I.6.2, I.14.20, and II.6.1. I do not 
find in Boyle the lack of spirituality for which R.S. 
Westfall generally condemns the virtuosi in Science and 
Religion in Seventeenth-Century England (New Haven: Yale 
UP, 1958). What I find is a lack of emphasis on redemption 
within a creation orientation. The same could be said of 
Calvin, for whom redemption was not as much salvation from 
damnation as it was a restoration of the created state. 
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power, but not his wisdom and goodness.17 Thus Boyle 
turned Cartesianism on its head, arguing for God 
teleologically rather than ontologically. Boyle also 
inverted Descartes' inference from an omnipotent God to a 
universe of seemingly boundless size~ instead of arguing 
that an infinite God demanded an immense universe, Boyle 
took the fact of an immense universe as evidence of God's 
infinite power.18 
This is not to say that Boyle equated the practice of 
science with the pursuit of final causes. No good 
voluntarist--no good Christian--could presume to know all 
of God's purposes. But there were two very different ways 
wherein a man may pretend to know the ends of God in 
his visible works: for, he may either pretend to know 
only some of God's ends, in some of his works~ or he 
may pretend to know all his ends. He, that arrogates 
to himself to discover God's ends in this latter 
sense, will scarce be excused from a high 
presumption, and no less a folly, from the reason 
lately intimated in the Cartesian objection. But to 
pretend to know God's ends in the former sense, is 
not a presumption, but rather to take notice of them 
is a duty. For there are some things in nature so 
curiously contrived, and so exquisitely fitted for 
certain operations and uses, that it seems little 
less than blindness in him, that acknowledges, with 
the Cartesians, a most wise Author of things, not to 
conclude, that, though they may have been designed 
for other (and perhaps higher) uses, yet they were 
designed for this use.19 
17. Final Causes (V, 40lf). Cf. Boyle's unenthusiastic 
comments about the ontological argument in High Veneration 
(V, 132). 
18. Usefulness (II, 20). 
19. Final Causes (V, 397). 
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A modest search for final causes was entirely appropriate, 
indeed a duty. If it was erroneous to say "that everything 
in the visible world was made for the use of man," it was 
"more erroneous to deny, that any thing was made for ends 
investigable by man."20 Some purposes were very clear: the 
manifestation of God's glory, the general welfare of the 
creation, the welfare of individual creatures, and the 
suitability of certain things for human needs.21 Final 
causes and efficient causes were complementary and 
harmonious. Both were required for a complete 
understanding. A man might "give a mechanical reason of 
the structure of every wheel and other part of a watch," 
all the while supposing "that the artificer designed it to 
shew the hours of the day."22 
* * * * * 
Design for Boyle was more than just a manifest feature 
of the world which pointed unambiguously to a Designer. It 
was a necesssary principle of natural philosophy~ without 
it, the origin of the world was inexplicable. Mechanical 
principles alone were insufficient to account for the 
20. Ibid., p. 396. 
21. Final Causes (V, 395f)~ cf. Usefulness (II, 15) and 
Free Inquiry (V, 198). For a detailed discussion of 
teleology in Boyle's biology, see James Lennox, "Robert 
Boyle's Defense of Teleological Inference in Experimental 
Science," Isis 74 (1983), 38-52. 
22. Ibid., p. 399~ also seep. 443 and Free Inquiry 
(V, 245). 
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formation of the universe. We needed in addition 
an architectonick principle or power~ by which I mean 
those various determinations, and that skilfull 
guidance of the motions of the small parts of the 
universal matter by the most wise Author of things, 
which were necessary at the beginning to turn that 
confused chaos into this orderly and beautiful world~ 
and especially, to contrive the bodies of animals and 
plants, and the seeds of those things whose kinds 
were to be propagated. For I confess I cannot well 
conceive, how from matter, barely put into motion, 
and then left to itself, there could emerge such 
curious fabricks as the bodies of men and perfect 
animals, and such yet more admirably contrived 
parcels of matter, as the seeds of living 
creatures.23 
Boyle rejected Descartes' cosmogony in which God set matter 
into motion according to laws he established and then 
ceased to interpose. Although Boyle saw "some probability" 
that, once God had properly set matter into motion, 
vortices might be produced by "numberless occursions" of 
the parts of the world without further divine action, he 
deemed it "utterly impossible that brute and unguided, 
though moving, matter should ever convene into such 
admirable structures as the bodies of perfect animals."24 
But once God had framed the world and established the 
course of nature, 
the naturalist (except in some few cases where God or 
incorporeal agents interpose) has recourse to the 
first cause but for its general and ordinary support 
23. The Sceptical Chymist (I, 571). 
24. Origin of Forms and Qualities (III, 30f), emphasis his~ 
cf. p. 15 and The Relation betwixt Flame and Air 
(III, 597f). 
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and influence, whereby it preserves matter and motion 
from annihilation or desition~ and in explicating 
particular phenomena considers only the size, shape, 
motion (or want of it), texture, and the resulting 
qualities and attributes, of the small particles of 
matter. And thus in this great automaton, the world 
(as in a watch or clock), the materials it consists 
of being left to themselves could never at the first 
convene into so curious an engine: and yet, when the 
skilful artist has once made and set it a-going, the 
phenomena it exhibits are to be accounted for by the 
number, bigness, proportion, shape, motion (or 
endeavor), rest, coaptation, and other mechanical 
affections, of the spring, wheels, pillars, and other 
parts it is made up of~ and those effects of such a 
watch that cannot this way be explicated must, for 
aught I know, be confessed not to be sufficiently 
understood.25 
By this Boyle meant only that scientific explanations of 
the world as it now is (ever since God finished his 
creative work) had to be mechanical in character. He most 
emphatically did not mean that divine superintendence had 
ended with the creation of the world. The transcendent 
Clockmaker was also an immanent Mechanic. The most potent 
Author and Opficer of the world, wrote Boyle, 
hath not abandoned a master piece so worthy of Hirn, 
but does still maintain and preserve it, so 
regulating the stupendiously swift motions of the 
great globes, and other vast masses of the mundane 
matter, that they do not, by any notable 
irregularity, disorder the grand system of the 
universe, and reduce it to a kind of chaos, or 
confused state of shuffled and depraved things. 26 
No single metaphor is sufficient to convey the full 
25. Ibid., p. 31~ cf. Sceptical Chyrnist (I, 571), quoted 
above. 
26. Christian Virtuoso (V, 519). 
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Judeo-Christian concept of God. The Father Almighty is 
also the Maker of heaven and earth: the God of Abraham, 
Isaac, and Jacob is also the Ancient of Days. In precisely 
the same way, no single metaphor can fully capture the 
nature of God's relationship to the world. The clock 
metaphor, one of the most widely used images of the world 
throughout the scientific revolution, beautifully 
harmonized the mechanical philosophy with the notion of 
intelligent design, but simultaneously suggested the 
dangerous, deistic thought that the craftsman might leave 
his clock to run on its own after making it. This occured 
to Boyle, as it had others before him.27 Thus he stressed 
27. The Puritan divine John Robinson (1576?-1625) had said 
that "it addes to the honour of the skilfull Artificer, so 
at the first to frame his Clocke or other worke of like 
curious devise, as that the severall parts should 
constantly move, and order each other in infinite varietie, 
hee, as the Maker, and first Mover moving, and ordering 
all. Where yet this difference must alwayes be minded, 
that the Artisan leaves his worke being once framed to it 
selfe: but God by continual! influx preserves, and orders 
both the being, and motions of all Creatures. Here also we 
except both unnaturall accidents: and specially, 
supernaturall, and miraculous events: which are, as it 
were, so many particular creations, by the immediate hand 
of God." See his Essays: or, Observations Divine and 
Morall. Collected out of Holy Scriptures, ancient and 
moderne writers, both divine and humane. As also, out of 
the great volume of mens manners (2nd ed.: London, 1638), 
pp. 3lf. This passage is mentioned by John Dillenberger, 
Protestant Thought and Natural Science (Garden City, NY: 
Doubleday, 1960), p. 116. On Robinson see the DNB, XVII, 
18-22. Cf. Calvin's comment that "to make God amomentary 
Creator, who once for all finished his work, would be cold 
and barren, and we must differ from profane men especially 
in that we see the presence of divine power shining as much 
in the continuing state of the universe as in its 
inception." Institutes I.16.1 (Vol. I, p. 197). S.L. 
Macey, Clocks and the Cosmos: Time in Western Life and 
Thought (Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1980), traces 
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repeatedly the necessity of what he often called God's 
"general" or "ordinary concourse"--that is, his ordained 
power--for the orderly running of the universe and even for 
its moment by moment existence. God was "the continual 
preserver and upholder of [the universe]."28 Just "as the 
world could not have had a beginning, without having been 
provided by God, so for the continuance of the being it 
enjoys, it depends altogether, and every moment, upon the 
will and pleasure of its first author," to the extent that 
"if God should at any time withdraw his preserving 
influence, the world would presently relapse, or vanish 
into its first nothing ••• "29 All of God's creatures 
were likewise preserved in being "by that supporting 
influence of God, which keeps them from relapsing into 
their first nothing ••• "30 
In no sense, then, can Boyle's world be said to have 
run on its own, without the constant, direct supervision of 
its maker. God had not appointed a vice-gerent, "nature," 
to oversee his handiwork in his stead. The "vulgar notion 
of nature," by which Boyle signified the peripatetic 
the clock metaphor back to the 14th century. 
28. Free Inquiry (V, 163). 
29. Occasional Reflections (II, 403), commenting on Acts 
17:28 and Nehemiah 9:6. Cf. Free Inquiry (V, 222). 
30. Usefulness (II, 25), again commenting on Nehemiah 9:6~ 
cf. his comments on Psalm 104:29-30 in Occasional 
Relfections, loc. cit. Commenting on Hebrews 1:3, Calvin 
said that "allthings would instantly come to nothing, were 
they not sustained by his power." 
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conception, was "both injurious to the glory of God, and a 
great impediment to the solid and useful discovery of his 
works."31 By endowing the world with understanding or a 
rational soul called "nature," philosophers had been led to 
worship the creature rather than the Creator, an error 
which even Christians had not escaped. To say that "nature 
does such and such a thing" explained nothing, for it did 
not explicate how the thing was done, which could only be 
by mechanical and not incorporeal causes, "according to the 
laws of motion settled by the omniscient Author of things." 
As a "clear and eminent example" of the damage done by 
adhering to the received notion of nature, Boyle pointed to 
the ascension of water in pumps, and in other 
phenomena of that kind, whose true physical causes 
had never been found out, if the moderns had 
acquiesced, as their predecessors did, in that 
imaginary one, that the world was governed by a 
watchful being, called nature, and that she abhors a 
vacuum, and consequently is still in a readiness to 
do irresistably whatever is necessary to prevent itr 
nor must we expect any great progress in the 
discovery of the true causes of natural effects, 
whilst we are content to sit down with other, than 
the particular and immediate ones.32 
It was unbecoming to the naturalist "to attribute to the 
31. Free Inquiry (V, 162). Mary E.C. Bowen has properly 
said, "Indeed, just as the new science was an intellectual 
revolt against Aristotelian science, so also theologically 
it was an assertion of theism against Aristotelian 
paganism. " 2£. cit • , p. 3 5 • 
32. Free Inquiry (V, 183f, 172, 176, and 165). Cudworth, 
Glanvill, and More were three of the Christian philosophers 
Boyle must have had in mind. See Steneck, "Greatrakes the 
Stroker," pp. 174f. 
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senseless and inanimate body of water an aim at the good of 
the universe, ••• as if it were a free agent" capable of 
acting contrary to its nature by ascending to prevent a 
vacuum, "like a noble patriot, that sacrifices his private 
interests to the publick ones of his country."33 For 
Boyle, matter was correctly understood, both scientifically 
and theologically, as wholly inert and mindless, incapable 
of acting according to any intelligent principle--
incapable, therefore, even of obeying laws. Properly 
speaking, he said, 
a law being but a notional rule of acting according 
to the declared will of~ superior, it is plain, that 
nothing but an intellectual Being can be properly 
capable of receiving and acting by a law. For if it 
does not understand, it cannot know .what the will of 
the legislator is~ nor can it have any intention to 
accomplish it, nor can it act with regard to it, or 
know when it does, in acting, either conform to it or 
deviate from it: and it is intelligible to me, that 
God should at the beginning impress determinate 
motions upon the parts of matter, and guide them, as 
he thought requisite, for the primordial constitution 
of things~ and that ever since he should, by his 
ordinary and general concourse, maintain those 
powers, which he gave the parts of matter, to 
transmit their motion thus and thus to one another. 
But I cannot conceive, how a body devoid of 
understanding and sense, truly so called, can 
moderate and determinate its own motions, especially 
so, as to make them conformable to laws, that it has 
no knowledge or apprehension of ••• 34 
The laws of motion "did not necessarily spring from the 
nature of matter, but depended on the will of the divine 
33. Experimental History of Cold (II, 500) and Usefulness 
(II, 38). 
34. Free Inquiry (V, 170), italics Boyle's. 
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author of things •• " Boyle therefore looked upon a law 
as a moral, not a physical cause, as being indeed but 
a notional thing, according to which, an intelligent 
and free agent is bound to regulate its actions. But 
inanimate bodies are utterly incapable of 
understanding what a law is, or what it enjoins, or 
when they act conforrnably or unconforrnably to it~ and 
therefore the actions of inanimate bodies, which 
cannot incite or moderate their own actions, are 
produced by real power, not by laws~ though the 
agents, if intelligent, may regulate the exertions of 
their power by settled rules.35 
Manifestly, Boyle's conception of natural law was 
voluntaristic. God operated directly on matter, governing 
his actions by rules which were products of his own will. 
In commenting on these passages, J.E. McGuire has 
attributed to Boyle a view of causality akin to that of 
David Hurne, concluding that "Boyle implicitly expressed the 
view that causation is something imposed upon observed 
regularity by the conceptualizing power of the human 
mind."36 I am unconvinced that Boyle would have put it 
quite so strongly. It is clear, however, that he denied 
any immanency and necessity to natural laws. Because they 
were imposed by the will of a transcendent God, we could 
presumably know them in a manner analagous to that in which 
we could learn of his decrees in theology--to wit, by 
revelation and not by unaided reason. Just as the book of 
35. Christian Virtuoso (V, 521). 
36. "Boyle's Conception of Nature," p. 536. For a 
dissenting opinion, see Mary E.C. Bowen, £12.• cit., pp. 
69-71. 
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scripture revealed certain truths above reason, so the book 
of nature revealed certain patterns by which its author 
exercised his sovereign will. 
If the world was therefore not intelligent in that it 
possessed no mind of its own, it was yet intelligible 
because the Lord of nature continually imposed his will on 
his subjects. Instead of finding mind in nature, Boyle 
found it over and behind nature. Though in themselves 
mindless, inanimate bodies conformed to the intentions of 
human and divine agents, thus giving the appearance of 
innate intelligence where none was actually present. An 
arrow shot at a mark had no design to strike it, but moved 
as if it did because a man had aimed it. In declaring the 
hour, the wheels of a timepiece had no thoughts of their 
own, but only accomplished the intentions of the 
designer.37 As God's own masterpiece perfectly embodying 
his ends, the universe itself was "like a rare clock, such 
as may be that at Strasburgh, where all things are so 
skilfully contrived, that the engine being once set a 
moving, all things proceed, according to the artificer's 
first design ••• "38 The all-knowing Lord was more than 
37. Final Causes (V, 413), Free Inquiry (V, 171), and 
Usefulness (II, 40). 
38. Free Inquiry (V, 163). Cf. this passage from 
Usefulness (II, 39), which could easily be mistaken for a 
selection from Query 31 of Newton's Opticks: God in the 
beginning divided matter "into an innumerable multitude of 
very variously figured corpuscles, and both connected those 
particles into such textures or particular bodies, and 
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merely a divine mathematician who established initial 
conditions based on their calculated outcomes--indeed he 
was not a mathematician at all. His knowledge was not "a 
progressive or discursive thing, like that assigned by our 
ratiocinaton, but an intuitive knowledge" obtained, as it 
were, by looking into himself "as in a divine and universal 
looking-glass."39 He was the unsearchably wise DEMIURGOS, 
"whose piercing eyes were able to look, at once, quite 
through the universe, and take into his prospect both the 
beginning and end of time" with perfect knowledge not only 
of the mechanical parts of the world, but also of the 
secret thoughts and intentions of men and the contingent 
actions of free agents.40 God was indeed more than a 
watchmaker, and his creation more than a watch. Instead of 
dividing divine operations "into two sorts only, natural 
and supernatural," Boyle added a third category, "supra-
mechanical," for those operations which were "natural in a 
larger sense." Whereas 
placed them in such situations, and put them into such 
motions, that by the assistance of his ordinary preserving 
concourse, the phaenomena, which he intended should appear 
in the universe, must as orderly follow, and be exhibited 
by the bodies necessarily acting according to those 
impressions or laws, though they understand them not at 
all, as if each of those creatures had a design of 
self-preservation, and were furnished with knowledge and 
industry to prosecute it ••• " 
39. High Veneration (IV, 150). This recalls Galileo's 
view. 
40. Free Inquiry (V, 190) and High Veneration, loc. cit. 
This image is strikingly similar to Newton's PANTOCRATOR. 
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all the phaenomena of the world, as it is an 
aggregate, or system of mere bodies, are performed by 
matter, and local motion, according to mechanical 
laws~ the operations of the human mind, and its 
organical body upon one another, are not to be 
accounted for by mere matter, and its mechanical 
powers ••• So that these operations, that belong 
to a man as he is so, though in some sense they are 
not supernatural, because the order of things being 
once established by the most wise and powerful author 
of them, they are produced according to the course of 
nature~ yet they may be stiled supra-mechanical, 
because they cannot be mechanically explicated or 
produced, nor can they be proved to flow from natural 
causes, if these are considered, as but corporeal 
ones.41 
In its proper context, then, the clockwork metaphor 
was intended to convey the lawlike, mechanical regularity 
of the created universe under the absolute sovereignty of 
an omnipotent, wise, and free creator. Some measure of 
Boyle's appreciation of divine sovereignty and freedom can 
be obtained from an examination of his position on the 
plurality of worlds, a topic of frequent discussion in the 
scientific revolution.42 If God has made other worlds, 
wrote Boyle, he "may have given peculiar and admirable 
instances of his inexhausted wisdom in the contrivance and 
government of systems, that, for aught we know, may be 
41. Christian Virtuoso (VI, 754). In an unpublished 
manuscript listing remarks "About Atheism," Boyle said that 
"no mechanical account can be given of Paine and Griefe 
felt from the Body." Royal Society, Boyle Papers, vol. 6, 
folio 61, quoted by Bowen, .£.E.• cit., p. 86. 
42. See Steven J. Dick, Plurality of Worlds: The 
Extraterrestrial Life Debate from Democritus to Kant 
(Cambridge: UP, 1982). Dick's statement (p. 200 nl8) that 
Boyle "did not specifically address himself to the question 
of other worlds" is incorrect. 
146 
framed and managed in a manner quite differing from what is 
observed in that part of the universe, that is known to 
us." The kind of matter, the laws of motion, and the 
living creatures might be highly unlike those in our own 
world.43 In contrast to the Cartesian God, Boyle's God 
apparently saw no necessity to create a given type of 
matter or a given set of laws. These things could not be 
prescribed~ priori. God could just as easily have made 
other kinds of worlds as other worlds of the same kind. 
Boyle thought that in the new heaven and new earth which 
God would someday substitute for the present one, "the 
primordial frame of things, and the laws of motion, and 
consequently, the nature of things corporeal, may be very 
differing from those that obtain in the present world."44 
Boyle extended God's sovereignty yet further. Just as 
God could, at his pleasure, create other worlds or recreate 
the present one, so he could alter the established course 
of nature to suit his own purposes. It is not so much that 
Boyle admitted miracles, for any Christian would have, but 
that he dwelt on them as an integral part of his natural 
philosophy. Where Galileo and Descartes had relegated 
miracles forever to the realm of theology, Boyle considered 
them worthy of inclusion within the pale of philosophical 
discourse as something to be accounted for by the Christian 
43. High Veneration (V, 138-147). 
44. Christian Virtuoso (VI, 788f). 
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virtuoso. To be sure, this was not without its 
difficulties for the committed mechanist that Boyle was, 
but to say with R.S. Westfall that Boyle's reconciliation 
of miracles and mechanisms was "artificial and arbitrary" 
is to ignore the nuances and resources of the voluntarist 
tradition.45 
The paradigm miracle for Boyle was the creation of the 
world, an act of pure omnipotence accomplished by fiat 
without toil or pre-existent matter. But God was no less 
sovereign now as then. The world was to God as a shadow to 
a man: both could be changed at will, "in the twinkling of 
an eye." When God 
had a mind to work those miracles, we most admire, as 
when at Joshua'a prayer he stopped the course of the 
sun, and at Hezekiah's, made him go back7 we men are 
apt to imagine, that these prodigious effects must 
needs cost their author much, and that he must strain 
his power, and be necessitated to a troublesome 
exertion of his omnipotence, to be able to produce 
them: whereas to that divine agent, those things, 
that would be to all others impossible, are so far 
from being difficult, and the creatures have so 
absolute and continual a dependance on him, that it 
is as easy for him to effect the greatest alterations 
in them, as to resolve to do so. And even those 
miraculous changes of the course of nature, that do 
the most astonish us, do so naturally and necessarily 
flow from the motions of his own will, that to 
decree, and to execute, (whether or no they require 
powers otherwise than notionally differing) are alike 
easy to him: and that irresistable agent finds as 
45. Science and Religion, p. 89. Otherwise keenly aware of 
seventeenth century theological currents, Westfall failed 
to appreciate the signifigance of voluntarist orientations. 
In this of course he was not alone--it is only recently 
that historians have begun to see the importance of such 
orientations. 
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little more difficulty to produce the greatest 
changes among the creatures, than to produce the 
least, as I find it harder to move the whole arm of 
my shadow, than to move the little finger. 
By diverse ways, "some of them imaginable by us, and others 
inconceivable to us," the grand Author of nature could 
"bring such things to pass, as the ordinary course of 
nature would never produce, and surpassing those which her 
unassisted power could ever reach to."46 The laws of 
nature were not necessary truths binding on God, but were 
"arbitrarily instituted by God" and, in reference to him, 
were "but arbitrary still." It is a rule in natural 
philosophy, said Boyle, 
that causae necessariae semper agunt quantum possunt~ 
but it will not follow from thence, that the fire 
must necessarily burn Daniel's three companions, or 
their clothes, that were cast by the Babylonian 
king's command into the midst of a burning fiery 
furnace, when the author of nature was pleased to 
withdraw his concourse to the operations of the 
flames, or supernaturally to defend them against the 
bodies, that were exposed to them. That men once 
truly dead cannot be brought to life again, hath been 
in all ages the doctrine of mere philosophers~ but 
though this be true, according to the course of 
nature, yet it will not follow, but that the contrary 
may be true, if God interpose either to recal the 
departed soul, and re-conjoin it to the body, if the 
organization of this be not too much vitiated, or by 
so altering the fabrick of the matter, whereof the 
carcass consists, as to restore it to a fitness for 
the exercise of the functions of life. Agreeably to 
this, let me observe to you, that, though it be 
unreasonable to believe a miraculous effect, when 
attributed only to a mere physical agent~ yet the 
same thing may reasonably be believed, when ascribed 
to God, or to agents assisted with his absolute or 
46. Occasional Reflections (II, 402f) and Christian 
Virtuoso (VI, 678-80)~ cf. Final Causes (V, 414). 
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supernatural power. 
Physical laws were just "collected or emergent" truths 
inductively obtained by comparing many particulars 
regarding "the settled phaenomena of nature," not "axioms 
metaphysical, or universal, that hold in all cases without 
reservation." Thus Boyle rejected as "a great error" the 
idea of the double truth--"that this or that thing is true 
in philosophy, but false in divinity"--for it was "not 
repugnant to reason" that God might interpose his power to 
make iron float or a virgin conceive.47 
God had indeed performed miracles, always for a 
religious purpose, especially to authenticate the divine 
origin of Christianity. An argument grounded on miracles, 
Boyle thought, was "little less than absolutely necessary, 
to evince, that any religion, that men believe to be 
supernatually revealed, does really proceed from 
God." The miracles of Christ and his disciples certified 
the truth of their message. Although we ourselves have not 
seen them, Boyle argued, we have experienced them 
vicariously through the biblical histories, which were 
penned by men who "cheerfully suffered to attest the truth" 
of their witness. Knowledge of the true limits of 
mechanical powers would qualify the Christian virtuoso "to 
47. Christian Virtuoso (V, 714), Reason and Religion (IV, 
16lf), Things above Reason (IV, 463), and Reason and 
Religion (IV, 163). 
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distinguish between things, that are only strange and 
surprising, and those that are only miraculousr so that he 
will not mistake the effects of natural magic, for those of 
a divine power." The mechanical notion of nature was thus 
superior to the vulgar because it enabled its proponents 
more readily to recognize true miracles.48 Among the many 
biblical miracles which Boyle mentioned, the two already 
cited were perhaps his favorite examples of divine 
sovereignty over nature. One of these, the deliverance of 
Daniel's friends from the fiery furnace, was a standard 
theme of voluntarist theologians after Ockham.49 The 
resurrection of the dead, the other example, drew from 
Boyle an explanation of its possibility in light of the 
mechanical philosophy. By "recollecting a sufficient 
quantity of the scattered matter of a dead human body" and 
re-uniting it with a soul, God could "effect that wonder we 
call the resurrection."SO Putting aside considerations of 
48. Christian Virtuoso (V, 53lf) and Free Inquiry (V, 164). 
Cf. Seraphick Love (I, 269). 
49. See Reason and Religion (IV, 162), Usefulness (II, 17), 
The Martyrdom of Theodora, and of Didymus (V, 268), and The 
Possibility of the Resurrection (IV, 20lf). Francis 
Oakley, "Christian Theology and the Newtonian Science of 
Nature," in Creation: The Impact of an Idea, ed. Oakley and 
Daniel O'Connor (New York: Scribners, 1969), pp. 54-83, has 
found the fiery furnace as an example of divine freedom in 
the works of Luther, Melanchthon, Suarez, Perkins, Preston, 
Ames, Shepard, Norton, Increase Mather, and Willard. 
Klaaren (££. cit., p. 221 n22) has called it a "stock 
voluntarist example." 
50. Reason and Religion (IV, 159)r cf. Usefulness 
(II, 48f). Boyle's short treatise on The Possibility of 
the Resurrection was appended to Reason and Religion. 
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how God might have accomplished it, Boyle clearly believed 
that we too, like Christ, would be raised from the dead. 
On the occasion of his only known visit to a nonconformist 
religious service, Boyle disputed the meaning of Daniel 
12:2 ("And many that sleep in the dust of the earth shall 
awake, some to everlasting life, and some to everlasting 
shame and contempt.") with Sir Henry Vane, who gave it an 
allegorical interpretation in terms of the revival of long 
dead religious doctrines. According to Birch (who followed 
Sir Peter Pett's account), Boyle "thought himself obliged 
for the honour of God's truth to say, that this place in 
Daniel being the clearest one in all the Old Testament for 
the proof of the resurrection, we ought not to suffer the 
meaning of it to evaporate into allegory ••• "51 A third 
miracle, that at Pentecost, illustrates the apologetic 
function of miracles in Boyle's thought. In an unpublished 
essay on the circumstances of and inferences deducible from 
the Pentecost miracle, Boyle argued that the biblical 
account satisfied the basic criteria of historical veracity 
and then concluded that it confirmed such fundamental 
articles of the faith as the existence of God, the 
immortality of the soul, the reality of providence, the 
triune nature of God, the messiahship of Christ, and the 
51. Life of Boyle (I, cxl). Whether Boyle's objection was 
motivated, at least in part, by political goals as J.R. 
Jacob claims, I will not venture to consider. My point 
stands that Boyle believed in the importance of a literal 
resurrection of the dead. 
152 
resurrection of the dead.52 
That Boyle accepted biblical miracles is one thing. 
Did he also believe that God continued to perform miracles 
in the present age or did he hold with many other 
Protestants that they ceased with the apostolic era? To 
the best of my knowledge, Boyle addressed this question in 
only two contexts, when discussing either the origin of the 
soul or medical miracles. From the immateriality of the 
soul, Boyle inferred 
that the divine providence extends to every 
particular man; since whenever an embryo, or little 
human body formed in the womb, is, by being duly 
organized, fitted to receive a rational mind, God is 
pleased to create one, and unite it with that body. 
In which transaction, there seems to me a necessity 
of a direct and particular intervention of the divine 
power; since I understand not, by what physical charm 
or spell an immaterial substance can be allured into 
this or that particular embryo, of many that are at 
the same time fitted to receive a human soul; nor by 
what merely mechanical tie, or band, an immaterial 
substance can be so durably (perhaps for 80 or 100 
years) joined and united with a corporeal, in which 
it finds no parts, that it has organs to take hold 
of, and to which it can furnish no parts to be 
fastened upon by them.53 
In this sense at least Boyle believed that God had 
52. I am following Mary E.C. Bowen's account of this 
document on pp. 122-23 of her dissertation. The manuscript 
is in the Royal Society, Boyle Papers, vol. 7, folios 5 and 
95. 
53. Christian Virtuoso (V, 520). Boyle affirmed the 
miraculous origin of each soul in A Defense of the Doctrine 
touching the Spring and Weight of Air (I, 146) and in Free 
Inquiry (V, 241); in the latter place, he assigned this 
union of body and soul to the sixth or seventh week after 
conception. 
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performed miracles throughout human history. But these 
miracles involved no observable or unpredictable 
disturbance of the ordinary course of nature--indeed they 
happened normally, if not naturally, in the process of 
embryological growth. They were not miracles in the usual 
sense, nor did Boyle call them "miracles." In the affair 
of Greatrakes the Stroker, however, the occurrence of true 
miracles was certainly the issue.54 While visiting London 
in 1665-66 (the height of the plague and the year of the 
great fire), the Irish healer performed before reliable 
witnesses (including Boyle) numerous apparent cures of the 
king's evil and other ailments. Henry Stubbe, a Stratford 
physician who had seen some of the cures, published an 
account of his observations, accompanied by an explanation, 
in the form of a letter to Robert Boyle.55 Stubbe 
interpreted Greatrakes' deeds as the effects of a sanative 
temperament which was God's special gift to him. They were 
miracles equal to those of Christ and the apostles, yet the 
result of a natural power and not the direct hand of God. 
Boyle's reply, which was not published before Birch's 1744 
edition of his works, took exception to Stubbe's careless 
conflation of the natural and the supernatural. In the 
54. On Greatrakes see pp. 164-76 of J.R. Jacob, Robert 
Boyle, and pp. 50-63, 164-174 of his Henry Stubbe~ Nicholas 
Steneck, "Greatrakes the Stroker," cited above~ and Barbara 
Kaplan, "Greatrakes the Stroker: The Interpretations of His 
Contemporaries," Isis 73 (1982), 178-85. Other references 
are given in these:-
55. The Miraculous Conformist (London, 1666). 
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first part of his letter, said Boyle, Stubbe had argued for 
the miraculous character of Greatrakes' cures, but in the 
latter part he had offered a natural explanation. With 
regard to biblical miracles, in contrast, Boyle was "far 
from believing, that any mechanical or physical hypothesis 
will make out those supernatural phaenomena, without having 
recourse to the miraculous interposition of God." But if 
Boyle readily dismissed Stubbe's explanation, he did not so 
readily dismiss the possibility that Greatrakes might in 
fact have been the doer of miracles. For his part, he 
said, 
though I be very backward to believe any strange 
thing in particular, though but purely natural, 
unless the testimonies that recommend it be 
proportionable to the extraordinariness of the thing 
proposedr yet I remember not, that I have hitherto 
met with (no more than you have done) any, at least 
any cogent proof, that miracles were to cease with 
the age of the apostlesr and not only the excellent 
Grotius, but Tertullian, Justin Martyr, Cyprian, and 
other ancients tell us, that the power of ejecting 
devils out of possessed persons lasted long after 
that, and was not infrequent in the Christian church. 
And therefore if those relations of Mr. Greatraks's 
cures, that I have not yet seen, shall convince me, I 
shall not scruple, since his belief and life give me 
no just suspicions to acknowledge my conviction, and 
to rejoice in the appearing of a protestant, that is 
enabled and forward to do good in such a way, 
especially in an age where so many do take upon them 
to deride all that is supernaturalr and, whilst they 
loudly cry up reason, make no better use of it than 
to employ it, first to depose faith, and then to 
serve their passions and interests. But by what 
hitherto appears to me of Mr. Greatraks's cures, I 
must take leave to think, that either they are not 
real miraclesr or, if they have any thing in them of 
a supernatural gift, it is so far short of the gifts 
of our Saviour Christ and his apostles, that I 
presume your friends will think, that if it were not 
the effect of your haste, it was rather to shew your 
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wit than declare your opinion, that you seem to make 
a parity between them. And for my part I should in 
that case, reflecting upon the passage you cite [l 
Cor 12:5], that there are different administrations, 
but the same Lord, think it more fit to look upon 
this gift of Mr. Greatraks, as a distinct and 
inferior kind, than degrade the unquestionable 
miraculous gifts of the apostles, to depress them to 
the same level with his. 
Boyle's position here was an ambiguous one. While 
unwilling to affirm that miracles had ceased with the 
apostolic age, he nevertheless remained "not fully 
convinced" that Greatrakes' cures contained "any thing that 
is purely supernatural."56 Though open to the possibility 
of miracles in his own day, he did not see in the 
Greatrakes controversy an opportunity convincingly to 
settle the issue. 
Boyle brought to his study of miracles the same 
critical attitude that guided his study of Holy Writ. His 
Copernican leanings required adherence to the principle of 
accommodation, and his endorsement of the mechanical 
philosophy tempered his conviction that God could act as he 
pleased in the natural world. This is particularly clear 
in his views on the origin of plagues. The sacred writings 
expressly teach, said Boyle with his customary prolixity, 
that some plagues, and particularly that, which in 
David's time swept away in three days 70,000 persons, 
have been in an extraordinary manner inflicted by 
God. And to me it appears either scarce possible, or 
56. Birch, Life of Boyle (I, lxxix, lxxvi-lxxvii, and 
lxxxi). 
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far more difficult, than those that have not 
attentively enough considered the matter, are wont to 
think it, to deduce the astruse origin, strange 
symptoms, and other odd phaenomena of some plagues, 
that are recorded in history, from merely corporeal 
causes. 
On the other side it seems unphilosophical ••• to 
recur, without an absolute necessity, to supernatural 
causes, for such effects as do not manifestly exceed 
the power of natural ones: though the particular 
manner of their being produced is perchance more than 
we are yet able to explicate •••• 
Upon these and the like reasons I have sometimes 
suspected, that in the controversy about the origin 
of the plague: namely, whether it be natural or 
supernatural, neither of the contending parties is 
altogether in the right: since it is very possible, 
that some pestilences may not break forth, without an 
extraordinary, though perhaps not immediate, 
interposition of almighty God, provoked by the sins 
of men~ and yet other plagues may be produced by a 
tragical concourse of merely natural causes. 
But though the difficulties, that incumber each of 
the opposite opinions, keep me both from dogmatically 
asserting, that all plagues have a supernatural 
origin, and from denying, that they have it: yet, to 
say something on such an occasion, though I can speak 
but very hesitantly, I shall venture to add, that, 
whether or no the true plague be said to descend to 
the earth from a higher sphere, than that of nature: 
yet its propogation and effects are (at least for the 
most part) carried on mainly by a malignant 
disposition in the air ••• 57 
Miracles did happen, but only rarely. And some events we 
were wont to call miracles were not really the effects of 
supernatural causes, but rather of rational minds above the 
level of the purely mechanical. At diverse times--"perhaps 
oftener than mere philosophers imagine"--God, by the 
"intervention of rational minds," whether human or angelic, 
gave to the parts of human bodies motions which they would 
57. An Experimental Discourse of some Unheeded Causes of 
the Insalubrity and Salubrity of the Air (V, 56). 
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not have had "by laws merely mechanical" in order to 
produce things "conducive to the welfare or detriment of 
men." It was becoming to the Christian philosopher to 
admit "that God doth sometimes, in a peculiar though hidden 
way, interpose in the ordinary phaenomena and events of 
[medical] crisises"; but this happended so seldom "that we 
are not hastily to have recourse to an extraordinary 
providence, ••• if it may probably be accounted for by 
mechanical laws, and the ordinary course of things."58 We 
must be careful not to make too much of Boyle's insistence 
on the rarity of miracles. One scholar has said that 
because Boyle was "unable to deny biblical miracles, he 
forced himself to make miracles an exception to the general 
rule."59 What else was anyone to make of miracles? 
Without the ordinary course of nature, the extraordinary 
acts of God could not be recognized for what they are; 
there is no supernatural without the natural. 
* * * * * 
Boyle believed that miracles were events whose causes 
wholly exceeded the bounds of natural processes. Although 
miracles could be understood theologically and were a 
legitimate subject of rational discourse, supernatural 
explanation had no place in natural philosophy. It was 
58. Free Inquiry (V, 215f); cf. pp. 217 and 223. 
59. R.S. Westfall, Science and Religion, p. 89. 
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God's ordained power, not his absolute power, which the 
virtuoso ought to employ. Appeals to angels and astral 
influences were equally improper. Ockham's razor forbade 
any other approach.60 Those "schoolmen and philosophers 
[who] have derived forms immediately from God," Boyle 
protested in the Origin of Forms and Qualities, have "put 
omnipotence upon working I know not how many thousand 
miracles every hour, to perform that ••• in a 
supernatural way which seems the most familiar effect of 
nature in her ordinary course. 11 61 "'Tis the part of a 
philosopher," wrote John Wilkins in 1640, "not to fly unto 
the absolute power of God and tell us what He can do, but 
what according to the usual way of providence is most 
likely to be done, to find out such causes of things as may 
seem most easy and probable to our reason. 11 62 Boyle 
himself never said it any better. In 1661 the Jesuit 
Franciscus Linus proposed his funicular hypothesis to 
explain Boyle's experiments with the vaccuum pump. In 
order to account for the existence of a space between the 
top of a column of mercury and the top of a closed glass 
60. An Hydrostatical Discourse (III, 608f) and Suspicions 
about Some Hidden Qualities of the Air (IV, 95). 
61. Works III, 40. 
62. Discourse concerning a New World & Another Planet, Book 
2, p. 193. This was said with reference to the exceedingly 
great velocity of the celestial sphere which geocentric 
cosmology required. Although it was possible for God to 
perform such a motion, Wilkins argued, it was repugnant to 
the nature of things. 
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tube, Linus suggested that Nature formed an invisible 
elastic membrane of air or subtle matter between the 
mercury and the tube. As the mercury dropped, this 
funiculus resisted distention, suspending the liquid in the 
tube. Reluctant to admit that the apparently empty space 
left behind by the funiculus was a true vacuum, Linus 
called it "virtual extension," adding that such a thing was 
at least possible by divine fiat--to which Boyle replied, 
"our controversy is not what God can do, but about what can 
be done by natural agents, not elevated above the sphere of 
nature." In my hypothesis, Boyle said, "things are 
explicated by the ordinary course of nature, whereas in the 
other [Linus'] recourse must be had to miracles."63 Boyle 
reacted in a similar way when Hobbes introduced God's power 
into a discussion of infinite divisibility: "when Mr. 
Hobbes has recourse to what God can do (whose omnipotence 
we have both great reason to acknowledge) it imports not to 
the controversy about fluidity to determine what the 
almighty Creator can do, but what he actually has done."64 
Boyle's determination to limit scientific explanation 
to the sphere of God's ordinary activity--to what God 
63. A Defense of the Doctrine touching the Spring and 
Weight of the Air (I, 149). Linus' Tractatus de Corporum 
Inseparabilitate is discussed in Robert A. Greene, "Henry 
More and Robert Boyle on the Spirit of Nature," JHI 23 
(1962), 451-74. --
64. An Examen of Mr. T. Hobbes's "Dialogus Physicus de 
Natura Aeris" (I, 236). 
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actually did, not to what he had the power to do--betrays 
both a fundamental distrust of human speculation and a 
healthy respect for the facts as God saw fit to establish 
them. It is to the theological roots of that attitude that 
we will now turn our attention. 
God's Creative Power, the Limits of Human Knowledge, 
the Eternal Truths, and Empirical Science 
Some of the greatest minds of the seventeenth century 
yielded to the temptation to impose the bounds of their own 
reason on God's absolute power, enclosing his creative acts 
in a box of their own making. For Boyle, however, the 
rationalist enterprise amounted to sheer, unwarranted 
presumption. As "purblind mortals, that are not of the 
highest order of God's creatures," we could not but be 
"incompetent judges" of God's power, which could "justly be 
supposed to reach farther than our limited intellects can 
comprehend~ or, • without a saucy rashness, can presume 
to bound."65 We men, he wrote in the Christian Virtuoso, 
have too good a conceit of ourselves, when we think 
that no such thing can have an existence or at least 
have a nature or being, as we are not able to 
comprehend. For if we believe God to be the author 
of things, it is rational to conceive that he may 
have made them commensurate, rather to his own 
designs in them, than to the notions we men may best 
be able to frame of them. 
The world was made before man, who was not consulted in its 
65. Christian Virtuoso (VI, 676f). 
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construction. The author of nature "made things in such 
manner as he was pleased to think fit, and afterwards left 
human understandings to speculate as well as they could 
upon those corporeal, as well as other things." Therefore 
Boyle saw "no necessity, that intelligibility to a human 
understanding should be necessary to the truth or existence 
of a thing ••• "66 God was under no obligation to conform 
to human notions in anything he did. Boyle rejected as 
"not very cogent, and somewhat irreverant," Van Helmont's 
argument that divine providence was compelled to provide a 
cure for every disease; God was "not obliged any more to 
continue life or health to sinful man, than to beasts, that 
never offended him ••• " Neither the stars nor the 
passages of scripture had been "nicely or methodically 
placed," for "it became not the majesty of God to suffer 
himself to be fettered to human laws of method," which were 
far below his own conception of things.67 Fully to 
comprehend God's infinite nature required no less than an 
infinite understanding. Even for the corporeal works of 
God our knowledge was 
66. Works VI, 694. Things above Reason (IV, 450) contains 
a passage parallel to the last quotation. In an 
unpublished paper on the causes and remedies of atheism, 
Boyle denied that "the intellect of man is the genuine 
standard of truth, so that whatever surpasses his 
comprehension must not be admitted to be." Royal Society, 
Boyle Papers, vol. 6, folio 330, quoted by R.S. Westfall, 
Science and Religion, p. 168. 
67. Usefuless (II, 101) and Style of the Scriptures 
(II, 270). 
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incomparably inferior to his: for though some modern 
philosophers have made ingenious attempts to explain 
the nature of things corporeal, yet their 
explications generally suppose the present fabric of 
the world, and the laws of motion that are settled in 
it~ but God knows particularly, both why and how the 
universal matter was first contrived into this 
admirable universe, rather than a world of any other 
of the numberless constructions he could have given 
it~ and both why those laws of motion, rather than 
others, were established~ and how senseless matter, 
to whose nature motion does not at all belong, comes 
to be both put into motion, and qualified to transfer 
it according to determinate rules, which itself 
cannot understand.68 
Boyle considered it improper for the Cartesians to argue a 
priori that divine immutability implied the conservation of 
the quantity of motion. To do so was to presume too much 
knowledge of God's intentions. Nor did he see how that law 
could be demonstrated~ posteriori, since its agreement 
with terrestrial motions was questionable, and no one had 
directly experienced the propogation of celestial bodies. 
The "truth of the Cartesian rules [of impact] being evinced 
neither~ priori, nor~ posteriori," he concluded, it would 
not be unreasonable to think that God might have done 
things otherwise.69 Similarly, Descartes' identification 
of body and extension suffered from the "inconvenience" 
that God could not "annihilate the least particle of 
matter" without creating another "at the same instant and 
place"--which, as Boyle perceptively commmented, agreed 
68. High Veneration (V, 149f). 
69. Ibid., p. 140. Cf. Final Causes (V, 396f), where Boyle 
challenged the logic of arguing from divine immutability to 
uniformity in nature. 
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"very ill with that necessary and continual dependence, 
which he [Descartes] asserts matter itself to have on God 
for its very being."70 Reason concluded many other things 
which, if not directly repugnant to God's freedom, were 
clearly contradicted by his works. Experience showed, for 
example, that "bodies of very unequal weight, let fall 
together, will reach the ground at the same time": that 
"weaker sounds are. transmitted through the air as 
swiftly as stronger ones": and that water expands rather 
than contracts upon freezing.71 Experience had likewise 
disproved "diverse very plausible and radicated opinions, 
such as that of the uninhabitableness of the torrid zone, 
of the solidity of the celestial part of the world, of the 
blood's being conveyed from the heart by the veins (not the 
arteries) to the outward parts of the body," all of which 
had to be abandoned upon the discovery of phenomena with 
which they were inconsistent.72 
Boyle's suspicion of pure reason was intimately 
connected with his theological voluntarism. Revelation had 
already answered the larger questions of lifer further 
speculation on God's purposes and decrees was pointless, 
70. Excellency of Theology (IV, 43). Professor Edward 
Grant has suggested that Boyle chose the word 
"inconvenience" because of its Latin root inconveniens, 
"unsuitable." 
71. Christian Virtuoso (V, 527f). 
72. Certain Physiological Essays (I, 312). 
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even dangerous, for it could lead us into error. Science 
could progress without knowledge of ultimate realities, 
without encroaching on theological ground.73 Unlike 
Descartes, Boyle did not consider himself "obliged to treat 
of the cause of gravity in general" in order to use it in 
his explanations.74 The elasticity of air could be 
explained in two different ways, one atomist and the other 
Cartesian. To determine whether "the parts of a body are 
put into motion by the bending of the spring, or from the 
endeavor of some subtle ambient body" was a difficult 
business with which Boyle declined to meddle. His purpose 
was "only to mainifest, that the air hath a spring, and to 
relate some of its effects,"75 a position he maintained 
when attacked by Hobbes, who was contemptuous of 
"experimentarian philosophers" and criticized Boyle for 
refusing to specify the causes of the elasticity of air and 
of gravity.76 The nature of the continuum--whether or not 
matter was infinitely divisible--was probably insoluble, 
but "natural philosophy may be daily advanced without the 
decision of it, because there is a multitude of 
considerable things to be discovered and performed in 
73. For a similar interpretation, see the books by Fisher 
and Hunt. 
74. An Hydrostatical Discourse (III, 601). 
75. Spring of the Air (I, 12). 
76. See Hobbes' Dialo sive de Natura Aeris 
(1661) and Boyle's reply 1662) in Works I, 186-242. Also 
see Greene, "Henry More and Robert Boyle," pp. 462f. 
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nature, without so much as dreaming of this 
controversy . . . n77 
Thus Boyle eschewed the kind of rationalistic science 
pursued by Descartes and others. It was better to know a 
little with certainty from experiment than to construct 
speculative systems of the universe.78 Although he saw the 
advantage of knowing "in general, how the qualities of 
things are deducible from the primitive affections of the 
smallest parts of matter," he affirmed that knowing merely 
how one body affects another was sufficient. We might, 
"without ascending to the top in the series of causes, 
perform things of great moment; and such, as without the 
diligent examination of particular bodies, would, I fear, 
never have been found out a priori, even by the most 
profound contemplators."79 Arguments~ posteriori were 
just as valid, and more useful, than those~ priori.SO 
77. Excellency of Theology (IV, 43). 
78. Certain Physiological Essays (I, 299ff). Cf. page 307. 
79. Certain Experimental Physiological Essays (I, 310). 
Cf. the Short Memoirs for the Natural History of Mineral 
Waters (IV, 796), where Boyle stated that the ingredients 
and proportions of mineral waters "may be numberless, and 
the qualities resulting from these commixtures may be very 
differing from those of the separate ingredients; I am apt 
to look upon the difficulty of securely determining the 
effects of mineral waters~ priori, as little, if at all 
less than insuperable to human understandings." 
80. See the continuation of Spring and Weight of the Air 
(III, 279). Cf. Of the Strange Subtilty of Effluviums 
(III, 661) and Experiments and Considerations touching 
Colours (I, 663) for two of many similar statements. 
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Boyle devoted a short essay, "Of Unsucceeding Experiments," 
to the defense of experimentally derived knowledge in the 
face of contingencies. His heavy emphasis on Baconian 
natural histories is wholly consistent with this. 
Properties, not essences, were the aspects of nature he 
sought to determine. It is no accident that among Boyle's 
chief contributions to science are his discoveries of new 
chemical indicators and the establishment of almost all the 
properties of phosphorus known for the next two hundred 
years. 
* * * * * 
To say that God's thoughts are higher than ours, even 
to stress this point as fundamental to human knowledge, is 
not to say that God is unfettered by any considerations 
whatsoever. Boyle could not deny "that some things, that 
men may call bounds, may be assigned to the divine power," 
but only those boundaries which prevented one from holding 
"what is manifestly repugnant to the nature either of 
things, or of God." To turn a sphere of silver into a 
sphere of gold, though difficult, was not absolutely 
impossible, but to make a cylindrical sphere of gold was 
impossible, for "to give gold the necessary properties of a 
cylinder, the matter to be transformed must necessarily 
lose those of a sphere": and one could no more "make an odd 
number that may be divided into two even whole numbers" 
than one could "make a square triangle, the ideas of the 
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subject and the attribute being manifestly inconsistent.Bl 
Boyle therefore distinguished between probationary truths 
and absolute or eternal truths. By absolute truths, he 
said, 
I understand in the first place those theoretical 
principles and axioms, which are the foundations of 
our reasonings, such as are, two contradictories 
cannot both be true, every thing is, or is not, every 
line is either strait or crooked, every number (whole 
and finite) is either even or odd. Two quantities, 
that are each of them equal to a third, are 
themselves equal, and from truth nothing but truth 
can be legitimately deduced. And to this sort of 
primary truths may be referred the definitions of our 
more simple mental ideas, such as the clear 
conceptions we have of a triangle, a square, a 
circle, a cube, a cylinder, &c. And because there 
neither has [been], nor will be any time, wherein 
these principles of knowledge and ratiocinations may 
not be safely assented to, without any relation to 
contingent circumstances, these self-evident 
principles may be called eternal truths~ whereas for 
••• [probationary truths], though a man may 
rationally look upon them as truths, as long as he 
sees just cause to believe them, or no sufficient 
cause to question them, yet he cannot safely judge 
them to be more than truths upon supposition, or to 
express it shorter, conditional •••• For there are 
many doctrines and assertions, that for a long time 
(amounting perhaps to many ages) were generally 
received by philosophers themselves for true, which 
yet, by the happy discoveries of latter times, appear 
to unprejudiced judges to be errors • 
• • • I conceive, then, that there are two kinds or 
orders of principles and dictates of reason~ the one 
comprises those primary and universal notices and 
axioms, that are applicable to all kinds of subjects~ 
••• [which] hold on all occasions~ and therefore 
may be distinguished from other rules or dictates of 
philosophy, which, though they will hold in most 
81. Christian Virtuoso (VI, 677f). "Thinkers in the 
voluntarist tradition do not usually deny that God is bound 
by the laws of logic~ rather they are concerned to 
emphasize the power of God--PANTOKRATOR--and the 
inscrutability of Divine Will." J.E. McGuire, "Boyle's 
Conception of Nature," p. 527 nlO. 
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cases, do not hold in all cases, and are, on that 
account, subordinate, or at least of an inferior 
nature, to the primary and catholic principles lately 
mentioned • 
• • • I look upon the metaphysical and mathematical 
principles, we have been speaking of, to be truths of 
a transcendental kind, that do not properly, and 
exclusively to the other, belong either to philosophy 
or theology~ but are universal foundations and 
instruments of all the knowledge we mortals can 
acquire.82 
Thus Boyle agreed with Descartes in identifying the basic 
principles of logic and mathematics as eternal truths which 
functioned as the foundation of all knowledge. He also 
agreed that God, as "the author of our reason, cannot be 
supposed to oblige us to believe contradictions"~ God's 
veracity and boundless knowledge prevented him from 
deceiving us.83 But here Boyle's similarity to Descartes 
ended. Where the Frenchman moved on to embrace the 
proposition that all things perceived clearly and 
distinctly are true, the Englishman reminded us that we 
"mistake and flatter human nature too much, when we think 
our faculties of understanding so unlimited, ••• as many 
philosophers seem to suppose." Created and finite beings 
came we into the world, "as it pleased the almighty and 
most free author of our nature to make us." It followed 
from this that our mental abilities were "proportionable to 
82. These quotations have been taken from three separate 
speeches by the character Eleutherius, who speaks for Boyle 
in the dialogue appended to the first part of the Christian 
Virtuoso (VI, 709-711). 
83. Ibid., p. 712, and V, 529. 
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God's designs in creating us, and therefore may probably be 
supposed not to be capable of reaching to all kinds • 
of truths, many of which may be unnecessary for us to know 
here ••• " Thus it was not unreasonable to think that "in 
our present mortal condition there should be some objects 
beyond the comprehension of our intellects," so that "we 
cannot attain to a clear and full knowledge of them."84 
Therefore Boyle distinguished three degrees of 
demonstration and certainty. In metaphysical 
demonstration, built on the eternal truths, the conclusion 
was true and could not be otherwise. Physical 
demonstration, which presupposed physical principles (such 
as~ nihilo nihil fit), was less certain because subject 
to God's absolute power. Moral demonstration relied on the 
concurrence of probablities, as in the agreement of 
testimony from two different witnesses in a murder trial.BS 
Articles of religion Boyle assigned to the level of moral 
certainty, where he also placed most reasoning in physics: 
"in many things, that are looked upon as physical 
demonstrations, there is really but a moral certainty." 
For example, when astronomers discussed the paths and 
nature of comets, some did so without ever having seen a 
comet in their lives, but relied on their predecessors for 
information. Though the inferences they drew might "have a 
84. Things above Reason (IV, 410). 
85. Reason and Religion (IV, 182). 
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demonstrable certainty; yet the premises they are drawn 
from having but an historical one, the presumed 
physico-mathematical demonstration can produce in a wary 
mind but a moral certainty," and not even the greatest 
degree of that. It was no easy task to make the exacting 
observations required for constructing "an undoubted theory 
upon them." Boyle knew not "how many things in physics, 
that men presume they believe upon physical and cogent 
arguments, wherein they really have but a moral 
assurance • • • n86 
In adopting this view of knowledge, Boyle rejected 
both Cartesian and Baconian views. If Descartes had 
admitted into natural philosophy knowledge which was not 
more than morally certain, the basic propositions of his 
physics were derived, in his opinion, from reason alone and 
partook of absolute certainty. Bacon, though differing 
from Descartes on the means of obtaining scientific 
knowledge, also believed it to be demonstrable and 
absolutely certain. For both men, philosophers could learn 
the true structure or essence of the macroscopic and the 
microscopic. For Boyle, only God could have such a 
science; finite and fallen men could expect no more than 
moral certainty.87 As Henry Van Leeuwen has shown, the 
86. Excellency of Theology (IV, 42). 
87. Boyle put it more forcefully in Excellency of Theology 
(IV, 50): "our knowledge is not very deep, not reaching 
with any certainty to the bottom of things, nor penetrating 
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theory of certainty that had been worked out by liberal 
Anglican divines in defense of Protestantism--the certainty 
of reasonable men--was later adopted by the most 
influential members of the Royal Society. That this theory 
appealed to the voluntarist (and liberal Anglican) that 
Boyle was, is not at all surprising.88 
* * * * * 
If Boyle rejected Baconian and Cartesian notions of 
scientific certainty, he also drew from each tradition 
elements which harmonized more readily with his 
understanding of God's creative power: from Bacon, the 
conviction that experiments were the source of science~ 
from Descartes, a hypothetical corpuscularism in explaining 
natural phenomena. Many atomists, Boyle observed, 
confidently 
presume to know the true and genuine causes of the 
things they explicate~ yet very often the utmost they 
can attain to, in their explications, is, that the 
explicated phaenomena may be produced after such a 
manner, as they deliver, but not that they really are 
so. For as an artificer can set all the wheels of a 
clock a going, as well with springs as with weights~ 
and may with violence discharge a bullet out of the 
barrel of a gun, not only by means of gunpowder, but 
to their innate or inmost natures ••• " For Boyle's 
belief that the fall had affected our minds, see Reason and 
Religion (IV, 165f). 
88. The Problem of Certaint 1630-1690 
(The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1963 • 
Probability and Certainty in Seventeenth-Century England: A 
Study of the Relationships between Natural Science, 
Religion, History, Law, and Literature Princeton: UP, 
1983), has a wider scope but a similar argument. 
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of compressed air, and even of a spring: so the same 
effects may be produced by diverse causes different 
from one another~ and it will oftentimes be very 
difficult, if not impossible, for our dim reasons to 
discern surely, which of these several ways, whereby 
it is possible for nature to produce the same 
phaenomena, she has really made use of to exhibit 
them •••• [It] is a very easy mistake for men to 
conclude, that because an effect may be produced by 
such determinate causes, it must be so, or actually 
is so •••• For it is one thing to be able to shew 
it possible, for such and such effects to proceed 
from the various magnitudes, shapes, motions, and 
concretions of atoms~ and another thing to be able to 
declare what precise, and determinate figures, sizes, 
and motions of atoms, will suffice to make out the 
proposed phaenomena, without incongruity to any 
others to be met with in nature ••• 
Atomists were wont to assume "that either the proposed 
explication must be allowed, or men can give none at all, 
that is intelligible," an attitude which Boyle found 
wanting. No one, he thought, had shown "that men must be 
able to explicate all nature's phaenomena"~ how could it be 
proved that the omniscient God could not exhibit phenomena 
in ways other than those "explicable by the dim reason of 
man?" If we admit that God is the author of the universe, 
he argued, how could it be "that he, whose knowledge 
infinitely transcends ours, and who may be supposed to 
operate according to the dictates of his own immense 
wisdom, should, in his creating of things, have respect to 
the measure and ease of human understandings" rather than 
to any other?89 God had made a very complex world indeed. 
89. Usefulness (II, 45f). On Boyle's use of the Cartesian 
clock metaphor and the methodology it implies, see Laurens 
Laudan, "The Clock Metaphor and Probabilism: The Impact of 
Descartes on English Methodological Thought, 1650-65," 
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There were often "so many subordinate causes between 
particular effects and the most general causes of things, 
that there is left a large field, wherein to exercise men's 
industry and reason" in the framing of causal schemes for 
various illnesses. Since we knew "very little~ priori," 
it was without question "a great advantage" to have learned 
"by a variety of experiments" the "differing ways, whereby 
nature produces the same effects."90 Boyle had met with 
Annals of Science 22 (1966), 73-104. Cf. this passage from 
Joseph Glanvill's Scepsis scientifica (London, 1665): "And 
though the Grand Secretary of Nature, the miraculous 
Des-Cartes, hath here infinitely out-done all the 
Philosophers that went before him, in giving a particular 
and Analytical account of the Universal Fabrick: yet he 
intends his principles but for Hypotheses, and never 
pretends that things are really or necessarily, as he hath 
supposed them: but that they may be admitted pertinately to 
solve the Phaenomena, and are convenient supposals for the 
use of life. Nor can any further account be expected from 
humanity,but how things possibly may have been~ . 
consonantly to sensible nature: but infallibly to determine 
how they truly~ effected, is proper to him only that 
saw them in the Chaos, and fashion'd them out of that 
confused~- For to say the principles of Nature must 
needs be such as our Philosophy makes them is to set bounds 
to Omnipotence, and to confine infinite power and wisdom to 
our shallow models." I am quoting here from pp. 182ff of 
the 1885 reprint, ed. John Owen (London: Kegan Paul, Trench 
& Co.), italics Glanvill's. 
90. Certain Physiological Essays (I, 309) and Usefulness 
(II, 76). Cf. Experimental History of Colours (I, 692): 
"though by making the experiments and reflections deliver'd 
in this paper, I have endeavoured somewhat to lessen my 
ignorance in this matter, and think it far more desirable 
to discover a little, than to discover nothing, yet I 
pretend but to make it probable by the experiments I 
mention, that some colours may be plausibly enough 
explicated in general by the doctrine here proposed; for 
whenever I would descend to the minute and accurate 
explication of particulars, I find my self very sensible of 
the great obscurity of things ••• " Boyle's "descent" to 
the particulars recalls the sixth part of Descartes' 
Discourse on Method. 
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many things which could not be assigned a single, probable 
cause and some things which could be assigned several 
causes of widely differing character. He had often 
encountered "such difficulties in searching into the causes 
and manner of things," and was so aware of his "own 
disability to surmount those difficulties," that he dared 
to speak "confidently and positively of very few things, 
except matters of fact." No theory could be expected to 
endure all experimental tests. Boyle had seen many 
doctrines "confuted by the discovery of some new phaenomena 
in nature, which was either unknown ••• , or not 
sufficiently considered," a fate which any theory could 
suffer if proposed too hastily.91 
The contingency of all hypotheses was deeply ingrained 
in Boyle's thought. Among "The Requisites of a Good 
Hypothesis" was the requirement "That it be, at least 
consistent, with the rest of the Phaenomena it particularly 
relate to: and do not contradict any other known Phaenomena 
of Nature: or manifest Physical Truth. 11 92 But he who 
established a theory and expected it to last long enough to 
make him famous "must not only have a care, that none of 
the phaenomena of nature, that are already taken notice of, 
91. Certain Physiological Essays (I, 307f). 
92. Boyle's manuscript is reprinted by M.B. Hall, Robert 
Bo le on Natural Philoso h: An Essa , with Selections from 
his Writings (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1965 , pp. 134f, and 
R.S. Westfall, "Unpublished Boyle Papers Relating to 
Scientific Method," Annals of Science 12 (1956), 116f. 
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do contradict his hypothesis at the present, but that no 
phaenomena, that may be hereafter discovered, shall do it 
for the future." Boyle seriously questioned whether 
philosophers realized how incomplete the history of nature 
was, and how difficult it was "to build an accurate 
hypothesis upon an incompleat history of the phaenomena" it 
had to explain. The future might bring new discoveries 
which "may yet overthrow doctrines speciously enough 
accommodated to the observations, that have been hitherto 
made." The uninhabitability of the torrid zone, the 
solidity of the celestial orbs, and the received number of 
planets had all been overturned by recent observations. 93 
I know not, he said, "but that future discoveries by 
improved telescopes and other philosophical instruments may 
reduce us to make changes in the grand system of the 
universe itself, and in ••• the terraquaeous globe we 
live on."94 Thus Boyle preferred to finish his 
Experimental History of Cold before asserting a particular 
hypothesis concering the cause of cold.95 Although he 
nevertheless ventured an hypothesis in the preface, Boyle 
emphasized, not the hypothesis, but the phenomena he had 
studied. Even the most well established laws of his time, 
93. Excellency of Theology (IV, 59f). He had noted earlier 
(p. 50) that the extent of our knowledge was "not very 
large," for experience had acquainted us with only the 
"crust or scurf" of our own planet. 
94. Cosmical Suspicions (III, 318). 
95. Works II, 478. 
176 
about the motions of the planets, he was unwilling to place 
beyond doubt. "There may be less of accurateness, and of 
constant regularity, than we have been taught to believe, 
in the structure of the universe," he suspected. It could 
be the case that some things taken "for deviations and 
exorbitancies from the settled course of nature," if 
observed for a sufficiently long time, would "be found to 
be but periodical phaenomena, that have very long intervals 
between them," as was the case with the "strangely varying 
appearances of Saturn" due to the changing inclinations of 
the ring system.96 
Voluntarism and Empiricism: A Manifest Connection 
The ultimate goal of Boyle's scientific work, as Mrs. 
Hall has so eloquently shown, was the advancement of what 
he was the first to call the "mechanical philosophy" of 
nature.97 Boyle believed that matter and motion alone 
could explain almost everything, except the free actions of 
rational agents. This was the focus of his brief essay, 
"About the Excellency and Grounds of the Mechanical 
Hypothesis."98 No other philosophy of nature, he argued, 
rivals the mechanical in clarity, simplicity, and 
96. Cosmical Suspicions (III, 322-24). 
97. "The Establishment of the Mechanical Philosophy," 
Osiris 10 (1952), 412-541, and Robert Boyle and 
Seventeenth-Century Chemistry (Cambridge: UP, 1958). 
98. Works IV, 67-78. 
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versatility~ more than this, no other is even intelligible. 
For Boyle, then, the mechanical hypothesis represented the 
true system of the world, the correct picture of 
reality--at least in so far as man could discover it. 
Nevertheless a hypothesis it remained, however much he 
may have believed in its veracity. When contrasted with 
the absolutely certain axioms of metaphysics, its 
provisional character stands out. Absolute proof is 
something which Boyle never claimed for the mechanical view 
of nature. "That which I need to prove," he wrote in The 
Mechanical Origin of Qualities, "is not that mechanical 
principles are the necessary and only things, whereby 
qualities may be explained, but that probably they will be 
found sufficient for their explication."99 To be sure, 
Boyle believed that mechanical principles were in fact the 
only things whereby qualities could be explained. It is 
however wholly in keeping with his conception of science 
that he chose to demonstrate this from the phenomena, not 
from any innate truths implanted in his soul. 
In his astute critique of the "revisionist" thesis of 
M.B. Foster and others, Rolf Gruner concludes that modern 
science did not grow out of Christianity "as an oak tree 
grows out of an acorn." He is certainly correct. There is 
no necessity in the process of history--"nothing natural, 
99. Works IV, 232. 
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predestined, [or] logical about historical development."100 
It is not the case, as Reijer Hooykaas would have it, that 
"things happened thus and therefore, thus they must have 
happened."101 If the preceding study of Robert Boyle has 
shown anything, however, it is this: within the thought of 
a given individual, setting aside all questions of the flow 
of ideas from one person to another, a strong connection 
can be found between theological voluntarism and an 
empirical science of nature. Without a doubt, Boyle 
understood God's relation to the world in unabashedly 
voluntaristic terms. Transcendent and omniscient, God was 
known only as he chose partially to reveal himself in 
nature and scripture. Revelation, not ontology, was the 
road to religion~ worship, not contemplation, was the way 
to God. Omnipotent and free, God the creator was not bound 
to make the best possible world or to employ, in the world 
he did make, notions wholly comprehensible to merely human 
minds. As the product of uninterrupted and direct divine 
action, the universe reflected the laws by which its Author 
freely governed the brute matter he had made. Not 
necessary truths binding on God, the laws of nature were 
only collected or emergent truths arising from the 
phenomena rather than from unaided reason. Even with much 
100. "Science, Nature, and Christianity," Journal of 
Theological Studies n.s. 26 (1975), 55-81, on the last 
page. 
101. Religion and the Rise of Modern Science (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 1972), p. 162. 
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aid from experience and observation, reason could easily go 
awry. Influenced perhaps by his Calvinist tutor Marcombes 
or by the moderate Anglicans of seventeenth century 
England, Boyle brought to his natural philosophy a healthy 
scepticism about the scope and autonomy of human reason. 
All hypotheses, without which there can be no science, were 
to a greater or lesser degree contingent on the phenomena 
of nature. 
It is therefore clear that the voluntarist elements in 
Boyle's theology of creation impinged directly on 
corresponding aspects of his natural philosophy. Because 
the creator had worked and continued to work in accordance 
with his free will and not out of necessity, the order of 
nature was contingent and could not be known~ priori. 
Because the creator had made us but purblind mortals of 
limited capacity, we could not presume to share his 
infinite understanding of the inner constitution of things. 
The best that could be achieved was a hypothetical 
modelling of empirically determined properties, an a 
posteriori science of phenomena. 
necessary, said Boyle, 
It is not always 
that he, that propounds an hypothesis in astronomy, 
chemistry, anatomy, or other part of physicks, be 
able~ priori, to prove his hypothesis to be true, or 
demonstratively to show, that the other hypotheses 
proposed about the same subject must be false. For 
••• in the physical explications of the parts and 
system of the world, methinks, there is somewhat like 
what happens when men conjecturally frame some 
several keys to enable us to understand a letter 
180 
written in cyphers. For though one man by his 
sagacity have found out the right key, it will be 
very difficult for him, either to prove otherwise 
than by trial, that this or that word is not such, as 
it is guessed to be by others, according to their 
keys~ or to evince,~ priori, that theirs are to be 
rejected, and his to be preferred~ yet, if due trial 
being made, the key that he proposes, shall be found 
so agreeable to the characters of the letter, as to 
enable one to understand them, and make a coherent 
sense of them, its suitableness ••• [is] sufficient 
to make it be accepted as the right key of that 
cypher. And so, in physical hypotheses, there are 
some, that, without noise, or falling foul upon 
others, peaceably obtain discerning men's approbation 
only by their fitness to solve the phaenomena, for 
which they were devised, without crossing any known 
observation or law of nature. And therefore, if the 
mechanical hypothesis go on to explicate things 
corporeal at the rate it has of late years proceeded 
at, it is scarce to be doubted, but that, in time, 
unprejudiced persons will think it sufficiently 
recommended by its consistency with itself, and its 
appreciableness to so many phaenomena of nature.102 
Such an attitude could hardly go unnoticed in the vigorous 
debate from which the modern philosophy of nature emerged. 
Gottfried Leibniz, that great rationalist, complained to 
Christiaan Huygens that 
Mr. Boyle spends too much time, to be truthful, 
drawing from an infinity of splendid experiments no 
other conclusions than those which he could have 
taken for principles of nature ••• which one can 
certify to be true from reason alone, whereas 
experiments, no matter how numerous, cannot prove 
them.103 
102. Of the Excellency and Grounds of the Mechanical 
Hypothesis (IV, 77). Boyle employed the Cartesian cypher 
metaphor (from Book IV of the Principles) in other ways at 
other times too numerous to explore here. 
103. Letter of 8 January 1692, Oeuvres completes des 
Christiaan Huygens (22 vols.~ The Hague, 1882-1944) x, 
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By the time Huygens read these words, Boyle was dead. But 
ideas, like states and institutions, do not die with the 
individuals who shape them. Empiricism, that attitude 
toward nature which Boyle so strongly endorsed, and 
voluntarism, the theological orientation in which it 
thrived, both lived on in the person of Isaac Newton. 
228f, quoted by M.B. Hall, Robert Boyle on Natural 
Philosophy, p. 43. 
CHAPTER FIVE: 
ISAAC NEWTON, DIVINE FREEDOM, AND THE REJECTION 
OF RATIONALISTIC NATURAL PHILOSOPHY 
In distinguishing matter from extension, and in 
transferring the intelligibility of extension to the neuter 
realm of space, Newton denied the program and method of 
Cartesian science. Man faces an arbitrary universe created 
by omnipotent will and comprehensible only to omniscient 
wisdom. In such a universe we can never achieve necessary 
demonstrations. Our information is limited to sensations~ 
our knowledge is confined to phenomena. 
--R.S. Westfall, "Newton and Absolute Space," Arch. 
int. hist. sci. 17 (1964), pp. 129f 
"Metaphysical hypotheses," so Newton told us, "have no 
place in experimental philosophy." Yet it seems quite 
clear that metaphysical convictions play, or at least have 
played, an important part in the philosophy of Sir Isaac 
Newton. It is his acceptance of two absolutes--space and 
time--that enabled him to formulate his fundamental three 
laws of motion, as it was his belief in an omnipotent and 
omniactive God that enabled him to transcend both the 
shallow empiricism of Boyle and Hooke and the narrow 
rationalism of Descartes, to renounce mechanical 
explanations, and, in spite of his own rejection of all 
action at a distance, to build up his world as an interplay 
of forces, the mathematical laws of which natural 
philosophy had to establish. By induction, not by pure 
speculation. This because our world was created by the 
pure will of God~ we have not, therefore, to prescribe his 
action for him~ we have only to find out what he has done. 
The belief in creation as the background of empirico-
mathematical science--that seems strange. Yet the ways of 
thought, human thought, in its search for truth are, 
indeed, very strange. 
--Alexandre Koyre, Newtonian Studies, pp. 113f 
It is noticable that Newton, in common with the whole 
voluntaristic British tradition in medieval and modern 
philosophy, tended to subordinate in God the intellect to 
the will~ above the Creator's wisdom and knowledge is to be 
stressed his power and dominion. In some passages this 
emphasis is not present, but usually the proportions are 
unmistakable. 
--E.A. Burtt, The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern 
Physical Science, p. 294 
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Without question, Isaac Newton was a deeply religious 
man. His private theological writings contain over a 
million words devoted primarily to prophecy, sacred 
history, and doctrine. Though far less extensive, his 
public utterances leave no doubt that natural theology also 
received its fair share of attention.I Yet in spite of 
substantial recent study, the relationship between Newton's 
public scientific life and his private religious life 
remains, like almost all facets of this complex man, 
enigmatic.2 I do not propose here completely to clarify 
1. Modern scholarship of Newton's religion began with Louis 
Trenchard More, Isaac Newton, A Biography (New York: 
Scribner's, 1934), the first work to accept at face value 
the Arianism which so permeated Newton's private papers. 
Herbert McLachlan, hardly a disinterested party as a 
Unitarian himself, poorly edited a collection of 
unpublished papers bearing on soteriology and polity in 
Isaac Newton: Theological Manuscripts (Liverpool: UP, 
1950). Hereafter this will be cited as "McLachlan." 
Richards. Westfall, "Newton's Theological Manuscripts," in 
Contemporary Newtonian Research, ed. Zev Bechler (Boston: 
Reidel, 1982), pp. 129-43, surveys all the accessible 
collections and attempts an overview of their contents. 
Prophecy is the focus of Leonard Trengove, "Newton's 
Theological Views," Annals of Science 22 (1966), 277-94. 
Natural religion receives special attention in "Isaac 
Newton's Theologiae Gentilis Origines Philosophicae," 
Westfall's contribution to The Secular Mind, ed. w. Warren 
Wagar (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1982), pp. 15-34. 
2. Westfall's basic thesis, that Newton was a precursor of 
the Enlightenment, is developed in the final chapter of 
Science and Religion in Seventeenth-Century England (New 
Haven: Yale UP, 1958), in "Isaac Newton: Religious 
Rationalist or Mystic?" Review of Religion 22 (1958), 
155-70, and in his justly praised Never at Rest, A 
Biography of Isaac Newton (Cambridge: UP, 1980), which will 
be cited hereafter by its title alone. I am inclined to 
agree more with Frank E. Manuel, whose study of The 
Religion of Isaac Newton (Oxford: Clarendon Pres~l974) 
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that relationship. Rather it is my intention to focus on 
one aspect of Newton's theological thought, his 
voluntarism, in an attempt to show how his concept of God 
influenced the content and the character of his natural 
philosophy.3 
stresses those aspects which remind us that Newton was not 
a modern man. Unfortunately Manuel's A Portrait of Isaac 
Newton (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1968) suffers fatally from 
the assumption that Newton was not a man at all--he 
remained perpetually the fatherless boy whose mother played 
the harlot with a lascivious cleric. Neither Westfall nor 
Manuel sees a significant interaction between Newton's 
science and his religion, apart from his pursuit of natural 
theology. William H. Austin, "Isaac Newton on Science and 
Religion," JHI 31 (1970), 521-42, denies that Newton's 
theology derived from his science: E.W. Strong, "Newton and 
God," JHI 13 (1952), 147-67, denies the reverse. Varying 
degreesof synthesis are attempted with varying degrees of 
success by Klaus-Dietwardt Buchholtz, Isaac Newton als 
Theolo e: ein Beitra zum Ges rach zwischen 
Naturwissenschaft und Theologie Witten: Luther-Verlag, 
1965): Richard Stoddard Brooks, "The Relationships between 
Natural Philosophy, Natural Theology and Revealed Religion 
in the Thought of Newton and their Historiographical 
Relevance," doctoral dissertation at Northwestern 
University (1976): and David Castillejo, The Expanding 
Force in Newton's Cosmos (Madrid: Ediciones de Arte y 
Bibliofilia, 1981). 
3. Many scholars have recognized voluntaristic elements in 
Newton's natural philosophy, but few have written at length 
on this. Rare exceptions are Alexandre Koyr,, "Newton and 
Descartes," in Newtonian Studies (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 
1965), pp. 53-114: J.E. McGuire, "Force, Active Principles, 
and Newton's Invisible Realm," Ambix 15 (1968), 154-208, 
hereafter cited as "FAN": and Martin Tamny, "Newton, 
Creation, and Perception," Isis 70 (1979), 48-58. Henry 
Guerlac's article on "Theological Voluntarism and 
Biological Analogies in Newton's Thought," JHI 44 (1983), 
219-29, says little about biological analogies and less 
about voluntarism. In typical Marxist fashion, Simon John 
Schaffer, "Newtonian Cosmology and the Steady State," 
doctoral dissertation at Cambridge University (1980), sees 
Newton as avoiding "extreme voluntarism" for political 
reasons. He also sees the theological tension between 
God's potentia ordinata and his potentia absoluta as a 
contradiction, which it is not. 
185 
"In dealing with Philosophy, one must abstain from 
religion," Newton wrote in a private manuscript.4 If he 
meant this absolutely, or practiced it faithfully, there 
would be no point to this investigation. Fortunately he 
qualified himself elsewhere: "religion and Philosophy are 
to be preserved distinct. We are not to introduce divine 
revelations into Philosophy nor philosophical opinions into 
religion."5 What Newton intended to proclaim was not the 
divorce of science and religion--this would have been 
anathema to a man who believed he had rediscovered the 
prisca theologia of true religion hand in hand with the 
true system of the world--but their relative autonomy 
within the bounds of holy matrimony. Like Bacon and Boyle 
before him, Newton refused to use the Bible as an authority 
on matters scientific. If he went beyond his illustrious 
predecessors in seeking also to purge Christianity of what 
he perceived to be dangerous metaphysical errors, this was 
done for the fear of God and the love of true, biblical 
religion. The fact that the first editions of the 
Principia and the Opticks do not contain the theological 
material found in later editions must not be 
misinterpreted.6 To be sure, Newton wrote the General 
4. ULC Add. MS. 3965.13, quoted by Castillejo, The 
Expanding Force, p. 77. 
5. Keynes MS. 6, folio lr, printed by McLachlan, p. 58. 
6. See I.B. Cohen, "Isaac Newton's Principia, the 
Scriptures, and the Divine Providence," in Philosophy, 
Science, and Method, ed. Sidney Morgenbesser (New York: St. 
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Scholium only in reply to critics like Berkeley and 
Leibniz, who charged him with atheism and impiety. But his 
reluctance to mingle religion with science stemmed more 
from discretion than from principle. Always one to dodge 
disputes in an age much given to them, Newton knew that a 
full disclosure of his theological views would cost him his 
position and destroy his reputation. Publicly, he was 
content to leave theology to others, Bentley and Clarke 
among them. But privately--and we must remember that 
Newton's natural philosophy grew to fruition in 
solitude--he gave himself wholeheartedly to the God of 
Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, and he took no pains to keep his 
God out of his natural philosophy. 
Newtonian Voluntarism Versus Cartesian Materialism 
and Leibnizian Rationalism: The Primacy of Divine Will 
The divine being has always been associated with 
perfection, but this has not always meant the same thing. 
For Galileo, a perfect God had perfect knowledge, a portion 
of which the human mind could share~ for Descartes, 
perfection meant that God could not be a deceiver and had 
to be immutable in his actions. For Newton, perfection 
entailed the constant activity of the divine will. The 
highest idea of a perfect entity was 
Martin's Press, 1969), pp. 523-48. His letters to Bentley, 
discussed below, make it abundantly clear that Newton 
composed the Principia with a full awareness of its value 
for theology. 
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that it should be one substance, simple, indivisible, 
living and life-giving, always everywhere of 
necessity existing, in the highest degree 
understanding all things, freely willing good things: 
by his will effecting things possible: communicating 
as far as is possible his own similitude to the more 
noble effects: containing all things in himself as 
their principle and location: decreeing and ruling 
all things by means of his substantial presence (as 
the thinking part of a man perceives the appearances 
of things brought into the brain and thence rules its 
own body): and constantly co-operating with all 
things according to accurate laws, as being the 
foundation and cause of the whole of nature, except 
where it is good to act otherwise.7 
Newton's conception of worship was equally voluntaristic. 
In a manuscript commentary on 2 Kings 17:15-16, after 
acknowledging the piety of celebrating God "for his 
eternity, immensity, omnisciency, and omnipotence," Newton 
added that these attributes spring "not from the freedom of 
God's will but the necessity of his nature • II The 
wisest of beings, he continued, "required of us to be 
celebrated not so much for his essence as for his actions, 
the creating, preserving, and governing of all things 
according to his good will and pleasure. 11 8 The word God 
referred "not to the metaphysical nature of God but to his 
7. Royal Society, Gregory MS. 245, folio 14a, translated 
from the Latin by J.E. McGuire, "FAN," p. 190. McGuire has 
published an almost identical statement (from ULC Add. MS. 
3965.13) on p. 123 of "Newton on Place, Time, and God: An 
Unpublished Source," BJHS 11 (1978), 114-29. 
8. Yahuda MS. 21, folio lr, quoted by Manuel, Religion, pp. 
2lf. The circumstances surrounding the composition of this 
manuscript are set forth in Never at Rest, p. 355. 2 Kings 
17:15f condemns idolatry. 
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dominion," relating us to him as servants.9 Whoever could 
demonstrate that there is a perfect being without at the 
same time demonstrating that he is Lord of the Universe 
would not have shown that God exists, for "A Being eternal, 
infinite, all-wise and most perfect without dominion is not 
God but only Nature."10 So great was Newton's emphasis on 
God's will that even God's power, upon which voluntarists 
traditionally placed much weight, was relegated to a 
secondary role. "If God be called PANTOKRATOR the 
omnipotent," he wrote in a fragment on true religion, "they 
take it in a metaphysical sense for Gods power of creating 
all things out of nothing whereas it is meant principally 
of his universal irresistible monarchical power to teach us 
obedience."11 
The salient features of Newton's religion--his 
9. Yahuda MS. 15.7, folio 154r, quoted by Manuel, loc. cit. 
This idea worked its way into the General Scholiurn-.-Se~ 
the Mathematical Princi les of Natural Philso h , trans. 
Andrew Motte and revised by Florian Cajori Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1934), p. 544. Hereafter 
this edition will be called "Cajori." 
10. From a draft of the General Scholium, translated and 
printed by A. Rupert Hall and Marie Boas Hall in 
Unpublished Papers of Isaac Newton (Cambridge: UP, 1962), 
p. 363. This volume will be referred to simply as "Halls." 
11. "Of the faith which was once delivered to the Saints," 
Yahuda MS. 15.5, folios 96v, 97r, and 98r, quoted by 
Manuel, loc. cit. Yahuda MS. 9.2, folio 140r, which Manuel 
cites on pp. lOlf, shows that Newton had no small view of 
God's power, in spite of his placing it under God's will: 
"He that shall well consider the strange and wonderful 
nature of life and the frame of Animals, will think nothing 
beyond the possibility of nature, nothing too hard for the 
omnipotent power of God." 
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Arianism, his desire to avoid metaphysical formulations, 
his abiding interest in prophecy, his insistence on the 
importance of natural theology--are all consistent with his 
concept of God exercising his dominion by absolute will. 
As the sole Lord of the Universe, God the Father could have 
no equals, not even God the Son. Christ did not deserve 
our worship because of who he was--a better man than us--he 
earned it by his perfect obedience unto death. And this 
was the Christ of unadorned scripture, the Christ whom God 
had revealed to men, not the Christ of idolatrous reason. 
It was not enough to say that an article of faith could be 
deduced from scripture. "It must be exprest in the very 
form of sound words in which it was delivered by the 
Apostles," for men were apt to "run into partings about 
deductions. All the old Heresies lay in deductions~ the 
true faith was in the text."12 This was the meaning of 
Newton's remark about keeping philosophical opinions out of 
theology. Although he thought that true religion was 
indeed reasonable, rationalism in religion is something 
Newton never sought. His Sovereign Ruler was no 
constitutional monarch, no petty prince bound by the wishes 
and understanding of his subjects. It was "contrary to 
God's purposes that the truth of his religion should be as 
obvious and perspicuous to all men as a mathematical 
12. Commenting on 2 Timothy 1:13, "Hold fast to the form of 
sound words, which thou hast heard of me •• " Yahuda MS. 
15.1, folio llr, quoted by Manuel, Religion, pp. 54f. 
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demonstration." God moved the assent of those whom he had 
chosen to save, allowing the rest to "dy in their sins."13 
Men erred when they pretended to foreknow events by 
interpreting prophecy according to their fancies, for "the 
design of God was much otherwise." Prophecy was intended 
"not to gratify men's curiosities by enabling them to 
foreknow things, but that after they were fulfilled they 
might be interpreted ,ey the event," thereby manifesting 
divine Providence to the world.14 Newton's argument for 
the existence of God was equally~ posteriori. "The 
dominion or Deity of God," he wrote in a draft of the 
General Scholium, "is best demonstrated not from abstract 
ideas but from phenomena, by their final causes."15 
Being the voluntarist that he was, Newton rejected the 
ontological argument in favor of the teleological. God had 
to exist not by the necessity of his being or the force of 
innate ideas, but by the clear evidence of his willful 
actions in nature, evidence to which Newton believed he had 
13. Fragments from a treatise on Revelation, Yahuda MS. 1, 
folio 19r, printed as an appendix to Manuel, Religion, p. 
124. 
14. Observations upon the Prophecies of Daniel and the 
Apocalypse of St. John, in Isaac Newton opera quae existant 
omnia, ed. Samuel Horsley (5 Vols.: London, 1779-85) V, 
449, emphasis mine. "It is not for us to know the times & 
seasons which God has put in his own breast." Yahuda MS. 
7.3g, folio 13, quoted in Never at Rest, p. 816. 
15. Halls, p. 363. The final version of the Scholium put 
it like this: "We know him only by his most wise and 
excellent contrivances of things, and final causes •• 
(Cajori, p. 546) 
" 
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contributed in no small measure. "When I wrote my treatise 
about our Systeme," he told the Rev. Mr. Richard Bentley, 
"I had an eye upon such Principles as might work with 
considering men for the beliefe of a Deity & nothing can 
rejoyce me more than to find it useful! for that 
purpose."16 Bentley had asked the great man to comment on 
the first set of Boyle lectures, which he had been 
appointed to deliver. There is reason to believe that 
Newton may have had a hand in the selection of Bentley as 
the inaugural lecturer.17 Certainly he was receptive and 
more than a bit helpful. In the correspondence which 
followed, and in the General Scholium which was added to 
the 1713 edition of the Principia, Newton answered 
Bentley's every inquiry, including these: Could the system 
of the world have been produced by purely natural causes 
from an initial uniform distribution of matter in space? 
Could the planetary motions have resulted from gravitation 
alone, unassisted by God? The answer to both was in the 
negative. The only possible cause of the frame of the 
world and the diversity of creatures was the will of a 
sovereign God. The six planets, Newton observed in the 
General Scholium, all revolve about the sun in concentric 
16. Letter of 10 December 1692, in The Correspondence of 
Isaac Newton, ed. H.W. Trumbull et al. (7 Vols.: Cambridge: 
UP, 1959-77) III, 233. All future references will be given 
as Corres. 
17. See Henry Guerlac and M.C. Jacob, "Bentley, Newton, and 
Providence (The Boyle Lectures Once More)," JHI 30 (1969), 
307-18. 
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circles in the same direction and almost in the same plane; 
the ten moons show a similar regularity. Though their 
orbits might continue "by the mere laws of gravity, yet 
they could by no means have at first derived the regular 
position of the orbits themselves from those laws." It was 
inconceivable that "mere mechanical causes could give birth 
to so many regular motions. " Such a beautiful system 
"could only proceed from the counsel and dominion of an 
intelligent and powerful Being."18 From the direct hand of 
that Being, Newton could.have added. Gravity alone might 
have sufficed to give the planets their orbital speeds, but 
the divine arm had been required to bend them into their 
proper orbits around the sun.19 The astronomical bodies 
required divine agency also for their formation, in order 
to separate the opaque matter of the planets from the lucid 
matter of the stars.20 Newton summarized his general 
position in a letter to Thomas Burnet: "Where natural 
18. Cajori, pp. 543f. For similar comments to Bentley, see 
Corres III, 235 and 254f. Cf. the drafts of the General 
Scholium in Halls, pp. 353, 360, and 362f. 
19. Corres III, 240 and 244. For the details of Newton's 
consideration of Galileo's "Platonic" cosmogony, which 
Newton attributed to Blondel's L'Art de jetter les bombes 
(Amsterdam, 1683), see Alexandre Koyri, "Newton, Galileo, 
and Plato," in Newtonian Studies, pp. 201-220; I.B. Cohen, 
"Galileo, Newton, and the Divine Order of the Solar 
System," in Galileo: Man of Science, ed. Ernan McMullin 
(New York: Basic Books, 1967), pp. 207-231: and Shigeru 
Nakamaya, "Galileo and Newton's Problem of World-
Formation," Japanese Studies in the History of Science 1 
(1962), 76-82. 
20. Ibid., p. 234. 
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causes are at hand God uses them as instruments in his 
works, but I do not think them alone sufficient for ye 
creation."21 
Divine counsel and contrivance were no less apparent 
in the animal kingdom. It could be no accident that birds, 
beasts, and men had a perfect symmetry of parts on both 
sides of their bodies, a matched pair of limbs, wings, 
eyes, and ears. The specialized organs of sense and 
motion--above all the eye--had to have been made by one who 
understood the nature of light, sound, and the rest of the 
world in which creatures had been placed. "In ye frame of 
animals," as Newton told William Briggs, God "has done 
nothing without reason."22 
If regularity pointed to choice rather than chance, 
variety pointed to will rather than necessity. "Blind 
metaphysical necessity," argued Newton in the General 
Scholium, "could produce no variety of things. All that 
diversity of natural things which we find suited to 
different times and places could arise from nothing but the 
will of a Being necessarily existing."23 Because it became 
21. January 1681 (Corres II, 234). 
22. 12 September 1682 (Corres II, 384). Also see "A Short 
Scheme of the True Religion," in McLachlan, pp. 48f; the 
early notebook Certain Philosophical Questions, ed. J.E. 
McGuire and Martin Tamny (Cambridge: UP, 1983), p. 447 and 
the commentary on p. 254; and Query 31 from the Opticks 
(4th ed; New York: Dover, 1952), pp. 402f. 
23. Cajori, p. 546. This passage was added in the third 
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him who created all material things to set them in order, 
Newton found it "unphilosophical to seek for any other 
Origin of the World, or to pretend that it might arise out 
of a Chaos by the mere laws of Nature • " To discourse 
of God from the appearances of things, he proclaimed in the 
General Scholium, "does certainly belong to Natural 
Philosophy."24 Far from excluding teleology from natural 
philosophy as Descartes had done, Newton made divine 
purpose the ultimate explanation within natural philosophy. 
Indeed the "main Business of natural Philosophy" was 
to argue from Phaenomena without feigning Hypotheses, 
and to deduce Causes from Effects, till we come to 
the very first Cause, which certainly is not 
mechanical: and not only to unfold the Machanism of 
the World, but chiefly to resolve ••• [ultimate] 
Questions.25 
Thus Newton proposed a hierarchy of causes, each inferred 
from effects. Embracing both mechanisms and minds, his was 
truly a natural philosophy: all of created nature, together 
with the Creator, fell within its domain. The frame of the 
world spoke volumes of the counsel and dominion of God. 
(1726) edition. Cotes expressed a similar view in his 
preface to the second edition (Cajori, pp. xxxi-xxxii). 
Cf. the selection from ULC Add. MS. 3965.13, printed by 
McGuire in "Newton on Place, Time, and God," p. 123. 
24. Query 31 (Opticks, p. 402) and Cajori, p. 546. Cf. 
Halls, pp. 360 and 363. 
25. Query 28 (Opticks, p. 369). Cf. the drafts for the 
beginning of Book III of the Principia, from ULC Add. MS. 
3965, printed by Anita Pampusch in '"Experimental,' 
'Metaphysical,' and 'Hypothetical' Philosophy in Newtonian 
Methodology," Centaurus 18 (1974), 289-300. 
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Natural causes alone were insufficient to explain its 
regularity and variety. There was only one ultimate cause 
of phenomena, and all true science sought that cause. True 
science and true religion literally went hand in hand; 
heliocentrism and monotheism were partners. The ancients 
had known the true system of the world and had possessed 
the prisca theologia which Newton thought he had 
rediscovered in his chronological and prophetical studies. 
Noah and his sons took the heavens for "ye true & real 
temple of God," so they framed their own Temple "in the 
fittest manner to represent the whole system of the 
heavens," placing fire in the center to represent the sun. 
Geocentrism, a corruption of true philosophy, resulted from 
the corruption of true religion when the vestal fire was 
erroneously taken for a fire in the center of the earth.26 
This is just what Newton had in mind when he concluded 
Query 31 with the following observation: 
And if natural Philosophy in all its Parts, by 
pursuing this Method [of analysis and synthesis], 
shall at length be perfected, the Bounds of Moral 
Philosophy will also be enlarged. For so far as we 
can know by natural Philosophy what is the first 
Cause, what Power he has over us, and what Benefits 
we receive from him, so far our Duty towards him, as 
well as that towards one another, will appear to us 
by the Light of Nature. And no doubt, if the Worship 
26. Yahuda MS. 41, folios 6-8. See Westfall, Never at 
Rest, p. 355, and '!Isaac Newton's Theologiae Gentilis 
Origines Philosophicae," pp. 24-26; and Manuel, Religion, 
pp. 42-48. On Newton's rediscovery of ancient science and 
religion, see J.E. McGuire and P.M. Rattansi, "Newton and 
the 'Pipes of Pan'," Notes and Records of the Royal Society 
of London 21 (1966), 108-43. 
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of false Gods had not blinded the Heathen, their 
moral Philosophy would have gone farther than to the 
four Cardinal Virtues: and instead of teaching the 
Transmigration of Souls, and to worship the Sun and 
Moon, and dead Heroes, they would have taught us to 
worship our true Author and Benefactor, as their 
Ancestors did under the Government of Noah and his 
Sons before they corrupted themselves.~ 
* * * * * 
Of all the competing natural philosophies which rushed 
into the vacuum left behind by the disintegration of 
Aristotelianism, two stand out as prime examples of an 
approach to nature which Newton particularly loathed: the 
materialism of Ren~ Descartes and the rationalism of 
Gottfried Leibniz. Neither one, as Newton saw it, allowed 
God to exercise dominion over the creation he had made. 
Already in the early treatise De gravitatione et equipondo 
fluidorum, written around 1670, a strong aversion to 
Cartesianism was clearly well advanced. It was Descartes' 
relativistic definition of motion which, in the words of 
one scholar, "first aroused Newton's opposition to 
Cartesian physics."28 According to Descartes, as Newton 
pointed out, place was only a relative notion. But since 
"there are no bodies in the world whose relative positions 
remain unchanged with the passage of time," there are no 
fixed points of reference which enable us to locate the 
27. Opticks, pp. 405f. 
28. Alexandre Koyr~, Newtonian Studies, p. 82. The Latin 
text of De gravitatione is printed with an English 
translation in Halls, pp. 89-156. 
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past positions of bodies. From this Newton inferred that 
"not even God himself could define the past position of any 
moving body accurately ••• , since in fact, due to the 
changed positions of [all] the bodies, the place does not 
exist in nature any longer." Such a conception of motion 
was absurd to Newton, for a body could not meaningfully be 
said to have moved from place to place. Following the same 
definition of motion, he said, "God himself could not 
generate motion in some bodies even though he impelled them 
with the greatest force." If, for example, God were to 
apply a very great force to the starry heaven, causing it 
to revolve about the earth, Descartes would maintain that 
"the Earth alone and not the sky would be truly said to 
move," as if there were no difference between moving the 
heavens in one direction with a tremendous force and moving 
the earth in the opposite direction with a small force. 
Again, "if God should cause any Planet to stand still and 
make it continually keep the same position with respect to 
the fixed stars," Descartes would say that the planet moves 
because it is no longer at rest relative to the solar 
vortex.29 Though unstated, the clear implication of 
Newton's argument was that Descartes' definition of motion 
placed unacceptable limits on God's ability to know and to 
control his universe. The same could be said of Descartes' 
description of the world as being of "indefinite" 
29. Halls, pp. 127-30. 
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dimensions. Recall that Descartes reserved the term 
"infinite" for God alone, because only he could be known 
positively to have no limits. Other entities might have no 
perceivable limits and might appear to be boundless, but 
since we could not know positively that they were infinite, 
we should call them "indefinite." Newton disagreed. The 
world was "indefinite" in size, he said, only before God 
had decreed anything about its creation--if there ever was 
such a time. After that time, however, the quantity of 
matter and the number of stars were very definitely 
defined. And though we were ignorant beings incapable of 
grasping infinity, "God at least understands that there are 
no limits [to space] not merely indefinitely but certainly 
and positively ••• "30 The scope of the imaginable could 
not be presumed to be the same as that of God's creative 
act. 
Newton's most vociferous--and most voluntaristic--
objection to Cartesian physics was directed at Descartes' 
conception of matter, which Newton took for a path to 
atheism. Body "does not exist necessarily but by divine 
will," Newton began. Our notion of it was therefore 
uncertain, 
30. Ibid., p. 135. Cf. Certain Philosophical Questions, p. 
453: "To say that extension is but indefinite ••• because 
we cannot perceive its limits, is as much as to say, God is 
but indefinitely perfect because we cannot apprehend his 
whole perfection." Henry More also attacked Descartes on 
this point. See Koyre, Newtonian Studies, p. 89. 
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because it is hardly given to us to know the limits 
of the divine power, that is to say whether matter 
could be created in one way only, or whether there 
are several ways by which different beings similar to 
bodies could be produced. 
Newton went on to "describe a certain kind of being similar 
in every way to bodies, and whose creation we cannot deny 
to be within the power of God, so that we can hardly say 
that is is not body." The analogy upon which he relied was 
the human ability to move the body at will, by thought 
alone. The same "free power of moving bodies at will can 
by no means be denied to God, whose faculty of thought is 
infinitely greater and more swift." By "the sole action of 
thinking and willing," God could "prevent a body from 
penetrating any space defined by certain limits." If by 
his power God should cause some part of space to be 
impenetrable, to reflect light, and to resonate when 
struck, it would be impossible to distinguish that space 
from true body. 
Thus we may imagine that there are empty spaces 
scattered through the world, one of which, defined by 
certain limits, happens by divine power to be 
impervious to bodies, and~ hypothesi it is manifest 
that this would resist the motions of bodies and 
perhaps reflect them, and assume all the properties 
of a corporeal particle, except that it will be 
motionless. If we may further imagine that that 
impenetrability is not always maintained in the same 
part of space but can be transferred hither and 
thither according to certain laws, yet so that the 
amount and shape of that impenetrable space are not 
changed, there will be no property of body which this 
does not possess. It would have shape, be tangible 
and mobile, and be capable of reflecting and being 
reflected, and no less constitute a part of the 
structure of things than any other corpuscle, and I 
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do not see that it would not equally operate on our 
minds and in turn be operated upon, because it is 
nothing more than the product of the divine mind 
realized in a definite quantity of space. For it is 
certain that God can stimulate our perception by his 
own will, and thence apply such power to the effects 
of his will.31 
If the whole world were constituted of only such spaces, 
"it would seem hardly different." Thus "we can define 
bodies as determined quantities of extension which 
omnipresent God endows with certain conditions."32 "I have 
deduced a description of this corporeal nature from our 
faculty of moving our bodies," Newton added, "so that God 
may appear ••• to have created the world solely by the 
act of will, just as we move our bodies by an act of will 
alone ••• " Newton allowed the possibility of the 
Cambridge Platonist belief in a world soul created by God 
with the power to do this, but he did not see "why God 
himself does not directly inform space with bodies 
The point of this voluntarist conception of matter, as 
Newton was not reluctant to say, was that "we cannot 
postulate bodies of this kind without at the same time 
" 
supposing that God exists, and has created bodies in empty 
space out of nothing ••• " The Cartesian identification 
of matter and extension, on the other hand, was manifestly 
"a path to Atheism, both because extension is not created 
31. Ibid., pp. l38f. If Berkeley had known of this 
passage, I doubt that his criticism of Newton would have 
been quite so acerbic. 
32. Ibid., pp. 139f, emphasis his. 
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but has existed eternally, and because we have an absolute 
idea of it without any relationship to God," which would 
make it "possible for us to conceive of extension while 
imagining the non-existence of God."33 
Now Descartes had never imagined that matter could 
exist, even for a moment, without the ordinary concourse of 
God, which he understood as the continuous divine 
re-creation of the world. As I have argued in an earlier 
chapter, however, divine sovereignty and freedom were not 
unambiguously on the cutting edge of Cartesian natural 
philosophy, so Newton can readily be excused for failing to 
find them here. Less warranted was his implicit 
attribution to Descartes of his own view that extension is 
uncreated.34 When coupled with Descartes' assumption that 
matter and extension are the same thing, the eternity of 
extension yields the eternity of matter, a conclusion which 
Descartes not only never drew but surely never believed. 
The source of Newton's idea of an uncreated, infinite 
extension was probably the Neoplatonic philosophy of Henry 
33. Ibid., pp. 141-43. Cf. pp. 132 and 145. This entire 
argument recalls Boyle's simile, which compared God's 
ability to move the bodies in his world to a man's ability 
to move his own shadow by an act of pure volition. See 
Occasional Reflections and The Christian Virtuoso, in The 
Works of the Honourable Robert Bo le, ed. Thomas Birch~nd 
edn., 6 Vols.r London, 1772 , II, 402, and VI, 678-80, 
respectively. 
34. This is McGuire's point. See "Space, Infinity, and 
Indivisibility: Newton on the Creation of Matter," in 
Contemporary Newtonian Research, ed. Zev Bechler (Boston: 
Reidel, 1982), pp. 145-90. 
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More, Newton's colleague at Cambridge.35 Space, Newton 
proclaimed in De gravitatione, is fundamental to the 
existence of every being. 
God is everywhere, created minds are somewhere, and 
body is in the space that it occupies~ and whatever 
is neither everywhere nor anywhere does not exist. 
And hence it follows that space is an effect arising 
from the first existence of being, because when any 
being is postulated, space is postulated. And the 
same may be asserted of duration: for certainly both 
are dispositions of being or attributes according to 
which we denominate quantitatively the presence and 
duration of any existing individual thing.36 
Thus space and time were coeval with God--to assert God's 
existence was to assert his duration in time and his 
presence in space--and logically prior to God's existence, 
though not to his being, of which they were emanent 
effects.37 God's relation to the frame of time and space 
35. For details see E.A. Burtt, The Metaphysical 
Foundations of Modern Physical Science (London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1932), pp. 135-150 and 231-264; Marcus Pierz, 
"fiber den Ursprung und die Bedeutung des Lehre Isaac 
Newtons vom Absoluten Raum," Gesnerus 11 (1954), 62-120~ 
Koyre, From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe, pp. 
125-189 and 206-234~ Westfall, "Newton and Absolute Space," 
Archives internationales d'histoire des sciences 17 (1964), 
121-32~ and McGuire, "Existence, Actuality and Necessity: 
Newton on Space and Time," Annals of Science 35 (1978), 
463-508, and "Newton on Place, Time, and God." In Never at 
Rest (p. 318), Westfall has noted that Newton went beyond 
the Cambridge Platonists "directly to the [Patristic] 
sources on which they drew." 
36. Halls, p. 136. In the early notebook Certain 
Philosophical Questions, Newton had interpreted Genesis 1, 
Colossians 1:16, and Hebrews 1:2 to mean that God created 
time (seep. 449). Obviously he changed his mind in the 
few years before De gravitatione was written. 
37. Ibid., p. 137. See the comments of the Halls on pp. 
78f and of McGuire in "Existence, Actuality and Necessity," 
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was indeed an intimate one. As the eternal and infinite 
PANTOKRATOR, 
he governs all things, and knows all things that are 
or can be done. He is not eternity and infinity, but 
eternal and infinite: he is not duration or space, 
but he endures and is present. He endures forever, 
and is everywhere present: and, by existing always 
and everywhere, he constitutes duration and space. 
Since every particle of space is always, and every 
indivisible moment of duration is everywhere, 
certainly the Maker and Lord of all things cannot be 
never and nowhere •••• He is omnipresent not 
virtually only, but also substantially: for virtue 
cannot subsist without substance. In him are all 
things contained and moved: yet neither affects the 
other: God suffers nothing from the motion of bodies: 
bodies find no resistance from the omnipresence of 
God. It is allowed by all that the Supreme God 
exists necessarily: and by the same necessity he 
exists always and everywhere.38 
Because God had "a propensity to action," it concerned his 
glory and majesty "that he should never and nowhere be 
idle."39 The omnipresent, eternal God "is more able by his 
Will to move the Bodies within his boundless uniform 
Sensorium, and thereby to form and reform the Parts of the 
Universe, than we are by our Will to move the Parts of our 
own Bodies."40 
p. 481. 
38. From the General Scholium to the second (1713) edition 
of the Principia (Cajori, p. 545), italics Newton's. The 
third (1726) edition contains three additional sentences 
which I have replaced with an ellipsis. Cf. the draft 
version in Halls, pp. 359f. 
39. ULC Add. MS. 3965.13, folio 541v, quoted by McGuire, 
"FAN," p. 201. 
40. Query 31 (Opticks, p. 403). Cf. Query 28 (p. 370). On 
Newton's belief in space as the literal sensorium of God, a 
position which he later tried to hide, see Koyre and Cohen, 
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Activity was for Newton "the province of divinity," as 
Mrs. Dobbs has put it.41 Influenced by More's Christian 
Neoplatonism and his own extensive alchemical 
investigations, Newton rejected the brute mechanisms of 
traditional mechanical philosophies, infusing the inert 
world of matter with the activity of the divine will, 
either directly through the hand of God or indirectly 
through active prin~iples, which gave the world a structure 
and order that evinced providential choice rather than 
blind mechanical necessity. In the end, if Dobbs is 
correct, Newton assigned to Christ control over the short 
range forces of alchemical, electrical, and vital 
phenomena, leaving the cosmic force of gravitation to God 
himself. 42 A number of Newton's contemporaries certainly 
understood the latter to have been the case.43 According 
"The Case of the Missing Tanguam: Leibniz, Newton & 
Clarke," Isis 52 (1961), 555-66, and Never at Rest, pp. 
646-48. 
41. "Newton's Alchemy and His Theory of Matter," Isis 73 
(1982), p. 526. Her study of The Foundations of Newton's 
Alchemy (Cambridge: UP, 1975) has already become a classic. 
Other outstanding contributions to this aspect of Newtonian 
thought are McGuire's article "FAN" and Ernan McMullin, 
Newton and Matter and Activity (Notre Dame, IN: UP, 1978), 
a model of clarity. 
42. Ibid., pp. 527ff. 
43. This would include Locke, Wren, Gregory, and Whiston. 
See Never at Rest, pp. 510 and 647, and Westfall, Force in 
Newton's Physics (New York: American Elsevier, 1971), pp. 
395-400. Leibniz, another who understood this, will be 
discussed below. Newton's return to an aether in his old 
age, as seen in Queries 17-24, must not be mistaken for a 
return to traditional mechanical explanation. See Never at 
Rest, p. 794. For an account of Newton's changing views on 
the cause of gravitation and other forces, see McGuire, 
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to Gregory's memorandum from May 1694, Newton also gave God 
the responsibility of preventing the stars from collapsing 
together under the very attraction which he caused: 
"[Newton says] that a continual miracle is needed to 
prevent the Sun and the fixed stars from rushing together 
through gravity ."44 This is probably what Newton had 
in mind fifteen months before when he agreed with Bentley 
that if "all ye matter were at first divided into several 
systems & every system by a divine power [were] constructed 
like ours: yet would the outward systemes descend towards 
the middlemost so yt this frame of things could not always 
subsist without a divine power to conserve it."45 Thus in 
Query 31 Newton described Nature as 
very conformable to her self and very simple, 
performing all the great Motions of the heavenly 
Bodies by the Attraction of Gravity which intercedes 
those Bodies, and almost all the small ones of their 
Particles by some other attractive and repelling 
Powers which intercede the Particles. The Vis 
inertiae is a passive Principle by which Bodies 
persist in their Motion or Rest, receive Motion in 
proportion to the Force impressing it, and resist as 
much as they are resisted. By this Principle alone 
"FAN." 
44. Corres III, 336. 
45. Letter of 25 February 1693 (ibid., 255). In Query 28 
(Opticks, p. 369), published first in 1706, Newton implied 
that God was "what hinders the fix'd stars from falling 
upon one another?" In the General Scholium, however, we 
find only the following phrase, added to the third (1726) 
edition: "and lest the systems of the fixed stars should, 
by their gravity, fall on each other, he [God] hath placed 
those systems at immense distances from one another." 
(Cajori, p. 544) Apparently the continuous action of God 
was no longer thought to be required for the stability of 
the universe. 
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there never could have been any Motion in the World. 
Some other Principle was necessary for putting Bodies 
into Motion; and now they are in Motion, some other 
Principle is necessary for conserving the Motion.46 
On the following pages, Newton elaborated on the 
inadequacies of a purely mechanical world. Without active 
principles, he argued, the quantity of motion in the world 
would decrease. What he had in mind here--that collisions 
are rarely elastic and that rotating vortices quickly slow 
down--fails to distinguish between what we now call 
momentum and energy. But it would not be misleading to 
suggest that his insight, despite serious difficulties, 
captured the essential thrust of the law of entropy: the 
universe is running down. "Seeing therefore the variety of 
Motion which we find in the World is always decreasing," he 
concluded, 
there is a necessity of conserving and recruiting it 
by active Principles, such as are the cause of 
Gravity, by which Planets and Comets keep their 
Motions in their Orbs, and Bodies acquire great 
Motion in falling; and the cause of Fermentation, by 
which the Heart and Blood of Animals are kept in 
perpetual Motion and Heat; the inward Parts of the 
Earth are constantly warm'd, and in some Places grow 
very hot; Bodies burn and shine, Mountains take fire, 
the Caverns of the Earth are blown up, and the Sun 
continues violently hot and lucid, and warms all 
things by his Light. For we meet with very little 
Motion in the World, besides what is owing {either} 
to these active Principles {or to the Dictates of a 
Will}. And if it were not for these Principles the 
Bodies of the Earth, Planets, Comets, Sun, and all 
things in them would grow cold and freeze, and become 
inactive Masses; and all Putrefaction, Generation, 
Vegetation, and Life would cease, and the Planets and 
46. Opticks, p. 397. 
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Comets would not remain in their Orbs.47 
The end of this passage, which was added in the 1717 
edition, suggests a further, more cosmic, sense in which 
Newton believed the universe was running down. By virtue 
of their great masses, Jupiter and Saturn noticeably 
perturb one another's orbits and those of passing comets, 
which in turn perturb the rest of the planets. Eventually 
these perturbations would accumulate "till this System 
wants a Reformation. 11 48 A few years before his death, 
Newton confided to John Conduitt what may have been the 
full meaning of this cryptic remark. It was Newton's 
conjecture, Conduitt recorded, "that there was a sort of 
revolution in the heavenly bodies." Vapors and light from 
the sun "had gathered themselves by degrees into a body and 
then attracted more matter from the planets," at length 
forming a new planet and then a comet, which eventually 
fell into the sun and replenished its matter. The comet of 
1680, Newton thought, would someday meet the same fate, at 
which time "this earth would be burnt" and all animals 
would perish. Apparently he believed that something like 
this had happened previously, for the earth bore "visible 
marks of ruin upon it which could not be effected by a 
flood only." When Conduitt asked how the earth could have 
47. Pages 399f. The words in brackets were deleted from 
the 1717 edition, in which the last sentence was added. 
48. Page 402. 
208 
been repeopled if this had ever happened, Newton replied 
that "the power of a creator" was required.49 We have come 
a long way from the Cartesian universe of matter and 
necessity. 
* * * * * 
In 1714 Queen Anne died without surviving heirs. 
Under terms of the Act of Settlement the crown passed to 
the Elector of Hanover, who became King George I. When 
Caroline, the Princess of Wales, joined her father-in-law 
at court in London, she left behind her philosophical 
mentor, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, with whom she continued 
a personal and intellectual correspondence. Her efforts to 
find a translator for Leibniz's Theodicy (1710) led her to 
Dr. Samuel Clarke, a theologian and disciple of Newton. 
Although Clarke declined to undertake the translation, he 
became a regular courtier and, in time, an advisor to the 
Princess. When in late 1715, in answer to an inquiry about 
Clarke's theological position, Leibniz sent a letter to 
Caroline charging Newton with theological errors, it was 
Clarke who took it upon himself to reply. Before their 
49. King's College, Conduitt Papers, Keynes MS. 130.11, 
quoted by Castillejo, The Expanding Force, pp. 95-97. 
According to Gregory's memorandum of May 1694 (Corres III, 
336), Newton believed that "The Satellites of Jupiter and 
Saturn can take the places of the Earth, Venus, Mars if 
they are destroyed, and be held in reserve for a new 
Creation." Cf. Newton's letter to Bentley of 25 February 
1693 (ibid., 253). Whether Newton believed in pre-Adamite 
men, I do not know and do not care to speculate. 
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correspondence ended just a year later with the death of 
Leibniz, the two men had laid bare the fundamental 
theological and philosophical differences which separated 
Newton from his German rival.SO 
It is not immediately apparent that Clarke can be 
taken for Newton's spokesman. He was, after all, an 
accomplished theologian capable of debating Leibniz in his 
own right--remember that he had been recommended as a 
translator for the Theodicy.51 The weight of the evidence, 
however, favors the conclusion that Newton worked closely 
with him, at least to the extent that Clarke spoke with 
Newton's approval. That Newton preferred to deal with 
Leibniz--and Hooke, and others--through intermediaries is 
well known. As a voluntarist52 and fellow Arian--for which 
he lost his position as chaplain to Queen Anne--
Clarke was worthy of his trust, but it is hard to believe 
that Newton, even in his seventies, would have allowed 
50. Clarke himself published Leibniz's five papers together 
with his own replies in 1717. I have used the excellent 
edition prepared by H.G. Alexander, The Leibniz-Clarke 
Correspondence (Manchester: UP, 1956), which will be cited 
as "Alexander." 
51. See James P. Ferguson, The Philosophy of Dr. Samuel 
Clarke and its Critics (New York: Vantage Press, 1974), and 
William Whiston, Historical Memoirs of the Life of Dr. 
Samuel Clarke (London, 1730). 
52. Clarke's voluntarism is discussed in John H. Gay, 
"Matter and Freedom in the Thought of Samuel Clarke," JHI 
24 (1963), 85-105. In Gay's opinion, "the reconciliation 
of freedom with Newtonian science" was an impossible task. 
I am afraid that Gay does not understand Newtonian science. 
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anyone to work unsupervised on a project of such importance 
as that of refuting charges of impiety. The documents do 
in fact confirm Caroline's report that Clarke consulted 
with Newton.53 First of all, Clarke's replies reveal an 
intimate understanding of Newton's views on absolute space, 
the non-mechanical nature of gravitation, and the need for 
miracles in the cosmos. Secondly, surviving drafts of 
Newton's letter to Conti, composed before Clarke sent his 
third reply to Leibniz, contain the same views on the 
nature of miracles that Clarke defended in his later 
replies. Finally, Des Maizaeux's compilation of the debate 
papers prompted Newton in 1720 to draft a letter, 
purporting to have been written by Clarke, in which he 
explained the significance of principal concepts from the 
controversy. I shall therefore assume that though Clarke 
very likely contributed some of his own arguments to the 
defense of Newton's ideas, the bulk of the correspondence 
was written in consultation with Newton and bore his seal 
of approval. 
Certainly Newton approved of Clarke's vigorous defense 
of theological voluntarism, which reflected the same basic 
concerns that Newton himself had expressed forty five years 
53. See her letter to Leibniz of 10 January 1716, printed 
in Alexander, p. 193. The relevant evidence is evaluated 
in Alexandre Koyr, and I.B. Cohen, "Newton and the 
Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence with Notes on Newton, Conti, 
and Des Maizeaux," Archives internationales d'histoire des 
sciences 15 (1962), 63-126. 
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earlier in De gravitatione. The central issue of the 
entire debate was the nature of divine freedom: Is God's 
will wholly conformable to his reason? or, to put it 
another way, are all of God's actions subject to certain 
rational constraints? Consistently Leibniz answered in the 
affirmative: just as consistently, Clarke did not.54 The 
position against which Clarke reacted was summarized by 
Leibniz in the letter to Princess Caroline which 
accompanied his fourth paper. Clarke "and his like," he 
wrote, 
do not properly understand that great principle that 
nothing happens without a sufficient reason for it 
and, what follows, that even God cannot choose 
without having a reason for his choice. This is the 
error of vague indifference or the absolutely 
absolute decree, which I have refuted in the 
Theodicy. This error is also the source of the 
54. Scholars who have seen divine freedom as the focal 
point of the correspondence include Koyre, From the Closed 
World to the Infinite Universe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
UP, 1957), pp. 235-72: McGuire, "FAN," p. 197 nl26: and 
Denis J. Corish, "Time, Space and Freewill: The 
Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence," in The Study of Time, III, 
ed. J.T. Fraser et al. (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1978), 
pp. 634-55. StevenShapin adds a political context to the 
intellectualist-voluntarist dimensions of the debate in "Of 
Gods and Kings: Natural Philosophy and Politics in the 
Leibniz-Clarke Disputes," Isis 72 (1981), 187-215. Ernst 
Cassirer, "Newton and Leibniz," The Philosophical Review 52 
(1943), 366-91, takes for the central issue the side issue 
of differing conceptions of science--the two are related, 
but Cassirer puts the tail before the dog. Margula R. 
Perl, "Physics and Metaphysics in Newton, Leibniz, and 
Clarke," JHI 30 (1969), 507-26, insists upon separating the 
physical from the metaphysical and therein misconstrues the 
whole debate. 
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vacuum and atoms.55 
Leibniz distinguished between the factual truths of physics 
(verites de fait) and the eternal truths of mathematics 
(verites eternelles). The principle of sufficient reason 
derived its importance from its ability to bridge the gap 
between these two realms, transforming contingent truths 
into necessary truths, subsuming all of nature under the 
power of pure reason. The principle of contradiction, he 
explained in his second paper, "is sufficient to 
demonstrate every point of arithmetic and geometry, that 
is, all mathematical principles. But in order to proceed 
from mathematics to natural philosophy, another principle 
is requisite," namely the principle of sufficient reason, 
"that nothing happens without a reason why it should be so, 
and not otherwise." By that principle one could 
"demonstrate the being of a God, and all the other parts of 
metaphysics or natural theology: and even, in some measure, 
••• the dynamical principles, or the principles of 
force."56 Thus for Leibniz, the goal of science was to 
reduce all of nature to rational necessity, a goal which 
could be attained because the creative power of God was 
bound by the principle of sufficient reason. As he had 
told Varignon at the turn of the century, "the real never 
ceases to be governed perfectly by the ideal and the 
55. Alexander, p. 195. 
56. Ibid., pp. 15f. Cassirer gives a clear analysis of 
Leibniz's view of knowledge in "Newton and Leibniz." 
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abstract • • • • This is because everything is governed by 
reason~ otherwise there could be no science and no rule, 
and this would not at all conform with the nature of the 
sovereign principle."57 
The principle of sufficient reason had two major 
consequences for Leibniz's natural philosophy. There could 
be no void (and therefore no atoms), and there could be no 
absolute space. "When I was a young man, I also gave into 
the notion of a vacuum and atoms," he condescended to 
confess to Clarke, "but reason brought me into the right 
way." To admit a vacuum in nature "is ascribing to God a 
very imperfect work: 'tis violating the grand principle of 
the necessity of a sufficient reason • " Leibniz took 
it for granted that "every perfection, which God could 
impart to things without derogating from their other 
perfections, has actually been imparted to them"--God is 
bound to make the best of all possible worlds. But God 
could have placed some matter in a space wholly empty 
"without derogating in any respect from all other things: 
therefore he has actually placed some matter in that space: 
therefore, there is no space wholly empty: therefore all is 
full." Leibniz based this argument explicitly on the 
principle of plenitude. To this he added "another 
57. Letter of 2 February 1702, in Gottfried Wilhelm 
Leibniz: Philosophical Papers and Letters, ed. and trans. 
by Leroy E. Loemker (2nd edn.~ Dordrecht: Reidel, 1970), 
p. 544. 
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argument, grounded upon the necessity of a sufficient 
reason." There could be no principle--no sufficient 
reason--"to determine what proportion of matter [to space] 
there ought to be, out of all the possible degrees from a 
plenum to a vacuum, or from a vacuum to a plenum." As for 
atoms, "what reason can one assign for confining nature in 
the progress of subdivision?" Unwilling to leave such 
matters to the unencumbered will of God, Leibniz flatly 
asserted that atoms and the void were "fictions merely 
arbitrary, and unworthy of true philosophy."58 
He was no less convinced of the imaginary quality of 
absolute space. In his second reply, Clarke agreed "that 
nothing is, without a sufficient reason why it is, and why 
it is thus rather than otherwise." But he immediately 
qualified himself: frequently this sufficient reason was 
none other than the pure will of God. For example, 
why this particular system of matter, should be 
created in one particular place, and that in another 
particular place~ when, (all place being absolutely 
indifferent to all matter,) it would have been 
exactly the same thing vice versa, supposing the two 
systems (or the particles'r'of matter to be alike~ 
there can be no other reason, but the mere will of 
God.59 
58. Alexander, pp. 43-45. Cf. pp. 16, 28, 39f and 64ff. 
On Leibniz's use of the principles of plenitude and 
sufficient reason, see Arthur o. Lovejoy, The Great Chain 
of Being (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1936), pp. 142-82. 
59. Alexander, pp. 20f. Later Clarke put ii thusly 
(p. 119): "the question is, whether, in some cases, when it 
may be highly reasonable to act, yet different ways of 
acting may not possibly be equally reasonable~ and whether, 
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This was something which Leibniz could in no way allow. To 
say that the mere will of God is a sufficient reason was to 
deny the principle entirely, to fall back "into the loose 
indifference, which I have confuted at large, and showed to 
be absolutely chimerical even in creatures, and contrary to 
the wisdom of God, as if he could operate without acting by 
reason." If space were absolutely uniform, then there 
could be no reason why God should have placed bodies in 
space in one particular manner rather than in another.60 
Clarke, a shrewd thinker, then caught his opponent in a 
dilemma. Supposing with Leibniz that space "were nothing 
real, but only the mere order of bodies," the situation 
would be no different. There could still be "no other 
reason but mere will, why three equal bodies should be 
placed or ranged in the order a, b, c rather than in the 
contrary order. 11 61 In reply, Leibniz resorted once again 
to the denial of divine freedom. To place three identical 
bodies in any order whatsoever w6uld be "a thing 
indifferent": and "consequently they will never be placed 
in any order, by him who does nothing without wisdom. But 
then he being the author of things, no such things will be 
produced by him at all • II Therefore there was "no such 
thing as two indivisibles indiscernible from each 
in such cases, the bare will of God be not itself a 
sufficient reason for acting in this or the other 
particular manner. " Cf. pp. 30 and 35. 
60. Leibniz's third paper (Alexander, pp. 26f). 
61. Clarke's third reply (p. 30). 
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other"--another good reason to deny atoms.62 The argument 
continued, but the basic disagreement remained. Leibniz 
insisted that God required a sufficient reason for each 
creative act~ indifference would paralyze his infinite 
wisdom. Against this, Clarke maintained that God is not a 
balance which cannot move itself when the weights on both 
sides are equal. He is a free agent, capable of acting 
according to his own will, apart from external 
considerations.63 
Divine freedom was also fundamental to the debate over 
the nature of God's ongoing relation to the world. Leibniz 
spelled out his differences with Newton in a letter to 
Johann Bernoulli, dated just a month after his first paper 
for Clarke. What Newton thinks, the German complained, 
"seems plainly absurd to me, namely that the motion of the 
world-machine will come to cease unless from time to time 
restored by God. Thus miracles are necessary to him, and 
he will prove unable to explain his attraction without 
perpetual miracles."64 Leibniz believed that vis viva was 
conserved in all natural events, so that the world needed 
no divine renewal for its continued operation. In his 
opinion, Newton's concept of divine maintenence reflected 
poorly on God's wisdom. If God had "to wind up his watch 
62. Page 36. 
63. Pages 32-35, 45-50, and 97-107. 
64. Corres VI, 261. 
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from time to time," then he lacked "sufficient foresight to 
make it a perpetual motion." According to the Newtonians, 
Leibniz claimed, God had made a machine so imperfect that 
he was "obliged to clean it now and then by an 
extraordinary concourse, and even to mend it, as a 
clockmaker mends his work ••• " Against this, Leibniz 
held that God worked miracles not "in order to supply the 
wants of nature, but those of grace." To think otherwise 
was to "have a very mean notion of the wisdom and power of 
God."65 Clarke did not agree. God was not a watchmaker: 
nor was the world a watch. The skill of a human artificer 
lay in combining certain motions which he himself could not 
produce, but only adjust. However God was "himself the 
author and continual preserver" of the forces in the world. 
Consequently it was 
not a diminution, but the true glory of his 
workmanship, that nothing is done without his 
continual government and inspection. The notion of 
the world's being a great machine, going on without 
the interposition of God, as a clock continues to go 
without the assistance of a clockmakerr is the notion 
of materialism and fate, and tends, (under pretence 
of making God a supra-mundane intelligence,) to 
exclude providence and God's government in reality 
out of the world. And by the same reason that a 
philospher can represent all things going on from the 
65. The first paper for Clarke (Alexander, pp. llf). Cf. 
his letter to Conti from late 1715: "I am astonished that 
M. Newton and his followers believe that God has made his 
machine so badly that unless he affects it by some 
extraordinary means, the watch will very soon cease to go. 
This is to have very narrow ideas of the wisdom and power 
of God. I call extraordinary every operation of God 
demanding something other than the conservation of the 
natures of created things." (Ibid., p. 185.) 
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beginning of the creation, without any government or 
interposition of providence7 a sceptic will easily 
argue still farther backwards, and suppose that 
things have from eternity gone on (as they now do) 
without any true creation or original author at all, 
but only what such arguers call all-wise and eternal 
nature. 
Just as Newton had objected to the Cartesian notion of 
matter because it did not require a creator, so Clarke 
objected to the Leibnizean notion of the world machine, 
which likewise made the creator a dispensible appendage. 
Casting away the clockwork metaphor, Clarke turned to the 
much more Newtonian image of the world as the dominion of a 
sovereign ruler: 
If a king had a kingdom, wherein all things would 
continually go on (as they now do) without his 
government or interposition, or without his attending 
to and ordering what is done therein7 it would be to 
him, merely a nominal kingdom7 nor would he in 
reality deserve at all the title of king or governor. 
And as those men, who pretend that in an earthly 
government things may go on perfectly well without 
the king himself ordering or disposing of any thing, 
may reasonably be suspected that they would like very 
well to set the king aside: so whosoever contends, 
that the course of the world can go on without the 
continual direction of God, the Supreme Governor7 his 
doctrine does in effect tend to exclude God out of 
the world.66 
Clarke had gone straight to the heart of the matter: what 
is the nature of God's relation to the world? Is he an 
absentee landlord, a perfect watchmaker who has built into 
his machine every event which he has foreordained? Or is 
he an omnipotent governor who rules his kingdom directly 
66. Clarke's first reply (Alexander, pp. 13f). 
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and continually as active cause of all that comes to pass? 
Leibniz opted for the former. Although he denied that 
the world is a machine "that goes without God's 
interposition," he affirmed it "to be a watch, that goes 
without wanting to be mended by him," for "God has foreseen 
every thing" and "has provided a remedy for every thing 
before-handr there is in his works a harmony, a beauty, 
already pre-established." This opinion, he argued, did not 
exclude divine providence or government, but made it 
perfect. True providence required perfect foresight and 
advance provision of adequate remedies.67 As he told 
Wolff, Clarke "does not realize that the divine governance 
of natural things consists in sustention, and must not be 
taken in an anthropological sense."68 
For his part, Clarke continued his attack on the 
purely mechanical universe, upholding in its stead the 
picture of the world painted by Newton in the Queries and 
the General Scholium. Contrary to what Leibniz had argued, 
neither the motions of heavenly bodies, nor the formation 
and motions of plants and animals were merely mechanical in 
nature. Whoever thought so was 
obliged in reason to be able to explain particularly, 
by what laws of mechanism the planets and comets can 
67. Leibniz's second paper (pp. 18f). 
68. Letter of 23 December 1715, in Alexander, p. 188. The 
original Latin letter is printed in Corres VI, 257ff. 
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continue to move in the orbs they do, thro' 
unresisting spaces: and by what mechanical laws, both 
plants and animals are formed: and how the infinitely 
various spontaneous motions of animals and men, are 
performed. Which, I am fully persuaded, is as 
impossible to make out, as it would be to show how a 
house or a city could be built, or the world itself 
have been at first formed by mere mechanism, without 
any intelligent and active cause. That things could 
not be at first produced by mechanism, is expressly 
allowed: and, when this is once granted: why, after 
that, so great concern should be shown, to exclude 
God's actual government of the world, and to allow 
his providence to act no further than barely in 
concurring (as the phrase is) to let all things do 
only what they would do of themselves by mere 
mechanism: and why it should be thought that God is 
under any obligation or confinement either in nature 
or wisdom, never to bring about any thing in the 
universe, but what is possible for a corporeal 
machine to accomplish by mere mechanical laws, after 
it is once set a going~ I can in no way conceive.69 
For Clarke, divine wisdom entailed not the making of a 
world capable of operating independently of God, but rather 
"the perfect and complete idea of a work, which began and 
continues, according to that original perfect idea, by the 
continued uninterrupted exercise of his power and 
government." Nothing prevented that perfect idea from 
involving disorder and divine renovation, or even miracles. 
The wisdom of God did not consist in making the present 
frame of the world eternal, but only in making it "to last 
as long as he thought fit." Nor did it consist in 
providing remedies for natural disorders, for "with regard 
to God, there are no disorders, and consequently no 
remedies, and indeed no powers of nature at all, that can 
69. Clarke's fifth reply (pp. 117f). Cf. p. 51. 
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do anything of themselves •• " From God's point of view, 
the world never needed correction or amendment: it always 
followed his original perfect design, which could certainly 
include the reformation of what he had made.70 Where 
Leibniz insisted upon limiting God's actions by the 
ordinary course of nature and the principle of sufficient 
reason, Clarke allowed God to act in any way he pleased for 
reasons known only to him. Leibniz was operating with a 
rationalistic definition of perfection--God's design must 
not involve "corrections"--but Clarke conceived of 
perfection in a voluntaristic sense--perfection was 
whatever God had intended to do, for God is perfect: 
For why was not God at liberty to make a world, that 
should continue in its present form as long or as 
short a time as he thought fit, and should then be 
altered (by such changes as may be very wise and fit, 
and yet impossible perhaps to be performed by 
mechanism,) into whatever other form he himself 
pleased?71 
Thus for Clarke, as for Newton, divine wisdom and 
foresight were identified with dominion, with God's 
activity "in continuing at once, what his power and 
government is continually putting in actual execution." 
God's ordinary concourse meant "his actual operation and 
government, in preserving and continuing the beings, 
powers, orders, dispositions and motions of all things": 
70. Clarke's second reply (pp. 22f). 
71. Clarke's fifth reply (p. 113). 
222 
anything less would make him "a governor only nominal." 
This conception of divine governance implies that the 
distinction between natural and supernatural is an 
artificial one, of merely human convenience. This was 
indeed the next step in Clarke's argument: 
To cause the sun (or earth) to move regularly, is a 
thing we call natural: to stop its motion for a day, 
we call supernatural: but the one is the effect of no 
greater power, than the other~ nor is the one, with 
respect to God, more or less natural or supernatural 
than the other •••• God is present to the world, 
not as a part, but as a governor~ acting upon all 
things, himself acted upon by nothing. He is not far 
from every one of us, for in him we (and all things) 
live and move and have our beings.72 
With regard to God, no one possible thing was more 
miraculous than another. Miracles were simply unusual acts 
of God, but no more or less acts of God than ordinary 
events of nature. The raising of a dead human body and the 
sudden stopping of the earth's motion were called miracles~ 
the ordinary generation of a human body and the continual 
motion of the earth were called natural, "for no other 
reason, but because the power of God effects one usually, 
the other unusually."73 This was precisely the same view 
of miracles which Newton himself expressed. In an undated 
72. Clarke's second reply (pp. 23f). For a provocative 
treatment of the breakdown of the natural/supernatural 
distinction in theological and scientific literature of the 
Middle Ages and the Renaissance, see Keith Hutchinson, 
"Supernaturalism and the Mechanical Philosophy," History of 
Science 21 (1983), 297-333. 
73. Clarke's fifth reply (p. 114). Cf. pp. 35 and 53. 
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manuscript now in the library of Lehigh University, he 
wrote: 
For Miracles are so called not because they are the 
works of God but because they happen seldom & for 
that reason create wonder. If they should happen 
constantly according to certaine laws imprest upon 
the nature of things, they would no longer be wonders 
or miracles, but might be considered in Philosophy as 
part of the Phenomena of Nature {notwithstanding 
their being the effects of the laws impressed upon 
Nature by the powers of God} notwithstanding that the 
cause of their causes might be unknown to us.74 
The identical opinion is found in several drafts of 
Newton's February 1716 letter to Conti, certainly written 
before Clarke wrote his third reply and perhaps before the 
second reply had been completed. The drafts also contain 
Newton's views on Leibniz's perfect watch, which are 
similar to those of Clarke. 75 It is possible that Clarke 
74. Quoted by Guerlac and Jacob, "Bentley, Newton, and 
Providence," p. 309 n8, and McLachlan, pp. 17f. The 
passage in brackets was crossed out. 
75. The drafts are printed in Koyr, and Cohen, "Newton and 
the Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence," pp. 72-75 and 108-115. 
The dating of the drafts is discussed on p. 115, where it 
is stated that the letter from Caroline which accompanied 
Clarke's second reply is dated 20/30 December 1715. 
Following Onno Klopp, the editor of Leibniz's 
correspondence with the Princess, Alexander gives the date 
as 10 December. Probably someone has erred in moving 
between Continental dates and English dates. The following 
are representative of Newton's opinions in the drafts (as 
printed by Koyr~ and Cohen): "Miracles are so called not 
because they are the actions of God but because they happen 
seldom & by happening seldom create wonder. If they 
happened constantly they would not be wonders." (p. 74) 
"[Leibniz] calls the world Gods Watch, & insinuates that it 
is the fault of the workman & not of the materials if a 
Watch will at length cease to go, & in like manner that it 
would be Gods fault if his Watch should ever decay & want 
an amendment. And by the same way of arguing a man may say 
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influenced Newton on these points, but I think it was more 
likely the other way around. In any case it is clear that 
Clarke and Newton both held the highly voluntaristic 
interpretation of miracles which Clarke defended in his 
correspondence with Leibniz. 
Of course Leibniz wanted no part of this voluntarism. 
There is a vast difference between the natural and the 
supernatural, he maintained, for the latter "exceeds all 
the powers of creatures." He offered an example, 
deliberately chosen to arouse the ire of any good 
Newtonian: the free motion of a body in the aether around 
"a certain fixed centre, without any other creature acting 
upon it," was something which "could not be done without a 
miracler since it cannot be explained by the nature of 
bodies." Since a free body would naturally recede from a 
curved path along the tangent, Leibniz concluded that "the 
attraction of bodies, properly so called, is a miraculous 
thing, since it ~annot be explained by the nature of 
bodies. 11 76 It was not a new complaint. Leibniz had first 
aired it in a February 1711 letter to Hartsoeker which was 
published in the 5 May 1712 issue of the weekly paper 
Memoirs of Literature, where Cotes saw it and called it to 
that it would be Gods fault if matter doth not think." 
(p. 73) 
76. Leibniz's third paper (pp. 29f). Cf. pp. 42f and 
90-95r his letter to Johann Bernoulli of 27 May 1716, 
printed with a translation in Corres VI, 353-56~ and his 
letter to Conti in Alexander, pp. 184-86. 
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Newton's attention. In an undated reply to the editor of 
the Memoirs, Newton argued that gravitation had been 
"proved by mathematical demonstrations grounded upon 
experiments & the phaenomena of nature: & Mr Leibnitz 
himself cannot deny [this]." Gravity should not be called 
a miracle just because no mechanical hypothesis has been 
offered to explain its operation, Newton said. Hardness, 
inertia, and extension were 
the natural real reasonable manifest qualities of all 
bodies seated in them by the will of God from the 
beginning of creation & perfectly uncapable of being 
explained mechanically ••• And therefore if any 
man should say that bodies attract one another by a 
power whose cause is unknown to us or by a power 
seated in the frame of nature by the will of God, 
••• I know not why he should be said to introduce 
miracles & occult qualities & fictions into ye world. 
For Mr Leibnitz himself will scarce say that thinking 
is mechanical as it must be if to explain it 
otherwise be to make it a miracle an occult quality 
and a fiction. 
But he goes on & tells us that God could not create 
Planets that should move round of themselves without 
any cause that should prevent their removing through 
the tangent. For a Miracle at least must keep the 
Planet in. But certainly God could create Planets 
that should move round of themselves without any 
other cause then gravity that should prevent their 
removing through ye tangent. For gravity without a 
Miracle may keep the Planets in.77 
Newton had spelled out precisely the fundamental 
disagreement with his archrival: mechanical explanation did 
not wholly exhaust the range of natural phenomenar the 
77. Corres VI, 299f. Here Newton seems to allow that 
gravity might be innate to bodies, a position he explicitly 
denied elsewhere. See the appropriate comments of A.R. 
Hall and Laura Tilling on p. 301 n6. 
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process of thought was neither mechanical nor miraculous, 
and the same was true of gravitation. The ontology which 
Newton employed recognized categories which Leibniz could 
only label "occult" and wish to go away. In a set of notes 
on Leibniz's "Tentamen," Newton took exception to the 
hypothesis that the centrifugal tendency of a body 
describing a curved line in a fluid "is only overcome by a 
contiguous moving [body]." "Then a body is only moved by a 
corporeal agent," Newton observed, and "not by the human 
mind (unless it be corporeal) nor by God (unless he be 
corporeal)." If so, then "God does not govern the world 
and so he is not the Lord God."78 The first cause was 
certainly not mechanical~ if only mechanical causes could 
keep bodies in curved paths, then the first cause was 
certainly not the Lord God, either. 
I wish further to clarify an important point. Like 
Leibniz, Newton called non-mechanical causes "occult." 
Unlike Leibniz, he asserted that they were no less real and 
natural. This is apparent from a draft of his letter to 
Conti: 
[Leibniz] gives the name of Miracles or Wonders to 
the laws impressed by God upon Nature tho by reason 
of their constant working they create no Wonder~ & 
that of occult qualities to qualities which are not 
occult but whose causes are occult tho the qualities 
78. Corres VI, 117. Leibniz's "Tentamen de motuum 
coelestium causis," which appeared in the Acta Eruditorum 
for February 1689, developed a vortex theory of planetary 
motion. 
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themselves be very manifest."79 
Provided that a quality itself was not occult--that is, 
provided that an effect was manifest and not hidden--Newton 
did not hesitate to accept its reality, whether or not the 
cause was equally demonstrable. God was free to impress on 
nature whatever laws he pleased. If he chose to produce 
gravitation mechanically, then let a mechanical cause be 
sought: if not, the phenomenon was no less lawlike and 
subject to philosophical understanding. "Gravity must be 
caused by an agent acting constantly according to certain 
laws," Newton explained to Bentley, "but whether this agent 
be material or immaterial is a question I have left to ye 
consideration of my readers."80 One reader who had 
considered this, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, was unwilling 
to allow an immaterial agent. Those who avow that gravity 
is an occult quality are correct, if they mean "that there 
is a certain mechanism unknown to them" by which bodies 
fall to earth, he told Hartsoeker in the letter later 
79. Printed by Koyrfi and Cohen, "Newton and the 
Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence," p. 73, italics Newton's. 
Cf. McGuire, "FAN," p. 168. In his article, "What Happened 
to Occult Qualities in the Scientific Revolution?" Isis 73 
(1982), 233-53, Keith Hutchinson is conscious of therole 
of voluntarism in Newton's understanding of occult 
qualities. 
80. Letter of 25 February 1693 (Corres III, 254). In the 
same paragraph Newton showed his hand: "Tis inconceiveable 
that inanimate brute matter should (without ye mediation of 
something else wch is not material) operate upon & affect 
other matter wthout mutual contact ••• " Cf. his earlier 
letter to Bentley in ibid., 240. 
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published in the Memoirs. But if they mean "that this 
transpires without any mechanism, by a simple primitive 
property, or by a law of God which brings about this effect 
without using any intelligible means, then it is a 
senseless occult quality ••• 11 81 
Newton could not abide such an attitude. It was bad 
science and bad theology, perhaps even more the latter than 
the former. "It must be allowed that these two Gentlemen 
differ very much in Philosophy," he smugly addressed the 
readers of the Philosophical Transactions in his anonymous 
"Account of the Book Commercium epistolicum."82 For want 
of decisive experiments, he wrote, the one 
doth not affirm whether the Cause of Gravity be 
Mechanical or not Mechanical: the other that it is a 
perpetual Miracle if it be not Mechanical. The one 
(by way of Enquiry) attributes it to the Power of the 
Creator that the least Particles of Matter are hard: 
the other attributes the Hardness of Matter to 
conspiring Motions, and calls it a perpetual Miracle 
if the Cause of this Hardness be other than 
Mechanical. The one doth not affirm that animal 
Motion in Man is purely mechanical: the other teaches 
that it is purely mechanical, the Soul or Mind 
(according to the Hypothesis of an Harmonia 
Praestablitia) never acting upon the Body so as to 
alter or influence its Motions. The one teaches that 
God (the God in whom we live and move and have our 
Being) is Omnipresent; but not as a Soul of the 
81. Quoted by Cajori, pp. 668f. 
82. Found in volume 29 (1714). The Commercium, a 
collection of documents pertaining to the calculus priority 
dispute, was compiled by Newton and published by the Royal 
Society during Newton's presidency. Not exactly intended 
to please Leibniz and his retinue, it poured oil on the 
flames of controversy. Newton's review added insult to 
injury by casting aspersion on Leibniz's theology. 
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World: the other that he is not the Soul of the 
World, but INTELLIGENTIA SUPRAMUNDANA, an 
Intelligence above the Bounds of the World7 whence it 
seems to follow that he cannot do any Miracle. The 
one teaches that Philosophers are to argue from 
Phaenomena and Experiments to the Causes thereof, and 
thence to the Causes of those Causes, and so on till 
we come to the first Cause: the other that all the 
Actions of the first Cause are Miracles, and all the 
Laws imprest on Nature by the Will of God are 
perpetual Miracles and occult Qualities, and 
therefore not to be considered in Philosophy. But 
must the constant and universal Laws of Nature, if 
derived from the Power of God or the Action of a 
Cause not yet known to us, be called Miracles and 
occult Qualities, that is to say, Wonders and 
Absurdities? Must all the Arguments for a God taken 
from the Phaenomena of Nature be exploded by new hard 
Names?83 -- ---
"Certainly these things deserve to be better considered," 
Newton concluded. In the following pages I will consider 
more closely the relationship between Newton's voluntarist 
God and his conception of natural philosophy. 
Newtonian Voluntarism and a Science of Phenomena 
"Hitherto I have not been able to discover the cause 
of those properties of gravity from phenomena," Newton 
declared in the General Scholium. Although as we have seen 
he did not lack ideas about the ultimate cause of 
gravity--he knew that it was not mechanical--he preferred 
here to feign no hypotheses, "for whatever is not deduced 
from the phenomena is to be called an hypothesis7 and 
hypotheses, whether metaphysical or physical, whether of 
83. Ibid., p. 224, italics his. Clarke raised the same 
issues in his debate with Leibniz. See Alexander, pp. 
114-119. 
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occult qualities or mechanical, have no place in natural 
philosophy." It is enough, he said, "that gravity does 
really exist, and act according to the laws which we have 
explained, and abundantly serves to account for all the 
motions of the celestial bodies, and of our sea."84 Newton 
captured in this passage the essence of his conception of 
natural philosophy: that natural phenomena could be 
understood adequately as phenomena, apart from any 
knowledge of their causes. As he wrote in Query 31, "we 
must learn from the Phaenomena of Nature what Bodies 
attract one another, and what are the Laws and Properties 
of the Attraction, before we enquire the Cause by which the 
Attraction is perform'd."85 Fully aware of alternatives, 
Newton intended his approach to be seen as the deliberate 
rejection of the kind of science advocated by his 
Continental rivals, who sought to derive all of nature from 
a few principles arising from their own fertile 
imaginations. He summarized his position in a draft of a 
letter to Roger Cotes, the gifted mathematician who was 
supervising the publication of the second edition of the 
Principia: 
Experimental philosophy reduces Phaenomena to general 
Rules & looks upon the Rules to be general when they 
hold generally in Phaenomena. It is not enough to 
object that a contrary phaenomenon may happen but to 
make a legitimate objection a contrary phaenomenon 
84. Cajori, p. 547. Cf. the draft in Halls, pp. 352f. 
85. Opticks, p. 376~ cf. pp. 40lf. 
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must be actually produced. Hypothetical Philosophy 
consists in imaginary explications of things & 
imaginary arguments for or against such explications, 
or against the arguments of Experimental Philosophers 
founded upon Induction. The first sort of Philosophy 
[i.e., experimental philosophy] is followed by me, 
the latter too much by Cartes, Leibnitz & some 
others."86 
The letter which Cotes actually received made no mention of 
those two gentlemen or their philosophies, but Cotes did 
not need to be told what he could see for himself. Natural 
philosophers may be reduced to three classes, he advised 
readers in his preface to the new edition. Some follow 
Aristotle and reduce the effects of bodies to natures and 
qualities, which is to tell us nothing. Others assume 
hypotheses as first principles of their speculations, 
forming an "ingenious romance" with little resemblance to 
reality. The third class pursue experimental philosophy, 
assuming as a principle nothing not proved by phenomena.87 
86. ULC Add. MS. 3984.14, folio 1, printed in Corres V, 
398f. 
87. Cajori, p. xx. Cotes probably borrowed the term 
"romance" from Newton, who used it in a draft on 
methodology which McGuire has dated to around 1700: "But if 
without deriving the properties of things from Phaenomena 
you feign Hypotheses & think by them to explain all nature 
you may make a plausible systeme of Philosophy for getting 
your self a name, but your systeme will be little better 
than a Romance. To explain all nature is too difficult a 
task for any one man or any one age. Tis much better to do 
a little with certainty & leave the rest for others that 
come after you then to explain all things by conjectures 
without making sure of any thing." ULC Add. MS. 3970.3, 
folio 480v, printed in McGuire, "Newton's 'Principles of 
Philosophy': An Intended Preface for the 1704 Opticks and a 
Related Draft Fragment," BJHS 5 (1970), p. 183. Cf. the 
drafts of his letter to Conti (see note 74), where he also 
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Later in his preface Cotes revealed the religious 
foundation of this third kind of philosophy: 
Without all doubt this world, so diversified with 
that variety of forms and motions we find in it, 
could arise from nothing but the perfectly free will 
of God directing and presiding over all. 
From this fountain it is that those laws, which we 
call the laws of Nature, have flowed, in which there 
appear many traces indeed of the most wise 
contrivance, but not the least shadow of necessity. 
These therefore we must not seek from uncertain 
conjectures, but learn them from observations and 
experiments. He who is presumptuous enough to think 
that he can find the true principles of physics and 
the laws of natural things by the force alone of his 
own mind, and the internal light of his reason, must 
either suppose that the world exists by necessity, 
and by the same necessity follows the laws proposed: 
or if the order of Nature was established by the will 
of God, that himself, a miserable reptile, can tell 
what was fittest to be done. All sound and true 
philosophy is founded on the appearances of things: 
and if these phenomena inevitably draw us, against 
our wills, to such principles as most clearly 
manifest to us the most excellent counsel and supreme 
dominion of the All-wise and Almighty Being, they are 
not therefore to be laid.aside because some men may 
perhaps dislike them. These men may call them 
miracles or occult qualities, but names maliciously 
given ought not to be a disadvantage to the things 
themselves, unless these men will say at last that 
all philosophy ought to be founded in atheism. 
Philosophy must not be corrupted in compliance with 
these men, for the order of things will not be 
changed.88 
To be sure, Newton himself did not write this: nor did 
he read what Cotes had written before it went to press.89 
But Cotes said nothing which Newton had not already said in 
spoke of a "Romance." 
88. Cajori, page xxxii. Cf. page xxvii. Locke had the 
same impression of Newtonian science. See Koyre, Newtonian 
Studies, pp. 154f. 
89. Samuel Clarke did, however. See Never at Rest, p. 749. 
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the course of his long and distinguished career. 
divine will that matter existed and possessed the 
It was by 
properties that it did: the same will had ordered the 
universe and would re-order it again some day. Natural 
laws were actively imposed by that will and, it seems, 
could be changed by that will: "it may be allow'd that God 
is able to create Particles of Matter of Sizes and Figures 
and in several Proportions to Space, and perhaps of 
different Densities and Forces, and thereby to vary the 
Laws of Nature, and make Worlds of several sorts in several 
Parts of the Universe."90 
I can find no necessity either in Newton's theology or 
in his natural philosophy, no trace of Leibniz's God of 
sufficient reason or Descartes' God of immutable decrees. 
Newton's God, as Koyr~ has noted, was not merely a 
philosopher's God, an uninterested, impersonal first cause. 
He was rather the God of the Bible, "the effective Master 
and Ruler of the world created by him."91 Created--it is 
an important word, conveying the irreducible fact that the 
world was not made by men. Therefore it might not be made 
as men would have made it. Therefore an a priori science 
90. Query 31 (Opticks, pp. 403f. The contrast with 
Descartes' Le Monde is instructive. Also cf. Leibniz's use 
of the principle of sufficient reason to deny that God 
could create particles of matter in varying proportions to 
space--he could create only one continuous matter (see note 
58 above). 
91. From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe, p. 225. 
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could not be a science of nature at all, but only a 
romance. To Newton the public scientist we owe so much of 
the modern understanding of nature, but to Newton the 
private theologian we owe no less: the attitude that what 
God has freely done can be learned not by inventing it, but 
by discovering it. 
CONCLUSION: 
THE IMPACT OF VOLUNTARISTIC THEOLOGY ON 
SEVENTEENTH CENTURY NATURAL PHILOSOPHY 
Science seems to me to teach in the highest and strongest 
manner the great truth which is embodied in the Christian 
conception of entire surrender to the will of God: Sit down 
before fact as a little child, be prepared to give up every 
preconceived notion, follow humbly and to whatever abysses 
nature leads, or you shall learn nothing. 
--T.H. Huxley, letter to Charles Kingsley, 
23 September 1860 
As we see, empiricism and metaphysics, and even a very 
definite kind of metaphysics, the creationist, are closely 
linked together. What other means, indeed, but observation 
and experience can we possibly use for the study of a world 
freely created by an Infinite God? 
--A. Koyre, From the Closed World to the Infinite 
Universe, p. 20 
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I began this dissertation by posing a general 
question: What was the relation of religion to science in 
the seventeenth century? Drawing on the insights of M.B. 
Foster and his followers, I narrowed the scope of my 
inquiry to the following, very specific question in 
intellectual history: Was there in the seventeenth century 
a connection between theological voluntarism and empirical 
science? The four case studies which comprise the bulk of 
this dissertation were intended to answer this question as 
definitively as possible within the obvious limits of my 
research. 
My conclusion is that Foster was correct, at least for 
the individuals I have studied. Theology impinged on 
natural philosophy through the doctrine of creation, in 
terms of which the four subjects of this essay approached 
the problem of scientific knowledge. How God had made the 
world, how he continued to uphold it, and how the human 
mind was related to the divine all had implications for 
natural philosophy. Ultimately it was a question of which 
divine attributes received the most attention--perfection, 
power, reason (and wisdom), or will. An emphasis on the 
divine will went hand in hand with a belief in the primacy 
of phenomena~ a lack of emphasis on the divine will was 
accompanied by an~ priori attitude toward nature. 
For Galileo, divine reason and power were uppermost. 
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An omnipotent God had perfectly imposed mathematical forms 
on nature, the obedient executrix of his commands. Made in 
the image of the divine mind, our own minds could 
participate in God's absolute knowledge of his creation 
through the deductive certainty of geometry, to which 
physics was essentially reduced. Our failure completely to 
know nature was due, not to the exercise of an inscrutable 
divine will, but to our finite capabilities. 
Descartes began with the unfettered freedom of God's 
will, but then mitigated that freedom almost totally by 
stressing divine perfection. Because perfection entailed 
immutability, God always acted in the same way. A perfect 
God could not change his mind and could not deceive us by 
allowing us clearly and distinctly to perceive false 
propositions. Thus the human mind became the touchstone 
for created reality~ what it could not comprehend God 
obviously had chosen not to create. If God was free to 
produce the particulars of nature in a variety of ways, he 
could have made only one kind of world in general, a world 
which conformed absolutely to the innate truths he 
implanted in our souls. Grounded upon such a theology of 
creation, Cartesian natural philosophy was largely~ 
priori~ the appeal to experience was required to augment 
pure reason only where the vestiges of divine will 
remained. 
Boyle never claimed, as Descartes did, that God could 
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have made a different set of eternal truths. He never 
exempted God's creative activity from the law of 
contradiction. Yet in every other respect, his theology of 
creation was more voluntaristic than Descartes'. God, when 
he made the world, had been under no obligation to conform 
to human thoughts or wishes. Rules by which God freely 
regulated his own actions, the laws of nature were not 
necessary truths and could have been otherwise. Therefore 
they had to be inferred from the phenomena and treated as 
hypotheses, contingent truths subject to change in light of 
future discoveries. As purblind mortals, we could know 
neither God nor nature from essences and innate ideas~ 
truths about both had to be gathered from his two 
revelations, nature and scripture. 
Divine will was also primary for Newton, who upheld 
God's freedom to do as he pleased both in creating the 
world and in sustaining it. Nothing limited God to 
mechanical causes alone or prohibited him from acting 
miraculously in the cosmos. The sovereign Lord governed 
matter and motion directly by his will, in accordance with 
laws of his own choosing. Knowledge of nature, like 
knowledge of God, was attained by induction from the 
phenomena, not by vain speculation from supposed necessary 
truths. 
Am I claiming that their voluntarism "caused" Boyle 
and Newton to advocate empiricism instead of conceptualism, 
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to use McMullin's terms?l That depends on the sense in 
which the word "cause" is employed. Even in natural 
science causation is an elusive concept which some would 
prefer to avoid. Causation in history is considerably less 
clear, yet historians frequently claim to be explaining the 
events they have recorded and almost always use language 
that implies causality--conjunctions like "because" and 
"since," and adverbs like "thus" and "therefore." I have 
certainly made similar claims in the present essay. 
Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary states that the 
term cause "applies to any event, circumstance, or 
condition or any combination of these that brings about or 
helps bring about a result." Thus I claim that voluntarism 
"caused" Boyle and Newton to advocate empiricism in that it 
helped bring about their rejection of conceptualism and 
their acceptance of an alternative science of nature. 
There is no sense, however, in which I wish to claim 
that voluntarism "caused" early modern science. I can find 
no significant references to divine freedom by Copernicus, 
Vesalius, or Galileo, without whom the scientific 
revolution as I understand it would never have happened. 
Voluntarism impinged on a scientific revolution which was 
already under way. If many natural philosophers were 
1. For a discussion of his article "Empiricism and the 
Scientific Revolution," in Art, Science, and History in the 
Renaissance, ed. Charles s. Singleton (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins UP, 1967), pp. 331-69, see page 32 of this essay. 
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convinced that the Aristotelian world view had to be 
replaced, they were not yet willing to abandon the notion 
that science contains necessary truths. The adoption of a 
more modest conception of science was left to the 
voluntarists, for whom a necessary knowledge of nature was 
incompatible with divine freedom. 
It has been a fundamental assumption of this essay 
that religion and science were inextricably intermingled 
during the crucial, formative years of the modern 
scientific world view. For too long historians have taken 
Galileo's encounter with the Holy See as normative of that 
relationship.2 The analysis presented in the preceeding 
pages suggests that this view is much too shallow to stand 
scrutiny. At a much deeper level than the superficial 
disputes over the interpretation of scripture, religion 
exerted a subtle but significant influence on seventeenth 
century science. In subsequent years the source of that 
influence--the voluntarist notion of a God who does 
whatever he pleases--was set aside by deists and 
2. The confrontational nature of this episode and others 
like it lends credence to the classic polemical accounts of 
John William Draper, Histor of the Conflict between 
Religion and Science New York: Appleton, 1874), and Andrew 
Dickson White, A History of the Warfare of Science with 
Theology in Christendom (2 Vols.~ New York: Appleton, 
1896). The shortcomings of the "warfare" school of 
historiography are, however, so serious as to warrant its 
wholesale rejection. See the first part of James R. Moore, 
The Post-Darwinian Controversies (Cambridge: UP, 1979), and 
the introduction to the forthcoming book Science and 
Christianity: A History, ed. David c. Lindberg and Ronald 
L. Numbers. 
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freethinkers. But the result of that influence--an 
empirical attitude toward nature--was retained. 
Divine freedom as a significant influence on early 
modern science? To the modern mind, accustomed to a 
radical separation of religion from almost every aspect of 
intellectual life, that sounds like a contradiction. But 
the modern world was not erected overnight by modern minds: 
it has emerged slowly from an older world shaped by minds 
not quite so modern._ That it still bears the marks of its 
history should not be surprising. 
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